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HENRY T. ROWELL

KEMP MALONE, BENJAMIN D. MERITT, JAMES H. OLIVER
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MASSILIAN DIPLOMACY BEFORE THE SECOND PUNIC WAR.

Roman and Greek historians devote slight attention to the rôle played by Massilia in the events or policies leading to the Second Punic War.¹ It has long been assumed, however, that Massilian influence on Roman policy was greater than would appear from the tradition,² and there are good grounds for supporting this view. To the evidence of friendly relations between Massilia and Rome dating at least from the fourth century B. C.³ may be added the assumption that these states would be mutually concerned about the eastward expansion of Carthaginian power in Spain. This concern grew increasingly more

¹ Massilia is not mentioned, except incidentally (Polybius, II, 32), until the end of the period between the First and Second Punic Wars, and then merely as the source of information sought by the Roman ambassadors returning from Carthage about the attitude of the Gauls in the impending struggle with Hannibal (Livy, XXI, 20). But Massilians may have been among the "other Greeks who dwelt in the neighborhood of Emporiae and in other parts of Spain" (Appian, *Iber.*, II, 7 [Loeb]) who sent ambassadors to Rome.

² Cf. B. L. Hallward, *C. A. H.*, VIII, p. 31: "Nor does the tradition sufficiently emphasize the effect of Massiliote diplomacy in urging Rome to challenge the eastward expansion of Carthage in Spain." The importance of Massilian diplomacy is noted also by T. Frank, *C. A. H.*, VII, pp. 809-10, *Roman Imperialism* (New York, 1914), pp. 121-2, H. Scullard, *A History of the Roman World from 753 to 146 B. C.* (London, 1935), p. 201, J. Nap, *Die Römische Republik* (Leiden, 1935), pp. 54-5, 226, and 338, G. De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani* (Turin, 1916), III, 1, pp. 307 and 410-12, A. Schulten, *C. A. H.*, VII, pp. 787-8, and F. Oertel, *Rh. Mus.*, LXXXI (1932), p. 224.

³ Diodorus Siculus, XIV, 93, 4, Appian, *Ital.*, VIII, 1, Justin, XLIII, 5, 8 ff.

acute when the Romans were in conflict with the Gauls, and the possibility of a Gallic-Carthaginian coalition had become serious. To such a threat the rapprochement of Massilia and Rome would be the natural response: by 218 the Massilians had become allies of Rome.⁴ It may, then, be taken for granted that diplomatic negotiations were conducted by Massilia and Rome before the Second Punic War dealing with the impact of developments in Spain and northern Italy upon their national security.

That the effectiveness of Massilian propaganda may be gauged by the degree to which it appealed to Rome's self-interest is recognized by Frank in his comments on the dispatch of the embassy to Hasdrubal in 226. "If Rome cared little for the question of open ports in Spain, the Massilians had other ways of arousing her interest. They could urge that a Punic attack upon Emporiae would be a declaration of war against Massilia, which, in turn, must involve Rome because of their alliance; and she could din into the ears of Roman senators the reports that were current in Spain that the ultimate purpose of the Barcids was a war of revenge upon Rome. Her diplomacy was effective, at any rate."⁵

It is here assumed that Rome at this time was alarmed by the direct threat of the Carthaginian expansion to herself. But in the twenty-year period between the First Punic War and the Saguntine episode, when Carthage was extending her power and steadily threatening Massilian trade and security, there were only two occasions when Rome was moved to intervene in Spain (in 231 and 226), in both instances under stress of danger from the Gauls. To the Roman Senate of this period Rome's self-interest—the key to her policy—was concerned not so much with the threat of the Carthaginian advance in Spain to Massilian trade (though this was undoubtedly a contributory factor) nor to Rome directly, as with the impact of the advance upon the Gauls and the possibility of their receiving active assistance from the Carthaginians.⁶

For a clear understanding of the motivation of the Roman government during these years it is essential to appreciate the gravity of the Gallic crisis and the vagueness to the Roman mind

⁴ Livy, *loc. cit.*

⁵ *Roman Imperialism*, p. 122.

⁶ See p. 10, *infra*.

of the danger from Carthage; Rome's primary concern and certainly her major resources were directed toward the defeat of the terrible Celtic barbarian. Polybius leaves no doubt of the impression left by these wars upon the contemporary mind: "Thus were destroyed these Celts during whose invasion (225), the most serious that had ever occurred, all the Italians and especially the Romans had been exposed to great and terrible peril."⁷ And again: "Such was the war against the Celts, a war which, if we look to the desperation and daring of the combatants and the numbers who took part and perished in the battles, is second to no war in history."⁸

The effectiveness of Massilia's propaganda can best be gauged, then, by her success in convincing the Romans that their peril from the Gauls would be enormously increased by the Carthaginian conquest of Spain. Her propaganda would become more effective in proportion as these potential dangers were focused in concrete and immediate crises and as their implications were understood by the Roman magistrates at the helm of the state during crucial periods. How did these dangers come into focus? What was the character of the Roman administration called upon to face them? To what extent was the administration aware of the larger issues involved and willing to meet them aggressively? The answers to these questions, in view of the silence of Roman tradition regarding Massilia's influence, may provide the approach to an understanding of what Roman policy in the North and West owed to her diplomacy.

Attempts to discover a consistent long-range foreign or domestic policy⁹ have not met with wide acceptance; Rome is

⁷ II, 31, 7 (Loeb).

⁸ *Idem*, II, 35, 2. Nap (*op. cit.*, p. 6) well portrays the intensity of Rome's concern.

⁹ E. g., the view that Rome sought to find a settlement with Carthage in the geo-political sense (E. Täubler, *Vorgeschichte des zweiten punischen Kriegs* [Berlin, 1921]); that Roman policy must be interpreted against a background of opposition between an agrarian party under Flamininus whose outlook was confined to Italy and a capitalistic group interested in *Weltpolitik* (Meyer, *op. cit.*); that Rome consistently sought to preserve the Italian race-federation (M. Gelzer, *Hermes*, LXVIII [1933], p. 151); that in Spain the Ebro River was intended to define Carthaginian and Roman "spheres of influence" (Frank, *Roman Imperialism*, p. 135, n. 28, lists several proponents of this point of view).

believed rather to have applied practical remedies to each situation as it arose.¹⁰ The history of this period, however, shows a marked consistency in the march of events themselves, with crises of similar character repeated at intervals (viz., in 231, 226 and, with the exception of the Gauls, 219). It would appear that certain noble Roman families, faced with recurring issues, were aligned in each instance into the same opposition groups, depending upon whether they favored intervention in Spain as an integral part of the program of national security or were convinced that defensible frontiers of the Italian peninsula were effective bulwarks against any danger that might arise. Continuity of senatorial policy as such cannot be found; it must be remembered, however, that, in this century, at least, we must not look for a governmental foreign policy comparable to that of modern states, a continuity of action generally undisturbed by changes of administration. The shaping of policy was, rather, in the hands of certain noble families who were constantly strengthening their ranks by the inclusion in their circles of lesser noble, and frequently plebeian, families, so that in general the course of foreign policy may be charted through the particular circles in control in critical periods, during which their reactions can be clearly discerned. This is neither to postulate a far-sighted policy nor to infer a lack of connection between the several phases of Rome's response to recurring perils. It is simply historical fact that, in precisely those years when Rome acted to forestall the possibility of a Gallic-Carthaginian coalition, members of the same or related circles (viz., the Aemilii and the democratic leaders) were in control of policy and were in each period opposed by the same group.

Scarcely three years after the First Punic War those developments began to be manifest which were characteristic of the next twenty-three years: the sporadic movements of the Gauls from the northwest, the efforts of the Roman government to keep the Carthaginians as far removed as possible from Italian shores, and the Carthaginian aggrandizement in Spain. Conflicts with the Ligurians throughout the years 238-236 are reported,¹¹ and

¹⁰ Scullard, *op. cit.*, p. 201, Frank, *op. cit.*, pp. 120-1 and *C. A. H.*, VII, p. 816. Täubler, *op. cit.*, pp. 79-80, believes that the attempt to formulate the opposition of parties drops the concrete aim from sight.

¹¹ Zonaras, VIII, 18; Livy, *Epit.*, XX; Orosius, IV, 12.

in 236 the Gauls were on the march toward Ariminum;¹² in 238 the Romans seized Sardinia (though its conquest and that of Corsica were not completed until 231); and the following year the Carthaginians, to rebuild their empire after the loss of Sicily and Sardinia, moved into Spain. By 235, however, the Romans closed the doors of the temple of Janus, believing that they had successfully quelled the disturbances in northern Italy and Sardinia.

In this initial phase, concluded by a symbolic act of peace by the consuls T. Manlius Torquatus and C. Atilius Bulbus II, there is slight indication of an aggressive foreign policy. Rome showed by the seizure of Sardinia, however, that she had come to appreciate the strategic value of the island to Carthage and was willing to take the necessary steps to make good her failure to include it in the peace terms of 241.¹³ With the campaigns against the Ligurians, perhaps prompted in part by Massilia's desire to rid her trade-routes of piracy,¹⁴ may be linked the invasion of Corsica in 236, for no settlement was permanent so long as the Corsicans and their kinsmen the Ligurians were able to assist one another against the Romans.¹⁵ The campaigns in

¹² Polybius, II, 21.

¹³ The seizure of Sardinia is variously interpreted: as part of a consistent policy of marking out a sphere of influence (Täubler, *op. cit.*, p. 77), as a move consequent upon Hamilcar's arrival in Spain (Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 387), as the result of a reversal of policy occasioned by the annual change of magistrates (Frank, *Roman Imperialism*, p. 113), as the desire to keep the Carthaginians out of territory adjacent to Italy (Scullard, *op. cit.*, p. 180). It seems clear that the demands of national security were justification enough in the Roman mind for seizing the island.

¹⁴ Cf. Scullard, *op. cit.*, p. 184. Though not directly threatened by the periodic movements of the Gauls into Italy, Massilia was nevertheless on the periphery of the storm area: in the region above Massilia the Gauls, among them the Gaesati, were massing in 231 for their offensive against Rome six years later (cf. Polybius, II, 22-23). Moreover, Sardinia and Corsica, particularly in the hands of the Carthaginians, could become a powerful sea-blockade against Massilia (F. Altheim, *Weltherrschaft und Krise Epochen der römischen Geschichte* [Frankfurt am Main, 1935], II, p. 23).

¹⁵ G. Giannelli, *Istituto di Studi Romani, Storia di Romani*, II: *Roma nell' età delle Guerre Puniche* (Bologna, 1938), p. 109; Scullard, *loc. cit.*

Sardinia and northern Italy were already bringing to the attention of the Roman government the wider implications of extra-peninsular expansion.¹⁶

The developments initiated in 238 appear in sharp relief in the years 233-231. This period is marked by intense rivalry between the leading noble families and by the growth of democratic power under the leadership of Flaminius. In these years the Gauls were busy with preparations for war upon Italy, and Hamilcar was advancing with alarming rapidity in Spain. In 231 the Romans intervened in Spain for the first time. The simultaneity of these events is no mere coincidence: the Roman government was awakened, perhaps by Massilia,¹⁷ to the realization that the dual threat from the West and the North might soon become one, and the effect of this contingency upon Rome's foreign policy would be sure to sharpen whatever differences there were between the leading factions. For it was by no means clear at this time how far Rome must go to secure her boundaries without committing herself to involvement in the western Mediterranean.

It is impossible to determine how those circles which were in control of foreign policy aligned themselves from 238 to 233.¹⁸ But from 233 to 230 the maze of political alliances and the cross-currents of opposition are well marked. The ascendancy of the powerful Fabius Maximus Verrucosus comes in a period of pronounced Aemilian and democratic dominance.¹⁹ This singular fact is regarded by Münzer²⁰ as evidence of an alliance between

¹⁶ Cf. Frank, *Roman Imperialism*, p. 114: "The incident (the seizure of Sardinia) is highly important in showing that Rome was acquiring . . . a wider view of her possible interest in neighboring lands."

¹⁷ See p. 9, *infra*.

¹⁸ The consuls of 238, Ti. Sempronius Gracchus and P. Valerius Falto, belonged to the Claudian circle (W. Schur, *Das Erbe der Alten* [Leipzig, 1927], Neue Folge, XIII, pp. 115-16, and *Hermes*, LIX [1924], p. 471); no one family enjoyed control in 237 and 236. The influence of the Fabian circle begins in 235 in the consulship of T. Manlius and C. Atilius Bulbus II (F. Münzer, *Römische Adelsparteien und Adelsfamilien* [Stuttgart, 1920], p. 57, Schur, *Das Erbe der Alten*, p. 108).

¹⁹ Of the eight consuls of 233-230 Fabius is the sole outsider, all the others being members of the Aemilian circle (see pp. 12-13, *infra*).

²⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 184. Schur (*Das Erbe der Alten*, p. 110) rightly believes that Fabius was "in scharfer Kampfstellung" to the Aemilii.

Fabius and the Aemilii, but all developments in these and later years point to the contrary. The emergence of democratic influence, apparent not only in the plebeian consulships of the Pomponii, M. Junius Pera, and M. Publicius Malleolus,²¹ but particularly in the tribuneship of Flamininus, is significantly illustrated by the success of the tribune's agrarian bill (to allot to Roman citizens the *ager Gallicus*) against the opposition of the Senate. But, as it will be seen, the issues went deeper than the traditional conflict between patrician and plebeian and were more complex. Flamininus' measure had a bearing on foreign as well as on domestic policy, and there were noble families in sympathy with its wider implications.²² How were these internal political struggles inter-related? To what extent were they touched off by the mounting threat of war? What relation do they bear to the measures taken by the Roman government to forestall it?

The immediate concern of the government was the Sardinian question. In 235 the Sardinians and Corsicans revolted, purportedly at the instigation of the Carthaginians, and the Ligurians likewise renewed the conflict.²³ The persistence of Rome's efforts to reduce these peoples has surprised some modern writers,²⁴ and it is indeed difficult to explain unless the im-
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²¹ It is noteworthy that the consuls of 233-231 were all, with the exception of Fabius, previously obscure figures: the families of M. Aemilius Lepidus and C. Papirius Maso had long been in obscurity, and the plebeian Pomponii and Publicius were the only representatives of their families to reach the consulship (Münzer, *op. cit.*, pp. 160-1). Their elevation is attributed by Frank (*C. A. H.*, VII, p. 806) to the democratic ferment made possible by the reform of the centuries, but the date of this reform is uncertain and Nap may be right (*op. cit.*, p. 175) in referring it to the year 225, since, along with chronological considerations, the impending war might well call for comprehensive revision. Internal political developments, moreover, will hardly suffice to explain the concentration of these hitherto little known persons in positions of the highest responsibility within this three-year period. The explanation of their ascendancy must take into account the impact upon Roman politics of external events.

²² See pp. 10-11, *infra*.

²³ Zonaras, *loc. cit.*

²⁴ Cf. Frank, *C. A. H.*, VII, p. 805. Meyer (*op. cit.*, pp. 385, n. 1, 387, n. 2, 389) rejects the charges against Carthage (made first in the year 237 according to Livy, Epit., XX; Orosius, IV, 11, 2; Eutropius,

tations of Carthaginian complicity are taken seriously. In the light of Polybius' statement that the resentment of Carthage over the loss of Sardinia was among the causes of the Hannibalic War,²⁵ it seems natural to suppose that Carthage would seek to embarrass the Romans by fomenting rebellion among the natives. But whether the charges were well founded or not, the fact that they had gained currency reveals that the Roman government was alive to what Carthaginian intervention might mean; the islands were, in fact, a laboratory demonstration of the seriousness of focalized infection.

Far more serious, however, was the danger to the north. In 233 Fabius had extended the Roman dominion beyond Genoa; the following year Flaminius' agrarian bill to apportion the *ager Gallicus* among the citizens served notice to the Gauls that Roman policy had gone beyond the stage of periodic skirmishing. The conviction was growing on both sides that a crisis was imminent:²⁶ the Boii and Insubres formed a league and enlisted the aid of the Gaesati near the Rhone; the Romans countered with feverish if confused preparations for defense. Polybius, following the Fabian interpretation, fixes the responsibility for inciting the Gauls on Flaminius, a reflection of the opinion of some conservative senators that the division of the *ager Gallicus* was the step which convinced the Gauls "that now the Romans no longer made war on them for the sake of supremacy and sovereignty, but with a view to their total expulsion and extermination."²⁷ In answer to this charge it is argued that the war

III, 2) as unhistorical; Giannelli (*loc. cit.*) considers them authentic. Polybius' silence on Carthaginian intervention is not surprising: the Fabian circle dominating Roman policy during these years, when the government was disinclined to renew the conflict with Carthage, would hardly circulate these inflammatory reports.

²⁵ III, 13, 1: *συνεπέτεινε δ' αὐτῶν* [*Πρωμαλῶν*] *τὴν ὁργὴν . . . τὰ κατὰ Σαρδόνα.*

²⁶ *Idem*, II, 22, Cicero, *De Officiis*, I, 38. M. Gelzer (*Hermes*, LXVIII [1933], p. 150) believes that "nicht das Plebisitz an und für sich, sondern seine Durchführung die Boier beunruhigte," apparently accepting 228 as the year in which the bill was passed. The evidence for the date is contradictory, Polybius (II, 21, 7-8) assigning the bill to 232, Cicero (*De Sen.*, 11) to 228. Münzer (*R.-E.*, s. v. "Flaminius," col. 2497) is probably right in his conjecture that the distribution of land extended up to the latter year.

²⁷ II, 21, 9 (Loeb).

with the Gauls did not come until the eighth year after the division of Picenum,²⁸ that the subjugation of the Po region was a long-standing policy.²⁹ But Polybius is right to the extent that the Gauls recognized how different a policy of permanent settlement³⁰ was from the annual campaigns which the Romans had hitherto conducted whenever danger seemed to threaten. If the Gauls and certain conservative senators could foresee the consequences of this settlement, it is hardly less probable that the sponsor of the bill himself and those who supported it were aware of them.

But before the pattern of Roman policy toward the Gauls can be drawn more precisely, it will be necessary to consider its relation to developments in Spain. Hamilcar had been moving steadily northward and was not far from Saguntum, with which Massilia had trade relations. Alarmed by the growing threat to her trade along the east coast of Spain, Massilia must have apprised the Senate of the gravity of these developments in the hope that Rome would intervene to check the Carthaginian advance. The moment which Massilia chose to make her appeal was indeed unpropitious: events in distant Spain could scarcely have seemed urgent to a Senate absorbed in the danger from the Gauls. But the advantages derivable from these negotiations were by no means unilateral: Rome reaped the benefits of Massilia's position as a friendly observation post between her potential enemies.³¹ From her vantage point Massilia could see the storm forming in two directions; she could hardly have failed to point out the significance of these movements to Rome. And the controlling circle in the Roman government at this time showed itself capable of understanding the relationship of a

²⁸ Cf. Polybius, II, 23, 1: ἔτει μετὰ τὴν τῆς χώρας διάδοσιν δύοδόφ. De Sanctis, *op. cit.*, p. 305; Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 397.

²⁹ Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 395.

³⁰ If the alliance with the Veneti and Cenomani fell in this period (Meyer, *loc. cit.*) rather than in 225 (Polybius, II, 23, followed by Nap, *op. cit.*, pp. 11, 59), it would strengthen the Gauls' conviction (if they knew of the alliance) that Rome was in northern Italy to stay.

³¹ The movements of the Gauls' allies, the Gaesati, who lived near the Rhone, were doubtless relayed to Rome by Massilia. Strabo, IV, 1, 5, and 9, suggests Massilia's value to Rome as a guard against any hostile assault on the south coast of Gaul (cf. Chester Starr, *A.J.P.*, LXIV [1943], p. 58, n. 5).

stable frontier in northern Italy to the progress of Carthage in Spain. In 231 an embassy was dispatched to Hamilcar to secure information concerning his movements and intentions.³²

The adoption of an aggressive and far-reaching policy in northern Italy and the decision, in view of Massilian alarm over Hamilcar's advance and of the danger to Rome if the Carthaginians should proffer aid to the Gauls, to intervene for the first time in Spain fall in a period when the Aemilian party was in the ascendancy and when democratic influence was at its height.³³ From this fact two premises may be made: (1) that the Aemilian party was aware in these years,³⁴ as in 226-225, of the broader implications of national security and was accordingly receptive to Massilian propaganda, and (2) that Flaminius' measure, which must be considered in its wider context as a step to stabilize the northern frontier as well as a move in the arena of domestic politics to strengthen the plebeians, was an integral part—in fact if not in intention—of the foreign policy of the Aemilian consuls of this period.³⁵ The program of the Aemilii

³² Dio, frag. 48: πρέσβεις ποτὲ ἐπὶ κατασκοπῆ . . . ἀπέστειλαν.

³³ That this is not mere coincidence is clear from the recurrence of the situation in 226-225.

³⁴ In 230, according to Zonaras (VIII, 19), the Romans forbade the giving of gold or silver to the Gauls because they feared that the money might be used against themselves; the law is discussed by Nap, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-6, 354.

³⁵ Nap (*op. cit.*) devotes a chapter (VII) to the conflict between Flaminius and M. Aemilius Lepidus over the passing of the agrarian bill of 232, basing his argument chiefly on Valerius Maximus, V, 4, 5: . . . cum (C. Flaminius) tribunus plebis legem de Gallico agro viritim dividendo invito et repugnante senatu promulgasset, precibus minisque eius acerrime resistens ac ne exercitu quidem adversum se conscripto, si in eadem sententia perseveraret, absterritus. . . . Of the opposition of the Senate to the bill there is, of course, no doubt (cf. Polybius II, 21, 8; Cicero, *De Inv.*, II, 52, *Acad. Pr.*, II, 13, *De Sen.*, 11). But except for Valerius Maximus, the tradition makes no mention of calling out the army, for Cicero says only that the bill was passed *invito senatu*, and Polybius concerns himself with its supposed demoralizing influence and its provocative effect upon the Gauls. Moreover it was Fabius, rather than Aemilius, who was presiding over the Senate when the bill was under discussion (cf. p. 13, n. 46, *infra*). The local political ramifications of the *lex Flaminia* may have been much greater than the tradition would lead us to suppose. It may, for example, have provided for the commission to allot the land and have sought to insure the success of

and the democratic consuls of the Aemilian party and that of Flaminini converged at the point at which aggressive action to establish a strong frontier against the Gauls was related to the policy of committing Rome to a possible intervention beyond the borders of Italy.

The concrete expression of these policies may be observed clearly in the reactions of the Roman government in Spain and in northern Italy, and in the conflicts and maneuvering in Rome between candidates for high office.

As we have said, it was to Rome's advantage to keep in touch with Massilia; doubtless at Massilia's suggestion³⁶ Rome sent an embassy to Hamilcar. The assumptions, drawn from Dio's account,³⁷ that the ambassadors were authorized to do no more than to investigate the reasons for the Carthaginian advance and that they returned apparently satisfied with Hamilcar's explanation that his conquests were necessary to furnish the means for paying the indemnity imposed by the peace terms of 241, would indeed afford no ground for concluding that Rome entertained serious intentions of intervening in Spain. Yet one may well ask why Rome should have signed a treaty with Saguntum in this year³⁸ if she did not intend to act upon a

the program by legal curbs upon the magistrates who might attempt to disrupt it (cf. Nap, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-120). With such provisions Aemilius probably was no more in sympathy than were the other senators, and he may even have shared the view that Roman settlers in the *ager Gallicus* would be exposed to the fury of the Gauls rather than form a bulwark against them (*ibid.*, pp. 2, 54). But whatever Aemilius' personal attitude toward the aggressive tribune or his view of the regulatory provisions of the *lex Flaminia* may have been, the program of his own circle of intervening in Spain in the face of the mounting threat of Gallic invasion was integrally related to the attempt of Flaminini to strengthen the northern frontier; however divergent the roots of their policies, the movement of events brought their aims into close alignment.

³⁶ Hallward, *op. cit.*, p. 27; cf. Schulten, *op. cit.*, p. 787.

³⁷ *Loc. cit.*

³⁸ Täubler's conjecture (*op. cit.*, p. 44) that the treaty was signed in 231 is generally accepted, e. g., by Frank (*C. A. H.*, VII, p. 809), P. Schnabel (*Klio*, XX [1926], p. 111), Oertel (*loc. cit.*); E. Groag (*Hannibal als Politiker* [Vienna, 1929], p. 55) argues for 221-220. Polybius (III, 30) says only that the treaty was arranged several years before the time of Hannibal: *πλείσιν ἔτεσιν ἡδη πρότερον τῶν κατ' Ἀννίβαν καιρῶν.*

renewal of the Carthaginian threat. Since, as Dio says,³⁹ Rome had as yet no interests in Spain, the treaty is indicative of a claim to intervene when potential danger threatened—a policy very different from that of manning the bulwarks whenever the foe appeared. The administration in these years was prepared to establish a diplomatic foothold in the West as well as a military frontier in the North.⁴⁰

That this frontier was the concern of the extreme aristocrats, Fabius and Marcellus, there can be no doubt: the former in these years and the latter in 222 vigorously pursued the war against the Gauls.⁴¹ But they did so only when war was upon them. The Fabian party had had ample incentive to adopt measures for a permanently effective defense when the Gauls threatened Ariminum in 236⁴² and an excellent opportunity to do so through their control of policy in the years immediately following. Their inaction means simply that they saw the Gallic danger in a narrower context than did the Aemilian party and Flaminius, and that they were apparently content to meet the crises as they arose rather than to commit Rome to what they may have believed to be provocative moves to forestall hypothetical perils.

In the light of these differences over foreign policy, let us examine the internal political struggles of 233-230. Intimations of the intense conflict between rival factions in this period appear in the attempts of each group to bolster its forces. The Aemilian house was strengthened by the elevation to the consulship of the plebeian Pomponii, Publicius, and M. Junius Pera, lifelong foe of Fabius, and the patrician C. Papirius Maso. The significance of these political relationships can be judged from the close marriage bonds which linked the Pomponii and Papirius with the Aemilii as well as from their association in

³⁹ *Loc. cit.*: καὶ περ μηδὲν μηδέπω τῶν Ἰβηρικῶν σφίσι προσηκόντων.

⁴⁰ Altheim (*op. cit.*, p. 52) would place Rome's interest in Saguntum after the Celtic War of 225, but Rome must at this time have seen the advantage Saguntum afforded (like Massilia) as an observation post in the area of enemy activity.

⁴¹ Scullard, *Scipio Africanus in the Second Punic War* (Cambridge, 1930), p. 35.

⁴² Nap (*op. cit.*, p. 2) believes that the conquest of the Po should have been risked in 238, after the Gauls had unsuccessfully attacked.

the pontifical college.⁴³ The conclusion is inescapable that the ascendancy to power of these previously little-known men may be attributed to the machinations of the Aemilii,⁴⁴ employing to their own advantage the wave of democratic influence.

In view of the enhanced position of the Aemilii and the influence of Flamininus, Fabius' strength at this time is remarkable. He had not, indeed, been idle: he had helped secure the consulship of 234 for L. Postumius, who in turn had assured the election of Fabius as his successor the following year.⁴⁵ As consul, Fabius led the opposition in the Senate to Flamininus' agrarian measure.⁴⁶ In a drastic move for power, Fabius, through his control of the college of augurs, removed from the censorship two former members of his own circle, Q. Fulvius Flaccus and T. Manlius Torquatus, in 231 despite their seniority, in order to clear the path for his own election as censor for the next year.⁴⁷ Almost by his own efforts, then, Fabius maintained his position in the face of a powerfully entrenched Aemilian circle and of an aroused popular group who looked to Flamininus for leadership.

The traditional cleavage between patrician and plebeian appears in this case to be complicated by a major division in the Senate itself, for the Fabian party was ranged not only against the Aemilii, but, one may infer, against the Cornelii, who had close connections with the Aemilii as early as the First Punic War, the alienated Fulvii and Manlii, and perhaps the Claudi, since by 225 they were ranged beside the Aemilii. The schism

⁴³ The brothers Pomponii were related to the Scipios through the marriage of their sister Pomponia to P. Cornelius Scipio, consul of 218. The close connections between the Scipios and the Aemilii dating from the First Punic War were cemented by the marriage of Aemilia, daughter of L. Aemilius Paullus, consul of 219, to P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus. The son of Paullus married Papiria, daughter of C. Papirius Maso, consul of 231. Between the families of M. Junius Pera and the Aemilii there had been affiliations long before this time. (For a complete discussion of family relationships and associations in the pontifical college, see Münzer, *op. cit.*, pp. 157, 160-164).

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 416.

⁴⁵ Fabius' consulship in 228 was likewise secured through the efforts of a Postumius (Albinus II), consul the previous year.

⁴⁶ For almost five months Fabius' consulship was coterminous with the tribunate of Flamininus (cf. Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 390).

⁴⁷ Fulvius thereupon moved his entire family into the camp of the Claudi (Schur, *Das Erbe der Alten*, pp. 111-112).

might very probably have weakened the opposition to Flaminius' measure. But the major inference to be drawn from the alignment of parties in 232-230 is that it reflects in the steps taken by Rome in northern Italy and Spain a rapprochement of the Aemilian consuls and the democratic group in a program integrated by the external pressure of Rome's potential foes, the Gauls and the Carthaginians. This policy, if not directly the result of Massilian diplomacy, was at least crystallized by Massilia's alarming reports, and the Massilians on their part found dominant factions in Rome ready to give serious consideration to these reports.⁴⁸

The steps taken in 232-230 apparently being regarded as sufficient, interest seems to have been diverted from affairs in Spain to more immediate issues such as the campaign against Teuta and to domestic problems. The Aemiliii, who were identified with the policy of intervention in Spain, were unable to maintain their dominant position and were replaced by members of the Fabian party.

Within a few years, however, Rome's attention was directed to the advance of the Carthaginian power in Spain, and the Romans determined to concern themselves again with Spanish affairs.⁴⁹ The influence of Massilia is once more apparent; it was doubtless upon the assumption of command by Hasdrubal in 229 that she renewed to Rome her protestations of alarm. And in 226 she may have proved of signal value to Rome in reporting an impending invasion of the Gauls, whose preparations for war she could keep under scrutiny in the region above her.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Nap (*op. cit.*, pp. 54-55, 269, and 338) believes that Rome was prompted to conclude a treaty with Massilia in 229/228 in order to forestall the coalition of the Gauls and the Carthaginians and that the treaty contained provisions for mutual aid. Although his conjecture rests upon the somewhat tenuous grounds of associating the treaty with the introduction of the Massilian Artemis to Rome, of identifying the Greeks (in the account of the burial alive of a Greek and a Gallic couple in 228) as Massilians, and of supposing that the treaty antedated those with the *nomen Latinum*, there is a core of probability in the assumption that Rome stood to gain much from an alliance with Massilia in the years 231-225.

⁴⁹ Polybius, II, 13, 3.

⁵⁰ Cf. Frank, *C. A. H.*, VII, p. 810.

The Gallic unrest, although part of a long, periodic movement, was doubtless fanned by the progress during this period of the settlement of the *ager Gallicus* in accordance with Flaminius' measure; for the attempt to stabilize the northern frontier had the effect of provoking alarm among the Gallic tribes. Thus the Fabian regime began to feel the pressure of the forces which had precipitated the crisis of 231.

These forces, already astir in 238 and sufficiently developed by 231 to provoke Roman intervention in Spain, had in 226-225 converged with momentous import.⁵¹ The long period during which the Romans and the Gauls had met in occasional skirmishes was over: the Gauls were now mustering their forces for a decisive struggle; revolt flared in Sardinia, and the Carthaginians, whose resources had appeared to be exhausted at the conclusion of peace in 241, were steadily rebuilding their empire by the conquest of Spain, apparently unmoved by the threat of Roman interference implicit in the Saguntine treaty. The persistent warnings of Massilia⁵² could not be ignored or discounted: the combination of Gallic and Carthaginian power, a potential threat in 231, was now capable of imminent realization.⁵³ For whatever Hasdrubal's intentions may have been,⁵⁴ it is clear that

⁵¹ So important does Nap (*op. cit.*) regard the year 225 that he relates the political and religious activity of the Romans between the First and Second Punic Wars either directly or indirectly to that year. While most of the connections seen between political measures and religious moves are admittedly conjectural, Nap puts the historian of Rome in his debt by focusing attention upon the epochal significance of the year 225.

⁵² Cf. Appian, *Iber.*, II, 7: "The Saguntines . . . and all the other Greeks who dwelt in the neighbourhood of Emporiae and in other parts of Spain, having apprehensions for their safety, sent ambassadors to Rome" (Loeb). There can be no doubt but that Massilians were among the ambassadors. Frank asserts (*loc. cit.*) that Rome came to a complete understanding with Massilia at this time.

⁵³ Cf. De Sanctis, *op. cit.*, p. 412, Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 395, Nap, *op. cit.*, p. 58, *passim*, M. Rostovtzeff, *A History of the Ancient World*, Vol. II: *Rome* (Oxford, 1927), pp. 63-64, Scullard, *A History of the Roman World from 753 to 146 B.C.*, p. 194.

⁵⁴ Frank (*C. A. H.*, VII, p. 809) believes that at this time Rome was needlessly afraid; that the real danger came later, in Hannibal's strategy. But the Romans in 226 could not have afforded to assume that the Carthaginians would not make common cause with the Gauls; in

a unique opportunity lay before him, a prospect which, had it come seven years later, might have altered materially the outcome of the Hannibalic War.

Once more the Romans turned to those men who they felt were competent to deal with the intricate character and far-reaching implications of the problems facing them. For Rome was no longer able to pursue an independent course without reference to the impact of peoples to the east, north, and west. The Illyrian campaign of 229, the first embassy to Greece the following year, and the increasing gravity of the danger from the Gauls and the Carthaginians committed the Romans to a wider outlook, a point of view which those conservative senators now in control found it difficult to grasp, or at least to implement, while the influence of Flaminius and the democratic element, mounting steadily in these years, provided an inner dynamic disturbing to the supremacy of the Fabii. As a result, while the Fabii were able to secure the election to the consulship of M. Valerius Messala and C. Atilius Regulus for 226 and 225 respectively, the plebeian strength revealed in the elevation to the consulship of L. Apustius Fullo in 226 and the comprehensive coalition of the Claudii and the Aemilii⁵⁵ the following year brought resistance to Fabius to a climactic phase and marked the beginning of the mastery of the Aemilian party.

A glance at the list of magistrates reveals the strength of the Aemilii. The Fabian representative in the consulship, Atilius, was matched by L. Aemilius Papus; the censors were M. Junius Pera, Aemilian consul of 230, and C. Claudius Centho, whose election was doubtless due to the aforementioned coalition of the Claudii and the Aemilii.⁵⁶

The issues confronting this administration were an inheritance, since the Fabian-dominated government after 230 had not acted upon them, from the Aemilian regime of 231—viz., the extent to which Rome should interfere in Spain to safeguard the interests of her ally, Massilia, and relieve the threat of Carthaginian

framing the Ebro Treaty they were reacting to what they rightly conceived to be a genuine threat. Altheim (*op. cit.*, pp. 50-51) and Nap (*loc. cit.*) are therefore correct in assuming that the Romans believed that the time was ripe for checking the Carthaginian advance.

⁵⁵ Cf. Schur, *Das Erbe der Alten*, p. 116.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

intervention in the impending Gallic conflict. "For the present they did not venture to impose orders on Carthage, or to go to war with her, because the threat of a Celtic invasion was hanging over them, the attack being indeed expected from day to day. They decided, then, to smooth down and conciliate Hasdrubal in the first place, and then to attack the Celts and decide the issue by arms. . . ." ⁵⁷ The outcome of this decision was the Ebro Treaty, stipulating that the Carthaginians should not cross the Ebro River under arms.

The attitude of the Romans in framing the treaty was in marked contrast to their former peremptory treatment of the Carthaginians, but Polybius' terms "smooth down" (*καταψήσαντες*) and "conciliate" (*παίνιντες*) are misleading. In so far as Rome acted in her own interests to secure a temporary respite from the threat of Carthaginian interference in her war with the Gauls, she was, of course, on the defensive, and the advantages afforded by the treaty weighed more heavily in her favor. But from the point of view of her championing the cause of Massilia, with the concomitant commitment to long-range and decisive action involved in the limiting of Hasdrubal's advance, Rome showed that she was prepared to challenge the progress of Carthaginian expansion northward. And Hasdrubal, although the agreement did not prevent him from completing the conquest of Spain up to the Ebro and even freed him from the fear that the Romans might incite rebellion among the recently subdued Spanish tribes in the rear, nevertheless, by his willingness to sign the treaty, recognized Rome as a power able to arbitrate in Spain.⁵⁸ This achievement, similar to that of the administration of 231 in the understanding of the problem and in the plane of its solution, must be credited to the Aemilian consuls.

But how far does the treaty reveal the concern of the government in safeguarding the interests of its ally? So far as we know, there was no clause limiting the commercial encroachment of Carthage north of the Ebro River; the Massilian colonies to the south, Hemeroscopium, Aloris, and Alicante, were forfeited.

⁵⁷ Polybius, II, 13 (Loeb).

⁵⁸ Cf. Oertel, *op. cit.*, p. 222, who quotes W. Otto (*Hist. Zeitschr.*, CXLV [1932], p. 509): "die in Spanien neben den Karthagern entscheiden könne."

Yet Massilia had good reason to be satisfied: Rome's intervention was in itself a triumph of Massilian diplomacy, and Rome might have been content to draw the line of demarcation still farther north.⁵⁹ Massilia must have realized that under the circumstances Rome had gone as far as she could.

Thus Rome secured the northwestern flank, and the presence of the consul Atilius in Sardinia⁶⁰ forestalled a renewal of trouble from that quarter. The government, then, effectively checked at their sources long-menacing disturbances, the simultaneous eruption of which would have proved disastrous in this crisis.

The successful prosecution of the war by the Aemilian administration insured the support of the Senate; the Romans were encouraged "to hope that they would be able entirely to expel the Celts from the plain of the Po; and the consuls of the next year (224), Quintus Fulvius and Titus Manlius, were sent against them with a formidable expeditionary force."⁶¹ This was a logical move if the policies of the administration were to be brought to fulfillment, but it is noteworthy as indicative of a general sentiment which, if it was not imperialistic, at least revealed an interest in expansion. The leaven of war and of the rapid unfolding of a broader foreign policy was working upon popular opinion, while the influence of those who, like the Fabii, had been protagonists of the status quo declined. The eclipse of the Fabian party is apparent in the election of Fulvius and Manlius, representatives of the Claudian and Aemilian factions, as well as in the growing strength of Flaminius.

⁵⁹ Scullard (*op. cit.*, p. 194) suggests that the Romans might have fixed the limits at the Pyrenees; Oertel (*op. cit.*, p. 225) sees the treaty as a compromise, Rome having sought to confine Carthage to a line south of Saguntum. I cannot agree with Schulten's view (*op. cit.*, p. 788) that the limit set was "a very considerable concession by Rome": the Ebro River boundary accomplished her primary purpose of preventing Carthaginian aid to the Gauls.

⁶⁰ This, in view of the imminence of the Gallic invasion, has evoked surprise from Meyer (*op. cit.*, p. 396; cf. Gelzer, *op. cit.*, p. 150). But it is consistent with Rome's policy of taking seriously any trouble in the island she had wrested from Carthage. Nap (*op. cit.*, p. 56) is clearly right in attributing it to Roman anxiety over a coalition of the Gauls and Carthaginians.

⁶¹ Polybius, II, 31 (Loeb).

There is little question but that Flaminius was a powerful force in these years, perhaps, as Meyer suggests,⁶² the real leader. His strengthening of the frontier through the settlement of the *ager Gallicus* had proved to be a sound measure of defense; the administration of the government was in the hands of noble families whose own policies were advanced by his program, with the Senate, too, apparently favoring expansion northward; popular influence, partly as a result of his own efforts, was finding expression in a succession of plebeian consulships; and his powerful opponents, the Fabian faction, had been compelled to relinquish for the time their dominant position. The movement of outer events had given heightened significance to what might otherwise have been merely a popular revolt against senatorial land capitalists, and Flaminius' leadership of a vigorous plebeian element placed him in the forefront of Roman politics. In 223 he was elected consul.

That Flaminius was the acknowledged leader of those plebeians in the Aemilian circle who reached the consulship cannot be proved, nor would tradition support the inference that the Aemilii and their colleagues were in close alliance with Flaminius and the democratic group, but their contemporaneous emergence to power in 233-230, the integration of their programs in 225-224, and their continuing association⁶³ in the highest magistracies from this time until the opening years of the Hannibalic War are cogent grounds for believing that in their recognition (to which Massilia had set the spark) of the need for Rome's pursuing a broader and more aggressive policy, and in their mutual conflict with Fabius, the Aemilii and Flaminius were united.

Flaminius' consulship, in conjunction with that of P. Furius Philus,⁶⁴ now gave him the opportunity of carrying out the pro-

⁶² *Op. cit.*, p. 398. Meyer, however, regards Flaminius' influence as extending only to domestic politics. Schur (*op. cit.*, p. 17) believes that Flaminius and Fabius were in agreement over domestic, but opposed in outer, policies. But these views fail to account for the fact that the periods of his preëminence are either inaugurated by, or help to inaugurate, crises in foreign affairs.

⁶³ Together with the Scipios, who, after 222, shared the consulship.

⁶⁴ A member of the Aemilian circle closely connected with the Scipios (Münzer, *op. cit.*, p. 250, Schur, *op. cit.*, p. 121).

gram of expansion⁶⁵ for which his agrarian measure and the invasion of the Gauls had prepared the way. But although the Senate was at last ready to carry through to completion the subjugation of the Gauls, opposition to Flaminius as general resulted in his recall, on the ground that terrifying omens had been observed.⁶⁶ This is clearly the work of Fabius, who, as head of the college of augurs, did not scruple to employ his office to the embarrassment of his enemy. The Senate, moreover, would be reluctant to see Flaminius' reputation enhanced by a triumph and perhaps favored his recall before he could claim a victory. But the people voted him the triumph despite senatorial opposition, and although he and his colleague abdicated a month before the expiration of their term, Flaminius' stature was increased rather than diminished. The campaign was reopened in 222 by the consuls Cn. Cornelius Scipio Calvus and M. Claudius Marcellus, a plebeian of aristocratic sympathies whose military ambitions could now be satisfied.

As soon as the pacification of northern Italy was assured, the Romans intervened again in Spain. It is unlikely that the Aemilian administration, which had been at the helm of the state since 226, had lost sight of developments in Spain after the signing of the Ebro Treaty; the stabilization of the Po region was of immediate concern, and Spanish affairs did not press for settlement. But when Hannibal opened the vigorous campaigns of 221 and 220, the Massilian colonies and Saguntum once again grew apprehensive, the Saguntines appealing repeatedly to Rome,⁶⁷ so that the Carthaginian question became a live issue on the agenda of the consuls of 220.

The political factions which had been receptive to Massilian propaganda in 231 and 226 were grouped to a remarkable degree in the present administration. The Aemilian circle had reached the peak of its power;⁶⁸ and the strength of plebeian influence

⁶⁵ Flaminius attacked the Insubres through the territory of the Anares, not far from Massilia (Polybius, II, 32; cf. Plutarch, *Marcellus*, 4).

⁶⁶ Cf. Zonaras, VIII, 20.

⁶⁷ Polybius, III, 15, 1.

⁶⁸ The consuls of 221 were P. Cornelius Scipio Asina and M. Minucius Rufus, whose house had long been in the Aemilian circle and later was faithful to Scipio Africanus (Schur, *op. cit.*, p. 121); in this year L. Cornelius Caudinus replaced as pontifex maximus L. Caecilius Metellus.

is apparent in the consulships of M. Minucius Rufus and C. Lutatius Catulus, in the elevation of Flaminius to the censorship (together with L. Aemilius Papus, consul of 225), and in the democratic composition of the Senate of 220.⁶⁹ The mastery of the group most appreciative of the implications of Rome's newly-won position of international importance⁷⁰ thus coincided with a vigorous popular movement centered in the censorship of Flaminius⁷¹ which enabled plebeian representatives to participate in the formulation of major policies of the state.

It might be expected, then, that this administration would interpret widely the Carthaginian issue as presented by the Massilian and Saguntine envoys. It was not a question merely of assisting an ally, nor again of Rome's acting in her own defense, as in the Gallic crises of 231 and 226. Confident of her power, Rome was now in a position to exploit the advantages

In 220 one of the consuls was L. Veturius Philo, a close friend of the Scipios, Aemilii, and Livii; the colleague of Flaminius in the censorship was L. Aemilius Papus.

⁶⁹ Cf. E. Cavaignac's study, *Rev. Ét. Lat.*, X (1932), particularly p. 466: "Sur 300 sénateurs, 190 avaient passé par le tribunat, dont quatre-vingts n'avaient géré que cette charge."

⁷⁰ Frank (*Roman Imperialism*, p. 134, n. 15) says of the foreign policy of Scipio Africanus: "Scipio's whole career proves him an anti-imperialist." But the association of the Scipios with the Aemilii in the policies leading to Rome's participation in western Mediterranean affairs indicates that they were intimately concerned with wider issues. Cf. Schur (*op. cit.*, p. 17): "Das Geschlecht der Scipionen hat . . . soweit uns die Überlieferung das zu sehen gestattet, immer zu der weiter ausschauenden Partei gehalten." And again (p. 18): "So überkam unser Scipio von seiner Vorfahren eine grosse Tradition weitausschauender Politik . . . Der Horizont der Scipionen war nicht durch die Küsten Italiens begrenzt, sondern umfasste zum mindesten den ganzen Westen des Mittelmeergebiets." This is also the view of Scullard (*Scipio Africanus*, p. 36).

⁷¹ The significance of Flaminius' censorship is recognized by Meyer (*op. cit.*, pp. 398-399) and Münzer (*R.-E.*, s. v. "Flaminius," col. 2498): "Leider gibt die hier besonders lückenhafte Tradition kein klares Bild von der grossen Bedeutung dieser Censur." The scope of his program is suggested by the probability that he proposed a revision of the entire constitution of the centuries (Münzer, *loc. cit.*, following Mommsen, *Staatsrecht*, III, pp. 270-271, 281, 436). For 225 as the date of revision see Nap, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

secured by the Gallic campaigns⁷² and the Ebro Treaty, and it was to her interest to intervene in Spain before the expansion and consolidation of Carthaginian strength necessitated war. The clash between the Saguntines and the Torboletae had afforded Rome the opportunity, on the strength of her alliance, of undermining Hannibal's position by supporting a faction within the city hostile to Carthage; and when it appeared that Hannibal was about to attack Saguntum the Romans sent envoys warning him to desist.⁷³ Since Hannibal had hitherto been careful to avoid any act of aggression against Saguntum,⁷⁴ Rome's interference showed that she did not intend to respect the Ebro Treaty now that the danger from the Gauls had passed, and that she was ready to assume the initiative in challenging the authority of Carthage in the West.⁷⁵

Accurately appraising the temper of the Roman administration and the consequences of its policy for Carthage, Hannibal launched the siege of Saguntum. The administration must have weighed the possibility that Hannibal could not be intimidated by threat or by the prestige of Rome; that if he attacked Saguntum, the Romans would be forced into the extremely awkward position of having to intercede without the justification afforded either by their previous treaties or by the urgency of present circumstances. It may be that they hoped by the warning to prevent Hannibal from exploiting their preoccupation with the Illyrian campaign.⁷⁶ But Hannibal ignored the threat and thereby precipitated a critical test of the policy of intervention

⁷² Northern Italy was brought within reach of the Roman armies by the building of the *via Flaminia* to Ariminum. Contracts for the road were let by the censor Flaminius, who doubtless appreciated the need for it as a result of his own campaigns in 223.

⁷³ Polybius, III, 15, 5.

⁷⁴ *Idem*, III, 14, 10.

⁷⁵ That Rome was the aggressor in instigating trouble in Spain is now generally agreed. Cf., e. g., Hallward (*op. cit.*, p. 31): "It is true that it was Hannibal's attack on Saguntum, undertaken in full knowledge of the almost inevitable consequences, that precipitated the war, but the historian must decide that, so far as attack and defence have a meaning in the clash between states, the balance of aggression must incline against Rome."

⁷⁶ Cf. Altheim, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

which this and previous Aemilian-democratic administrations had pursued.

The predicament of the administration was no less embarrassing in Rome. For the factions which had on each prior occasion been opposed to involvement in Spain⁷⁷ would now be disposed to point out how much sounder a program confined to expansion in northern Italy would have been.⁷⁸ Among the factors adduced to account for the Senate's hesitation to aid the Saguntines, the opposition of the Fabian circle, to which Hannibal's unexpected assault had given fresh virulence, must be accorded a salient position.

Unfortunately, the tradition regarding the discussions which must have been carried on in the Senate in the period between the attack on Saguntum and the decision to send an ultimatum to Carthage in March, 218, is contradictory. Polybius is at pains to prove (by the argument of probability) that no debate occurred; that, apparently, the Roman people were of one opinion regarding the Saguntine issue.⁷⁹ Dio-Zonaras, on the other hand, recounts the arguments presumably advanced by those favoring, and those opposed to, a declaration of war.⁸⁰ These and other intimations of underlying conflict in the Senate may throw some light on the dilatory course which the Romans pursued during this crucial ante-bellum year and on the reasons why the Senate eventually resolved upon war.

There were, to be sure, certain obvious reasons for avoiding war: both consuls were absent in Illyria, and Rome might at any time become entangled in hostilities with Macedonia.⁸¹

⁷⁷ It is possible that Hannibal was aware of a strong non-interventionist group in the Senate.

⁷⁸ Cf. Dio, frag. 57, 12 (probably spoken by Fabius in reply to Lentulus): "Now is it not absurd for us to be zealous for success in foreign and remote enterprises before we set the city itself upon a firm foundation?" (Loeb).

⁷⁹ III, 20. Roman tradition naturally contrasts the Carthaginian schism with Rome's unanimity.

⁸⁰ Dio, frag. 55, 1-9; Zonaras, VIII, 22. De Sanctis (*op. cit.*, III, 2, p. 197) has established the credibility of the tradition summarizing the debate.

⁸¹ Hallward, *op. cit.*, p. 32. It is unlikely, however, that the Illyrian campaign would have deterred the Romans once they had resolved upon war with Hannibal.

There had, moreover, been no breach of the Ebro Treaty, and it must have appeared to many that the plight of far-off Saguntum was a matter calling for the reopening of negotiations rather than for involvement in a major conflict. But most important was the issue of Rome's self-interest, which the spokesman for the opponents of war flung in the face of Lentulus.⁸² Once again, and at a time when the administration was in an inherently weak position, the question was raised as to whether it was to Rome's advantage to pursue a wider course.

The Massilians and Saguntines, whose envoys were probably in Rome to press their case, doubtless realized quite as well as the administration that this was the paramount issue. Possibly they sought to impress upon the Romans the fear that Hannibal was vowed to a war of revenge, and that his attack upon themselves would be but a prelude to the invasion of Italy. It is open to question, however, whether any Roman at this time seriously entertained the idea that Hannibal would cross the Alps. The problem lay elsewhere: if they were to succeed, the envoys would have to convince the Romans that their self-interest lay in the extension of their power, if not of their dominion, to the western Mediterranean—a task facilitated by Rome's intervention in Saguntum a couple of years earlier, and that now was the time to act.

It might be expected that the triumphant return of the consuls from Illyria would strengthen the cause of the interventionists:⁸³ the spirit of victory was in the air, and the settlement of affairs in the East would quiet the fears of those averse to fighting two wars simultaneously on opposite sides of Italy. But as a matter of fact even the fall of Saguntum, shortly before the arrival of the consuls in Rome,⁸⁴ had failed to evoke an immediate declaration of war. This is in itself good reason for believing that the Massilian propagandists and the administration were facing vigorous opposition to their policy of active intervention in Spain.

⁸² Dio, frag. 55, 5: "Do not arouse us, Lentulus, nor persuade us to go to war, until you show us that it will be really to our advantage" (Loeb).

⁸³ Cf. Täubler, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

⁸⁴ Polybius, III, 16, 6-7; 19, 12.

There is in the tradition no statement of policy by the consuls: they may already have been under suspicion for allegedly making an inequitable distribution of the Illyrian booty.⁸⁵ But if the consuls themselves were unable to exert maximum influence, the administration had a powerful spokesman in L. Cornelius Lentulus Caudinus, who as pontifex maximus and princeps senatus was the leading figure in Rome in this year. Explicit in the tradition followed by Dio-Zonaras is the fact that Lentulus epitomizes the wider outlook as Fabius embodies the narrower.

Before the new consuls assumed office in March, 218, the Senate had made up its mind: an embassy was named⁸⁶ to present the Carthaginian government with the alternative of surrendering Hannibal or of facing a declaration of war. This was ostensibly a compromise: the Fabian group had succeeded in its demand for negotiation; actually it was a victory for the Aemilian administration and the Massilian envoys, for the Senate must have realized that the Carthaginians would refuse to give up Hannibal and be forced to accept war. Despite the gravity of a war with Carthage and the indefensibility of Rome's juridical position,⁸⁷ and despite the power and prestige of Fabius, the wider viewpoint had prevailed. The Massilians might well congratulate themselves that, when the Romans could have modified their demands and effected a compromise avoiding war,⁸⁸ they interpreted to their own advantage Massilia's request for intervention.

⁸⁵ M. Livius Salinator is specifically indicted (cf. Frontinus, *Strat.*, IV, 1, 45: *quod praedam non aequaliter divisserat militibus*); his colleague, L. Aemilius Paullus, fares better (cf. Livy, XXII, 35, 3: *prope ambustus*, and 40, 2: *semustus*).

⁸⁶ According to Livy, XXI, 18, 1, the ambassadors were Quintus Fabius, M. Livius Salinator, L. Aemilius Paullus, and Q. Baebius Tamphilus. The chairman was more probably M. Fabius Buteo than Q. Fabius (cf. Dio, frag. 55, 10, Zonaras, VIII, 22). It is to be noted that the Aemilian consuls of 219 were named to the embassy.

⁸⁷ The case against Rome is summed up by Hallward (*op. cit.*, p. 31) and Scullard (*History of the Roman World*, pp. 197-198).

⁸⁸ There is no reason for supposing that the war was inevitable, that there was no point at which the Romans could not have turned back. Cf. Hallward (*ibid.*), who believes that a balance of power might have been effected, such as was achieved by Hellenistic statecraft.

Massilian propaganda, then, played a highly significant rôle in the shaping of policy which finally brought Rome into conflict with Carthage, and its effectiveness may be attributed to the following factors:

(1) The service which Massilia rendered to Rome in periodically informing her of the movements of the Gauls and Carthaginians, so that the Romans were made aware of impending crises and were accordingly more keenly alert to the scope of their own interests.

(2) The ascendancy in the Roman government during these crises of the Aemilian family and its adherents, together with a strong plebeian element closely connected with the Aemilii—an interstitial series of administrations whose consistency of action was due not to a long-range and continuous foreign policy but to the fact that the formulation of policy and its implementation in specific instances were in the hands of members of the same or related circles.

(3) The mutually supplementary character of the Aemilian and democratic programs as a result, first, of a common hostility to the Fabian party and, secondly, of the integral connection between the democratic interest in the expansion to, and consolidation of, northern Italy and the concern of the Aemilii in meeting the threat of a Gallic-Carthaginian coalition.

(4) The susceptibility of the Aemilian and plebeian administrations to Massilian propaganda aimed at convincing the Romans that in the critical years 231, 226, and 219 their self-interest was intimately associated with checking the Carthaginian aggrandizement in Spain.

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A BACCHIC GRAFFITO FROM THE DOLICHENEUM AT DURA.¹

In the course of the ninth season (1935-1936) of the Yale expedition to Dura a temple² was excavated in block X7 in the Roman military quarter. The inscriptions, sculptures, and cult objects found identify the temple as belonging to Jupiter Dolichenus and to a god addressed as Zeus Helios Mithras Tourmasgade. These two gods held equal rank. There is also a cult chamber dedicated to a goddess addressed as $\eta\ kypia$,—presumably Juno Dolichena. In a room (number 24) next to the cult chamber of Tourmasgade was found the graffito which I propose to present here, with such comment as seems necessary, leaving aside, however, the question of the relationship of the text to the religious life of the whole building and to the cult of Jupiter Dolichenus. Such matters must await the publication of the temple.

The Dolicheneum was built *ca.* 211 A. D. by units of the Roman army, and, in all probability, remained a purely military temple until the fall of Dura, *ca.* 256 A. D. Our text may, therefore, be roughly dated to the second quarter of the third century A. D.

Room number 24 in which the text was found measures approximately 3 by 6 metres and contained along its north end, the short wall furthest from the door, a bench 1.3 metres from front to back and extending the entire width of the room. The

¹ I would like to express my gratitude to Professor C. Bradford Welles who first suggested that I look at this text, made the first readings from the plaster, and who has helped the progress of this paper in many ways.

² Unpublished. The inscriptions were discussed in an as yet unpublished portion of his dissertation, *The Roman Garrison at Dura* (Yale, 1940) by J. F. Gilliam. I am indebted to Dr. Gilliam for information concerning the building, its use, and its date. For Dura in general see *The Excavations at Dura-Europos; Preliminary Reports I-IX* (Yale, 1929-1944) and *Final Report IV*, Part I, fascicle I (1945), and Part II (1943), and F. Cumont, *Fouilles de Doura-Europus* (Paris, 1926).

graffito was inscribed on the north wall and the pieces of plaster bearing the text, 17 in all, were found where they had fallen, on the bench. They are now at Yale. All the pieces show traces of red paint, indicating that the entire area occupied by the text, if not the whole wall, was painted red.

The text was inscribed in two parallel columns. Col. I, on the left, is .39 m. high and the length of the line varies from .23 m. to .30 m. Col. II is .14 m. high and about .24 m. wide. The letters are irregularly formed and vary from one to two centimetres in height. Where the plaster was soft and easy to write in, as in the lower lefthand corner of Column I, the letters are the rounded capitals typical for third century Dura. For most of the text, however, particularly in the case of Column II, the plaster was too hard for easy writing. The letters here are erratically formed and straight lines tend to be substituted for curves. Omega sometimes is written in the form W.

The text of Column II was cut in a *tabella ansata* .145 m. high. Below occurs a second *tabella*, with stray words (*δεύρο γε* [, *μετα μ*]) written here and there in large letters (.02-.035 m.). At the left of Column I the right end of a third *tabella* is preserved, .145 m. high, without writing. The plaster at the right is a tangle of scratches and letters, including some small, neat writing in a semi-cursive, .005 m. high, only *ἀπό* being legible.

Under Col. II is a rough sketch consisting of a single vertical line 26 centimetres long surmounted by a triangle, base 5 cent., height 2 cent. Immediately under the triangle a wavy line crosses the shaft. This sketch is not sufficiently detailed to enable us to decide what it represents. It may be a fillet-bound thyrsus with a disproportionately large head, or, possibly, the standard of the cult of Dolichenus, surmounted by the usual triangular plaque.³ To the right of this sketch is written in large letters (*ca.* 3 centimetres high) the month *Δεῖος*. Above the word *Δεῖος*, and crossing the shaft of the thyrsus (?), are written the words *Δεύρο γελῶν*.

³ That the famous triangular plaques of the cult of Dolichenus were mounted on wooden shafts has been established by the finds at Mauer-ander-Url. See R. Noll, *Der Grosse Dolichenusfund von Mauer a. d. Url* (Vienna, Kunsthistorisches Museum, 1938) and review by A. S. Hoey, *J. R. S.*, XXXI (1941), pp. 196-197.

COL. I.

1. Ὀδάριν
2. Δεῦρο γελῶν
3. Δεῦρο γελῶν
4. Δεῦρο γελῶν
5. μετὰ Μ
[[μετνν]] ενολίδων
6. ἀλόχευτε Βρόμιε /
7. καὶ σὺ [μ]άκαρ μετὰ Μ[ε]
8. νολίδων Χρησμωδέ /
9. καὶ μετὰ <Με>ν[ο]λίδων [κά]
10. λεσον θόασον Σ[ά]τυρε
11. {κα} καὶ σὺ μάκαρ μόλε παν
12. τομέδω<ν> κάλεσον Βρόμιε /
13. ΩΝΠΡΟΠΟΛΩΕΙΝΟΣΙ / δεῦ
14. ρο γελῶ[ν] μεθύνων Σάτυρε /
15. [μετ'] ἐφήβων Υμενέων
16. μετ' Ἐρώ{ω}των Ἀφροδ{ι}είτη /

COL. II.

Δεῦρο γελῶν
μετὰ Μενολ[ίδων]
ἀλόχευτε Βρ[όμιε]
καὶ σὺ μάκαρ [μετ]
α Με{νλιων}
νολίδων Χρησ[μ]ωδέ

Line 1. Ὀδάριν for Ὀδάριον, cf. C. B. Welles in *Dura Report* IV, p. 144. Lines 1 and 2 are in a different hand from the rest of Col. I. The letters are smaller and more widely spaced. As the plaster was softer when they were inscribed than it was when the scribe of the rest of the column wrote, they were probably written by some cult official to indicate where the Ὀδάριον was to go and what Ὀδάριον was to go there.

Line 3. This line is a title, probably copied unwittingly by the scribe from his example, not an integral part of the text. It was not repeated in Col. II. The two words occur three times by themselves at various positions on the plaster; once, followed by μετὰ Μεν-, in a tabella ansata. On first words used as titles see E. Nachmanson, "Der Griechische Buchtitel," *Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift*, XLVII (1941), pp. 37 f.

Line 4. This line is indented 4 centimetres to mark the beginning of the song.

Line 5. Μενολίδων: αι becomes ε here as in ύμενέων, line 15 below, but not in καὶ (cf. *Dura Report* IV, p. 143). In each case ε (= αι) is to be scanned as a long syllable. The corrected mistake, NN for ΑΜ,—a mistake of the eye, not of the ear,—indicates that lines 3-16 were copied from a text in a similar hand and not written down from memory.

Line 6. *Βρόμιε*—following this word is a stroke rising from left to right at approximately a thirty degree angle. Similar strokes follow *Βρόμιε* in line 12 and *Σάτυρε* in line 14 and precede *Δεῦρο* in line 13. Another presumably followed *Χρησμῷδέ* in line 8 where the plaster fails us. Compare the dashes to mark a change of speaker in *P. Petrie*, V, the fragment of the *Phaedo*.

Line 9. The *τ* of *μετά* is written above the line. The scribe omitted the first two letters of *Μενολίδων*.

Line 11. {*κα*} *καὶ*—this line, like line 4, is indented. After the *ἀδάριον* had been inscribed, the wall to the left of the text received a new coat of plaster which obliterated the first five or six letters of lines 12 to 16. The obliterated letters were then reinscribed on the fresh plaster. Line 11 had escaped because of its indentation. Nevertheless the first two letters were rewritten on the new plaster, and so we read {*κα*} *καὶ*. In patching up line 16 the scribe found that he had too much space and therefore repeated the omega, the last of the letters which he was restoring.

Lines 11-12. *παντομέδων*—for the omitted final *nu* see now L. R. Palmer, *A Grammar of the Post-Ptolemaic Papyri*, I: *Accidence and Word Formation*, Part I: The Suffixes (Publications of the Philological Society, XIII [London, 1945]), p. 2.

Line 13. *ΩΝΙΠΡΟΠΟΔΩΡΕΙΝΟΣΙ*—the reading is certain except for the last three letters, of which the bottom half only is preserved. For conjectures see pp. 35-6 below.

Line 16. *ἐρώ*{*ω*} *των*—see note on line 11. *Αφροδίτη*—a conflation of *Αφροδείτη*, representing contemporary orthography, and the older form *Αφροδίτη*.

Col. II has been of use in establishing the text of lines 4 to 8 of Col. I, which it repeats, but adds nothing new. Its writer knew little Greek and his work is full of insignificant error. The ΔΙ of line 8 of Col. I stand close together and resemble the letter N. They were so interpreted by the scribe of Col. II who then, characteristically, wrote it (in line 6, Col. II) upside down, proving that Col. I was the example for Col. II.

If we follow the punctuation rather than the line division of the original, the text may be reconstructed as follows:

Lines 4-6 Δεῦρο γελῶν μετὰ Μαινολίδων ἀλόχευτε Βρόμιε.
 “ 7-8 καὶ σὺ, μάκαρ, μετὰ Μαινολίδων, χρησμῷδέ.
 “ 9-10 καὶ μετὰ Μαινολίδων (κάλεσον θόασον) Σάτυρε.
 “ 11-12 καὶ σὺ, μάκαρ, μόλε παντομέδων (κάλεσον) Βρόμιε.
 “ 13 ΩΝΙΠΡΟΠΟΔΩΡΕΙΝΟΣΙ
 “ 13-14 δεῦρο γελῶν μεθύων Σάτυρε
 “ 15-16 μετ’ ἐφήβων Υμεναῖων, μετ’ Ἐρώτων, Αφροδίτη.

Hither laughing with the Maenads self-born Bromios;
 And thou, blessed one, with the Maenads, giver of oracles;
 And with the Maenads (call out, dance) Satyr.

And thou, blessed one, come, thou who rulest all, (call out)
Bromios;

-----;
Hither laughing drunken Satyr.

With the Hymenaioi who are young men, with the Erotes,
Aphrodite.

The main outlines of the *ῳδάριον* are clear. Its form, dictated by the religious beliefs of the man who composed it, provides an extremely simple answer to the demands of the occasion for which it was produced. It consists of a threefold invocation in lines 4 to 10, repeated in lines 11 to 14 with, however, the omission of the Maenads⁴ who served as companions in lines 4 to 10, followed by a simple invocation to the divine consort. The question as to whether the threefold invocation is addressed to three distinct divine beings who represent three functions of divinity or whether the terms *Βρόμιος*, *χρησμῳδός* and *Σάτυρος* are all thought of as describing the three functions of one god, is not clear from the text. The words *καὶ σύ* in line 7, which introduce a new god in *H. Hom.*, XXIX, 7 and *Orph. H.*, I, 5, 12, suggest that *χρησμῳδός* should be thought of as distinct from *Βρόμιος*,⁵ but in a text of such loose formulaic construction fine linguistic points must not be pressed too far. On the other hand the appearance of the word *Σάτυρος* in the singular rather than in the usual plural number suggests that it is used here, as in *Anth. Pal.*, IX, 524, as an epithet describing a function, not as the name of a distinct god. Whatever the answer may be,—and the problem possibly does not admit a simple one,—it is significant here that we have in this text evidence for the cult's belief in the threefold aspect of their male divinity and characterization, however, slight, of each aspect.

In lines 4 to 6, and again in lines 11 and 12, the god invoked is called *Βρόμιος*, in general an epithet, not a cult name,⁶ although

⁴ They are called *Μαινόλιδες* instead of the more usual *Μαινάδες metri gratia*. The adjective *μαινόλις*, feminine form of *μαινόλης*, does not occur elsewhere in the genitive, according to Liddell-Scott-Jones, *A Greek-English Lexicon*.

⁵ But cf. the formulaic *καὶ σὺ μὲν οὖτω χαῖρε* of *H. Hom.*, I, 20; III, 545, etc., where *καὶ σύ* does not introduce a new god. Compare the *καὶ σε* of the hymn to Dionysus in the *Antigone* of Sophocles (line 1131) and, on this, E. Norden, *Agnostos Theos* (Leipzig, 1913), p. 158.

⁶ Preller-Robert, *Griechische Mythologie*, p. 665, n. 1, " *Βρόμιος* scheint nur poetisches Beiwort zu sein."

there is in Pergamum a dedication to a Βρομίφ Πακοριτῶν.⁷ In addition to the traditional γελῶν⁸ and μάκαρ, words embedded in the introductory formulae, he is given the more particular epithets ἀλόχεντος and παντομέδων. This is the oldest of the known occurrences of the word ἀλόχεντος and it is perhaps significant that it first appears in a Syrian army temple of a superficially Hellenized Semitic cult.⁹ Its etymological meaning, from *a-* privative and λοχεύω, is “unborn” or rather “not having gone through the process of birth” and it is used once in the simple sense of our “unborn” (Nonnus, *Dionysiaca*, VIII, 27) of the god Dionysus still in his mother’s womb. It can also, by a simple extension of usage, mean “born in a manner other than the usual manner” and in this sense it is applied to Athena by Colluthus (*De Raptu Helenae*, 182). It is possible that this is its meaning here, in which case it should be associated with the other more specific epithets which have reference to the birth legend of Dionysus, διμήτωρ, πυριγενής, etc. Such an interpretation is not, however, in my opinion, satisfactory. The initiates in Dura did not have the interest in or knowledge of mythology and etymology possessed by Nonnus and Colluthus. Another passage in Nonnus gives us our lead for the true religious and mystic significance of the epithet. In *Dionysiaca*, XLI, 52 and 53 the goddess Φύσις is described as αὐτογένεθλος—ἀπάτωρ ἀλόχεντος

⁷ *I. Perg.*, II, 297 = W. Quandt, *De Baccho ab Alexandri aetate in Asia Minor culto* (Diss. Halle, 1912), p. 122.

⁸ The basic meaning of γελᾶν, according to W. B. Stanford (*Greek Metaphor* [Oxford, 1936], pp. 114-117) is “to be bright,” and hence can mean “to smile” or “to gleam.” Perhaps “radiant” would be a good translation of the participle here. For γελᾶν and its cognates applied to Dionysus see *Orph. H.*, XLIV, 3; XLV, 7; XLVII, 6; and L, 4. Compare also *P. L. G.*, III⁴, 675 (carm. pop. 46), lines 7 and 8 and *Anth. Pal.*, IX, 524, line 4. On the mystic significance of the divine laughter in Hellenistic thought see Philo, *De Praemiis et Poenis*, 31-35 and E. R. Goodenough, *By Light, Light* (New Haven, 1935), pp. 153 f.

⁹ Hitherto first in Synesius, *Hymn*, I, 54, who uses it to describe his neoplatonic god. I do not wish to imply that the word was coined by a soldier in Dura, which is unlikely, but simply to suggest that its first appearance in a Semitic cult is symbolic of the oriental background of Neoplatonism.

ἀμήτωρ. Parallel passages such as the oracle of Apollo at Colophon, quoted by Lactantius¹⁰ (*Div. Inst.*, I, 7, 1), given in answer to the question, “Quis aut quid esset omnino deus?”, beginning *αὐτοφυῆς ἀδίδακτος ἀμήτωρ ἀστυφέλικτος* and line 10 of the Orphic hymn to *Φύσις* (X), *αὐτοπάτωρ, ἀπάτωρ*, show that Nonnus here is imitating the language of hymns and oracles and suggest that *ἀλόχευτος* is one of a group of epithets,—*ἀπάτωρ, αὐτοπάτωρ, ἀμήτωρ, αὐτοφυῆς, αὐτογένεθλος, αὐτολόχευτος, αὐτοδίδακτος, κ.τ.λ.*—which make their appearance, or are first used in a religious sense, in the early Christian era¹¹ and serve to express the theological conception of god as Prime Mover, the ultimate source of reality. This is certainly the sense in *Synesius, Hymn*, I, 54:

οἱ μὲν αὐτόσσυντος ἀρχὰ,
ταμίας πατήρ τ' ἐόντων,
ἀλόχευτος — — —

I suspect that Nonnus, when he uses *ἀλόχευτος* of the unborn god, is playing a stylistic trick, a fondness for which he shares with our learned English epic poet, that of using a word in its etymological rather than in its idiomatic meaning.¹² Here a pleasing ambiguity is achieved, for the word is appropriate to the mature god in quite a different mystic sense.

Αὐτολόχευτος is similar in history and meaning to *ἀλόχευτος*. It, too, is applied to Dionysus (Nonnus, *Dionysiaca*, VIII, 87), and would have done equally well in Nonnus' description of *Φύσις* quoted above. This word occurs in a text preserved by Didymus (*De Trinitate*, III c, 2, 9), quoting *οἱ ἔξω*, which defines well the area of thought expressed by this group of epithets.

οὐ γὰρ ἀπ' ὀδίνος Θεὸς ἄμβροτος οὐδ' ἀπὸ κόλπων
νηδόνος ἐκ λοχίης φάος ἔδρακεν, ἀλλὰ νόοιο
ἀρρήτῳ στροφάλγυγι κυκλούμενος, αὐτολόχευτος
γίνεται, ἐξ ἔθεν αὐτὸς ἐών, γενέτης τε καὶ νιός.

¹⁰ On this see Norden, *op. cit.* (see note 5), p. 231, n. 1.

¹¹ *Ἀμήτωρ, αὐτογενῆς, αὐτοδίδακτος, and αὐτομαθῆς* all occur in Philo (see J. Leisegang, *Indices ad Philonis Alex. Opera* = Vol. VII of Philo, *Opera*, ed. L. Cohn and P. Wendland [Berlin 1926-1930], *sub verba*). The religious concepts involved had, therefore, already been expressed in these epithets in Hellenistic times.

¹² Compare Nonnus' use of *ἄγνωστος*, *Diony.*, I, 371.

Frequently, as in this passage from Didymus, these epithets are found in texts which stress the identity of the creating (father) and the created (son) gods.¹³ We may compare Synesius, *Hymns*, III, 145 ff. *πατέρων πάντων | πάτερ αὐτοπάτωρ | προπάτωρ ἀπάτωρ | νὶς σεαντοῦ*, and for this type of thought applied to Dionysus, *Orph. H.*, LII, 6, where the god is called *θεῶν πάτερ ἡδὲ καὶ νιέ*.

If the god is first given an epithet which emphasizes his character as the source of all things, his second distinctive epithet, used in describing this first and most impressive aspect of the divine principle, *παντομέδων*, "lord of all things," stresses his continuing rule over the universe. This compound was unknown until it appeared in an inscription from Syria (S. E. G., VII, 213, 23: II/III cent. A. D.) as the name of a horse. For the meaning we may compare the Dionysus *παντοδυνάστης* of *Orph. H.*, XLV, 2 and the Dionysus *παντοκράτωρ* of an inscription from Ephesus¹⁴ of the second century. Epithets compounded out of the same elements are to be seen in the formulaic "magic" invocation to Hecate from Pergamum: *ἰὼ πασικράτεια, ιὼ πασιμέδουσα, ιὼ πάντα ἐφέπονσα*,¹⁵ probably of the third cent. A. D., and in the *παμμεδέων* of Nonnus, *Paraphrasis S. Evangelii Ioannei*, V, 102; XII, 71, etc., and later, of *Anth. Pal.*, I, 31. *Παν-* (*πασι-*, *παντο-*) was a prolific compound-producing prefix in the second to fourth centuries A. D. and many single occurrences of words so produced are recorded from hymns and inscriptions.¹⁶ Their vogue reflects the prevailing monotheistic tendencies of this period.

For the god in his second aspect (or for the second god?) we have, unfortunately, only the evidence of lines 7 and 8, as the passage in which he is invoked again (line 13) is corrupt. The

¹³ Norden, *op. cit.* (see note 5), pp. 228 f.

¹⁴ Quandt, *op. cit.* (see note 7), p. 161 = *B. M. I.*, III, 2, 600.

¹⁵ R. Wünsch, "Antikes Zaubergerät aus Pergamon," *Jahrbuch, Ergänzungsheft VI*, p. 13, line 65, cf. also p. 25. With this compare K. Preisendanz, *Papyri Graecae Magicae*, IV, line 2775. O. Kern in "Die Herkunft des orphischen Hymnenbuchs," *Genethliakon . . . Carl Robert* (Berlin, 1910), p. 94, discusses this formula in relation to the Orphic Hymns.

¹⁶ See e. g., L. Van Liempt, *De Vocabulario Hymnorum Orphicorum atque Aetate* (Purmerend, 1930), pp. 58-60.

epithet *χρησμωδός*, "singer of oracles," by which he is characterized in line 8 has, like *ἱμνωδός*,¹⁷ a priestly ring to it. It is used six times in Plato, always of men, and four times paired with *μάντις* or *θεόμαντις*. In Roman times, however, it was used as a divine epithet in the Orphic hymn to *"Ονειρος"* (LXXXVI, 2) and in a dedicatory inscription to Apollo from Nubia.¹⁸ Here, apparently, it is used to express that aspect of divinity in which the god communicates with mortals, instructing them as to what they are to do and revealing to them their fate. Can we say what proper name would be appropriate for this *χρησμωδός*? I think not. If we were concerned with the traditional thiasos, as we know it in Italy and Asia Minor, a strong candidate would be Silenus, "the hierophant of the Dionysiac mysteries."¹⁹ The mantic wisdom of Silenus and his position as "elder statesman" of the thiasos are attested by the literary tradition²⁰ and by cult documents, both archaeological²¹ and epigraphical.²² Here, however, where Aphrodite has replaced Ariadne and a single Satyr the usual band of satyrs, analogy must be used with caution. In Syrian cults the divine power which communicates with men, the messenger god, had many names.

For the first 15 letters of line 13, in which he who is called *χρησμωδός* in line 8 is invoked again, I can suggest no satisfactory reading. These letters are among the clearest on the plaster and are all fairly certain except for the last three, of which the bottom half only is preserved. We must, I think, assume both omission and corruption. I have thought of <*καὶ μετὰ τ>*ῶν προπόλω<*ν*>²³

¹⁷ See Th. Reinach, *s. v.* "Hymnodus" in Daremberg et Saglio, *Dictionnaire*.

¹⁸ Kaibel, *Epigr. Gr.*, 1023, 2 = *C. I. G.*, 5039.

¹⁹ M. I. Rostovtzeff, *Mystic Italy* (New York, 1927), p. 74.

²⁰ See Vergil's sixth eclogue and the story of Silenus' capture by Midas (Preller-Robert, *op. cit.* [see note 6], p. 731, n. 1).

²¹ For Silenus participating in what is probably an act of divination see Rostovtzeff, *op. cit.* (see note 19), p. 51 and plate IV, 2. Cf. also K. Lehmann-Hartleben and E. C. Olsen, *Dionysiac Sarcophagi in Baltimore* (1942), pp. 39-40 and fig. 9.

²² See the *Σειληνόκοσμος* of the Bacchic inscription in the Metropolitan Museum published by Vogliano and Cumont in *A. J. A.*, XXXVII (1933), pp. 244-246. Cf. *Orph. H.*, LIV, 4, where Silenus is called *θιάσον νομίον τελετάρχα* and Athenaeus, 197e, *οι τὸν ὄχλον ἀνείργοντες Σειληνοί*.

²³ For the omitted final *nu* see on *παντομέδων* above (page 30).

Εἴνοσι "and with thy priests, shaker," and *〈δεῦρο γελ〉ῶν προπολῶ<ν>* *Εἴνοσι* "Hither laughing ministering shaker," or, if we assume the omission of a whole line *〈καὶ σὺ, μάκαρ, μετὰ τ>ῶν προπόλω<ν>* *Εἴνοσι* "And thou, blessed one, with the priests, shaker." *Εἴνοσι* (= *"Ενοσις*, Hesychius, s. v.) means "shaking" or "disturbance," usually an earthquake, but not always.²⁴ Once, in a bacchic setting, the concept is personified, and the word means, "Spirit of Earthquake."²⁵ Here, presumably, if the reading be correct, the god is addressed as being or causing that psychic disturbance with its concomitant irrational physical behavior which is characteristic of the mantic and orgiastic *ἐκστασις*.²⁶ There are, however, no parallels known to me for such a meaning and the reading must remain a possibility only.

Just as the eternal and all-powerful aspect of divinity is first invoked, followed by the mantic, guiding aspect, so, third and last, the orgiastic, generative principle is summoned, as the name, Satyr, and epithet, drunken,²⁷ tell us. In these three invocations we have, it is fair to assume, a brief statement of the beliefs of the cult about its male god.

In the last two lines of the text the divine consort is summoned. Aphrodite was the Hellenized form of the great Syrian nature goddess Atargatis and it is not surprising that in Dura, in cult practice, she has supplanted Ariadne, herself originally a very similar nature goddess.²⁸ We have hints of a similar association of Dionysus and Aphrodite in an inscription from Athens of the second century A. D.,²⁹ in the Orphic hymns,³⁰ probably from

²⁴ The word is used, perhaps metaphorically, of the sacking of Troy in Euripides, *Trojan Women*, 1326, and of a disturbance of the air in Euripides, *Helen*, 1363.

²⁵ Euripides, *Bacch.*, 585, *〈σειε〉 πέδον χθονὸς* "Εννοσι πότνια. This is the probable reading, though there is some uncertainty about the text.

²⁶ For the Bacchic *ἐνθουσιασμός* extended to all nature in the form of earthquakes and whirlwinds, an easy step for the Greeks with their animistic attitude to nature, see *Orph. H.*, XLVII, 1-5, and Aeschylus, frag. 65.

²⁷ With *μεθύων* cf. *Βάκχος μεθυδάτης*, *Orph. H.*, XLVII, 1, and *Βάκχος μεθύων*, Bergh, *P. L. G.*, III⁴, p. 335, "Anacreon tea" 57, 24.

²⁸ For the tomb of an Aphrodite-Ariadne in Crete, see Stoll in Roscher, *Lex. des Gr. und Rom. Mythologie*, I, col. 543, lines 62 ff.

²⁹ In the cult of the Iobacchoi an initiate plays the part of Aphrodite in cult performances (*S. I. G.*³, 1109, 122-126).

³⁰ In *Orph. H.*, LV, 7 Aphrodite is called *σεμνὴ Βάκχοιο πάρεδρε*. Compare also LVII, 3-4 and XLII, 7.

Asia Minor of the second to fourth centuries A. D.,³¹ and in the late mythological traditions as reported by Servius and others.³² The companions of the goddess, the **Eρωτες* and the **Υμέναιοι*, establish beyond a doubt that the text was composed for the important ceremony of the *ἱερὸς γάμος*.

The god **Υμέναιος* is a regular attendant at divine weddings³³ but I know no other case of his fission into a band of **Υμέναιοι*.³⁴ In Nonnus the word *ἱμέναιος* in the plural means neither "wedding songs" nor "gods of marriage" but "wedding" or, simply, "sexual union,"³⁵ with no notion of ceremony involved. The *έφηβοι* **Υμέναιοι* of this song are presumably personifications derived from this use of the word in the plural, a process of personification facilitated by the analogy of the **Eρωτες*.

For the form of the separate invocations, particularly for the first, an interesting parallel is provided by what has been called "gewiss eines der ältesten liturgischen Stücke, die wir in griechischer Sprache noch besitzen,"³⁶ the song of the women of Elis,³⁷

³¹ On the date and provenance of the Orphic hymns see Van Liempt, *op. cit.* (see note 16), *passim*, and, most recently, I. M. Linforth, *The Arts of Orpheus* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1941), pp. 179 f., where the current views are discussed and references given.

³² According to one tradition Hymenaios was the son of Dionysus and Aphrodite (Roscher, *op. cit.*, I, col. 2800, lines 38 ff.) as were Hermes (*Orph. H.*, LVII, 3-4) and Priapus (Preller-Robert, *op. cit.*, p. 736, n. 5) while the Graces were their daughters (Servius on *Aeneid*, I, 720).

³³ Dionysus and Althaea (Cornelius Balbus in Servius on *Aeneid*, IV, 127), Dionysus and Ariadne (Servius on *Ecl.*, VIII, 30). Compare also Lucian, *Herodotos*, 5.

³⁴ Unless we should capitalize *ἱμέναιος* in the fourth Anacreontic, line 13 (Bergh, *P. L. G.*, III⁴, p. 300),—ἢ Κύπρις | *ἱμέναιος κροτῦσα*—where the context is similar, as perhaps we should, if only by analogy with the *έφηβοι* **Υμέναιοι* of the graffito. Here, however, the meaning "wedding-songs" is appropriate.

³⁵ It means wedding in *Paraphrasis Ioannei*, B 62, Δ 253 (compare Vergil's "inceptos hymenaeos," *Aeneid*, IV, 316 and the comments of A. S. Pease on *Aeneid*, IV, 99 in his edition [Harvard, 1935]), but is used of seduction in *Dionysiaca*, XLVIII, 728, 869, etc.; *ἔρωτες* can have this same meaning, *ibid.*, XLVIII, 870, 875, where Koechly does not capitalize.

³⁶ A. Dieterich, *Eine Mithrasliturgie*⁸ (Leipzig, 1923), p. 127.

³⁷ Plutarch, *Quaest. Graec.*, 36, 7 = Bergh, *P. L. G.*, III⁴, pp. 656-657.

in which they request Dionysus to appear as their divine bridegroom: ³⁸

Ἐλθεῖν ἥρω Διόνυσε
Ἄλείων ἐς ναόν
ἄγνὸν σὺν Χαρίτεσσιν
ἐς ναόν
τῷ βοέῳ ποδὶ θύων.

And then, says Plutarch who quotes it, they add twice as a refrain, **Ἄξει ταῦρε.* In both our first invocation and the Elian song the basic formula seems to be (1) a request to the god to appear, (2) naming of companions, (3) acclamation in the vocative case. Furthermore, in giving us the Elian song Plutarch sets off the acclamation by the words *εἴτα δἰς ἐπάδουσιν*, indicating that, while part of the song, it is in some measure distinct from it, like a refrain. In our text the vocative acclamations are set off from the rest of the text by the fact that they do not always carry on the dactylic rhythm and by the insertion of the imperatives *κάλεσον*—which cannot be addressed to the god—and *θόασον*—which probably is not addressed to the god—immediately before them in lines 10 and 12. May we not conclude that we have in our text, clothed in the words of the third century A. D., an ancient type of liturgical invocation, a type which has survived the vicissitudes of syncretism and all changes in theological concepts, a universal simple formula which, because of its very simplicity, would be recorded only now and then, once by the antiquarian Plutarch, and once by a worshipper in Dura, who left it on a wall of his temple for us to examine?

The imperatives *κάλεσον*, “call,” and *θόασον*,³⁹ “rush about,” provide another link with the fragmentarily known tradition of Bacchic ritual. We may compare the scholiast on Aristophanes’ *Frogs*, 479 (= Bergh, *P. L. G.*, III⁴, p. 656, fr. 5): *Ἐν τοῖς Δημαικοῖς ἀγῶσι τοῦ Διονύσου ὁ δαδοῦχος κατέχων λαμπάδα λέγει· καλεῖτε θεόν, καὶ οἱ ἐπακούοντες βοῶσι· Σεμελὴν Ἱακχε πλουτοδότα.* ḥ

³⁸ So A. Klinz, *Ιερὸς Γάμος* (diss. Halle, 1933), p. 73.

³⁹ The verb *θόάξω* is used in the *Bacchae* of Euripides (lines 65 and 219) to describe the inspired motions of the female followers of the god and may have been imbedded in the Bacchic vocabulary from early days. It is not, however, a familiar word in ancient ritual and it is tempting to emend to *βόασον*. For *βόάξω* used to introduce acclamations see E. Peterson, *Eἰς Θεός* (Göttingen, 1926), 191.

πρὸς τὸ ἐν ταῖς θυσίαις ἐπιλεγόμενον· ἐπειδὰν γὰρ σπονδοποιόσωνται, ἐπιλέγονται. Ἐκκέχυται· κάλει θεόν. Here, however, they pose a problem. In hymns in which the god is described in the third person, *καλέω* and similar words commonly appear in the imperative addressed to the audience, but in a text in which the god is addressed in the second person, as here, these verbs are in the first person. The answer must be that this is not a hymn, but a series of loosely composed liturgical invocations, and that the imperatives, except, of course, *μόλε*, are, as it were, parenthetical stage directions which have found a position after the introductory formulae and the epithets and before the final vocative acclamations.

These imperatives, then, serve to stress the ritualistic nature of the text. The fact that they are in the singular is interesting. Are they addressed to a single individual who is, perhaps, going through the process of initiation? Or are they addressed to an initiate who is taking the part of the god in a sacred drama? We cannot say, for we do not know how to interpret in detail the symbolism of the *ἱερὸς γάμος*, and we know nothing of the liturgy of the Syrian cults.

In matters of language and style the graffito has many links with the hymns of its own age. In lines 4 to 14 the units of composition are sacred formulae and epithets, both probably designed originally for hexameter hymns. *Δεῦρο* is the first word in *Orph. H.* LXII and in a magic hexameter hymn to Hecate (Abel, *Orphica*, p. 289).⁴⁰ In hexameters in hymns of all periods *μάκαρ* frequently occupies the position it holds here, the second half of an introductory choriambic metrical colon.⁴¹ *Ἀλόχεντος*, *χρησμῷδος*, and *παντομέδων* are all typical hexameter compounds. While it is true that *Μαινολίδων* and *παντομέδων* in this text bridge over the normal caesura of the third foot, in the cult hymns there was never the strict avoidance, which we find in

⁴⁰ Compare the hymn to Poseidon in Aristophanes, *Equites*, 559 and 586, the Paean to Dionysus of Philodamus Scarpheus (*Collectanea Alexandrina*, p. 165), line 1, and the hymn to the Mother of the Gods from the temple of Aesculapius at Epidaurus (*I. G.*, IV [Ed. Minor, 1929], no. 131), line 2.

⁴¹ E. g. *Orph. H.*, XXX, 8, *κλῦθι*, *μάκαρ*, *ibid.*, XXXIV, 1, *Ἐλθέ*, *μάκαρ*. For the possible original meaning of this word see A. H. Krappe, "Μάκαρ," *Rev. Phil.*, 3. Série, XIV (1940), p. 245.

Callimachus and Nonnus, of such words,⁴² and so it is quite possible for *μετὰ Μαινολίδων* and *παντομέδων* to have stood in the same position in relation to the beginning of the line in a hexameter hymn which they occupy in this text. For the cadence of lines 11 and 12 we may compare the formulaic *ἀλλά, πάτερ, μόλε μυστικόλοις* (*Orph. H.*, XXV, 10; cf. LXVIII, 11 and LXXIX, 11).

Despite this use of hexameter formulae it would be a mistake to regard the text of lines 4 to 14 as consisting of defective hexameters. The composer clearly made no effort to shape his material to the hexameter structure. The invocations vary in length and the dactylic rhythm is carried only as far as, but not including, the final vocative acclamation.

In the invocation to Aphrodite (lines 15 and 16) we have a change in both meter and style. There is no introductory formula, not even *καὶ*, and no epithet. The two lines have the appearance of having been quoted whole, not assembled. While this meter, ionic *a minore* dimeter, was traditional in Dionysiac cult hymns of the Classical and Hellenistic eras,⁴³ I prefer to explain its appearance in Dura in the third century by reference to the Christian hymns of the following century. If Gregory of Nazianzus in Cappadocia could use this meter for a hymn to Christ in the second half of the fourth century⁴⁴ and if, a little later, Synesius, who did not know Gregory's hymns, could use the same meter in Cyrene for the neoplatonic hymns of his pre-conversion period,⁴⁵ the use of this meter for cult hymns must have been widespread, though the only hymns that we possess now in this form and of this period are the light-hearted literary *Anacreontics*.⁴⁶

⁴² In the Orphic hymns I have counted 24 cases in 1107 lines, almost twice the Homeric ratio.

⁴³ It occurs in Euripides, *Bacchae*, 65 ff., in the Iacchos-hymn of Aristophanes, *Frogs*, 324 ff., and in the refrain of the *Paean to Dionysus* of Philodamus Scarpheus. See E. R. Dodd's remarks in his commentary on the *Bacchae* (Oxford, 1944), p. 69.

⁴⁴ Hymn I in Christ and Paranikos, *Anthol. Gr. Carm. Christianorum* (Leipzig, 1871), p. 23.

⁴⁵ Hymns I and II in Christ and Paranikis, *op. cit.*, pp. 3 and 5.

⁴⁶ Though differing totally in spirit, the graffito has, besides the meter of lines 15 and 16, certain links in language and style with the *Anacreontics*. They, like our text, are called *ψδάρια* (see Bergh, *P. L. G.*,

Despite the difficulties and uncertainties of its interpretation, and despite its literary crudity, the graffito, supplementing the rich iconographic and epigraphic evidence,⁴⁷ casts a flood of light on the important mystery cult of Dionysus, here seemingly assimilated to the Semitic religion of Jupiter Dolichenus. We see the old Hellenic gods surviving by assimilation, not only in name, but, to some extent at least, in attributes and in liturgical tradition. The cult's conception of the nature of its god, as revealed in the epithets with which he is hailed, is in the Hellenistic tradition as expressed by Philo and further developed by the neoplatonic writers of the end of the third century. However, when we try to trace in this text the underlying Semitic character of the cult,⁴⁸ lack of evidence reduces all to conjecture. Possibly the appearance of Aphrodite as bride to the god is the product of local syncretism. Probably, in my opinion, the three-fold division of the male god, for which I know no parallels in the cult of Dionysus, reflects the beliefs of the worshippers of the baal of Doliche. Further study, when the temple as a whole is published, may clarify this point.

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III⁴, pp. 308, 312, 316). For the verbal framework of line 16 we may compare Anacreontic 50, 8: *μετὰ χρυσῆς Ἀφροδίτης* (*ibid.*, p. 327). For Dionysus, Aphrodite, the Erotes, and *ὑμέναιοι* together in a scene engraved on a cup, see Anacreontic 4, 10-14 (*ibid.*, p. 300), but cf. note 34 above.

⁴⁷ The evidence has been recently assembled by A. H. Kan in his *Juppiter Dolichenus* (Leiden, 1943).

⁴⁸ O. Kern, *Die Religion der Griechen* (Berlin, 1938), III, p. 255. "Der Einfluss des Griechentums auf diesen kommagenischen Baal scheint sehr gering gewesen zu sein"—a statement in need of modification. The evidence of this graffito suggests that the beliefs of the worshippers in the Dolicheneum at Dura had much in common with the theological concepts currently prevailing throughout the Greek-speaking world, however idiosyncratic were the iconographical manifestations of those beliefs.

THE "MORAL SENSE" ASPECT OF ARISTOTLE'S ETHICAL THEORY.

It is the object of this paper to bring into relation the use of the term *μεσότης* (i) in Aristotle's theory of perception as stated in the *De Anima* and (ii) in his account of the differentia of virtue in the definition in the *Nicomachean Ethics*.¹ An attempt will be made to show that the use of the *De Anima* serves as a clue to the use in the *Ethics* in the sense of being systematically prior to it.² At the same time, it will be necessary to consider the passages in the *Nicomachean Ethics* where direct reference is made to *αἰσθησις* as an element in the ethical situation.

The term *μεσότης* occurs first in the *De Anima* in an account of the physiological side of sense perception :

τὸ δὲ αἰσθητήριον αὐτῶν τὸ ἀπτικόν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἡ καλουμένη ἀφὴ ὑπάρχει αἰσθησις πρώτῳ, τὸ δυνάμει τοιοῦτον ἔστι μόριον· τὸ γὰρ αἰσθάνεσθαι πάσχειν τι ἔστιν. ὥστε τὸ ποιοῦν οἶον αὐτὸ ἐνεργείᾳ τοιοῦτον ἐκείνο ποιεῖ δυνάμει ὅν. διὸ τοῦ ὁμοίως θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ ἡ σκληροῦ καὶ μαλακοῦ

¹ An historical account of *μέτρον*, *μετριότης*, *μέσον*, *μεσότης* in Plato and the Presocratics is beyond the scope of this paper. Aristotle inherited an ample legacy in regard to the Mean from Greek mathematics, medicine, and philosophy (Cf. J. Souilhé, *La Notion Platonicienne d'Intermédiaire* [Paris, 1919]), but the emphasis of this paper will fall upon what the writer regards as Aristotle's transmutation of his inheritance in applying it to his own uses.

² Chronologically, W. Jaeger places the *De Anima* later than the *Nicomachean Ethics*, in the period of exact scientific research (*Aristotle, Fundamentals in the History of his Development* [Oxford, 1934], p. 331). Nevertheless, his view that the *Nicomachean Ethics* embodies Aristotle's ethical views at their most mature stage and records the obliteration of older doctrines by new ones based on the "psychological observation of life" (p. 236, n. 2), and in particular his account of the conception of *φρόνησις* contained in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (p. 82), may permit the assumption that the general lines of Aristotle's psychological theory had been sketched out when the *Nicomachean Ethics* was composed. It is more difficult to assume the background of a developed psychological theory for the period to which Jaeger assigns the *Eudemian Ethics*, and as the term *μεσότης* has the same place in the *Eudemian* as in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (and, of course, in the *Magna Moralia*), this paper will have to be regarded as taking a place indirectly in the reaction from Jaeger's views about the chronological development of Aristotle's ethical doctrine.

οὐκ αἰσθανόμεθα, ἀλλὰ τῶν ὑπερβολῶν, ὡς τῆς αἰσθήσεως οἶν μεσότητός τινος οὖσης τῆς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐναντίωσεως. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κρίνει τὰ αἰσθητά. τὸ γὰρ μέσον κριτικόν· γίνεται γὰρ πρὸς ἔκατερον αὐτῶν θάτερον τῶν ἄκρων (De An. 423b 30-424a 7).

Aristotle here describes sense perception as a process in which the sense organ is assimilated to its object. Each sense organ is sensitive to a set of qualities ranging between extremes, and to be sensitive to the whole range it must itself be a kind of mixture of the opposed qualities, in which neither extreme unduly predominates. The sense organ, or part in which the sense primarily resides, has potentially the qualities of its object, and in the moment of sensation actually has them. If the part already has the quality (as in the case where the object of touch is just as hot or cold as we are), there is no assimilation and no perception. Nothing happens. This implies, in Aristotle's view, that the sense is a kind of mediety, a capacity for achieving a middle quantity, or *μεσότης*. This is why the sense passes judgment on its objects, or discriminates.

The conception of a range limited by extremes, as defining the objective fields of the special senses, is perhaps the only point at which Aristotle's account of sense perception touches that given by modern physiology.³ He was not fortunate in his choice of an illustration of the manner in which sense discrimination arises, for it is not well described in general as an effect of contrast. When he says that we do not perceive what is just as hot or cold as we are, he is indeed pointing to the fact that there is a physiological zero for the temperature sense, since a stimulus of 31°C (about the surface temperature of the body) gives no temperature sensation, while with a stimulus of 30°C cold is felt, and with one of 32°C warmth, for most skin areas. It is wrong, however, to generalize from this observation, as Aristotle seems to have done, to the other senses, or even to the other aspects of touch. Sight and hearing, far from having a neutral spot, are most acute in the middle of their range. Pressure zero is at the lower

³ The human ear is sensitive to all sound waves ranging between two extremes of pitch, provided that the intensity is adequate, but the cat's ear has a greater range and is sensitive to sounds too high in pitch to be audible to the human ear. The color range of the human eye is between ultra-violet and infra-red.

extremity of the range of this sense. The temperature sensations have a neutral point partly because the flesh is the medium of the sense, but partly also because there are separate sense organs for hot and cold, or hot and cold "spots." The warmth and cold receptors are situated at some small depth in the skin, and this depth any external stimulus must penetrate to reach them. An adequate stimulus must be colder than the skin, or surface flesh, to set off a cold receptor, and warmer to set off a heat receptor. Similarly, the pressure sense has only a neutral response to the fairly constant pressure of the surrounding atmosphere communicated through the flesh, and the actual flesh in which the sense organ is imbedded is not apprehended by that organ because a continued stimulus is ineffective. It simply is not true, however, that we do not perceive by touch what is just as hard or soft as we are, as anyone can prove by placing the tips of the fingers of the two hands gently together. Aristotle could not, of course, be expected to understand the matter in terms of pressure receptors, warmth and cold receptors, etc., although he did suspect that the sense of touch might include more specific senses,⁴ and he did raise the question whether the flesh was the organ of touch or its medium.⁵ It has been thought worth while to enter a little into the physiological particulars, because the matter is sometimes discussed as if the part played by the flesh really differentiated the sense of touch from the other senses. In fact, the separate sense organs for cold, warmth, pressure, are comparable to the hair cells of the ear, or the rods and cones of the eye; and all the hot and cold spots, with their varying distribution and thresholds, when taken together, are comparable, as covering a range, with the whole range of the ear in sound and the eye in color. Luckily it is not the tenability of Aristotle's physiology which at the moment concerns us, but only the association by him of the terms *τὸ μέσον* and *μεσότης* with the idea of discrimination.

The conception of the *μεσότης* of sense is developed in a passage where Aristotle seems to be attempting the transition from physiology to psychology. This passage will be given in full, to display all its complications, although the strictly relevant clauses

⁴ *De An.* 422b 17-20, 33; cf. 435a 21.

⁵ *De An.* 422b 21—423a 12.

are at the beginning and end. A comparison is implied, although not quite stated, between sensation and nutrition. Both are forms of assimilation, but in nutrition, a faculty possessed by plants as well as animals, the matter of the food is absorbed; while sensation, or perception, possessed by animals and man, is receptive of form without matter.

καθόλου δὲ περὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι ἡ μὲν αἰσθησίς ἐστι τὸ δεκτικὸν τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν ἄνευ τῆς ὥλης, οἷον ὁ κηρὸς τοῦ δακτυλίου ἄνευ τοῦ σιδήρου καὶ τοῦ χρυσοῦ δέχεται τὸ σημεῖον, λαμβάνει δὲ τὸ χρυσοῦν ἡ τὸ χαλκοῦν σημεῖον ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ χρυσὸς ἡ χαλκός· ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ αἰσθησίς ἐκάστου ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχοντος χρώμα ἡ χυμὸν ἡ ψόφον πάσχει, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ ἐκαστον ἐκείνων λέγεται, ἀλλ' ἡ τοιοῦνδι, καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον. αἰσθητήριον δὲ πρῶτον ἐν ᾧ ἡ τοιαύτη δύναμις. ἐστι μὲν οὖν ταῦτόν, τὸ δὲ εἶναι ἔτερον· μέγεθος μὲν γὰρ ἄν τι εἴη τὸ αἰσθανόμενον· οὐ μὴν τὸ γε αἰσθητικῷ εἶναι οὐδὲ ἡ αἰσθησίς μέγεθός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ λόγος τις καὶ δύναμις ἐκείνου. φανερὸν δὲ ἐκ τούτων (1) καὶ διὰ τί ποτε τῶν αἰσθητῶν αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ φθείρουσι τὰ αἰσθητήρια· ἐὰν γὰρ ἡ ἴσχυροτέρα τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου ἡ κίνησις, λύεται ὁ λόγος (τοῦτο δὲ ἡνὶ ἡ αἰσθησίς), ὕσπερ καὶ ἡ συμφωνία καὶ ὁ τόνος κρονομένων σφόδρα τῶν χορδῶν· (2) καὶ διὰ τί ποτε τὰ φυτὰ οὐκ αἰσθάνεται, ἔχοντά τι μόριον ψυχικὸν καὶ πάσχοντά τι ὑπὸ τῶν ὀπτῶν αὐτῶν· καὶ γὰρ ψύχεται καὶ θερμαίνεται· αἴτιον γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν μεσότητα, μηδὲ τοιαύτην ἀρχὴν οὖσαν τὰ εἴδη δέχεσθαι τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἀλλὰ πάσχειν μετὰ τῆς ὥλης (De An. 424a 17-b 3).

It is here stated that sense in general is receptive of sensible forms apart from their matter, as wax receives the imprint of the signet ring apart from the iron or gold of which it is made. Sense as relative to each sensible is acted upon by that which possesses color, flavor, or sound, not in so far as each of these sensibles is called a particular thing, but in so far as it possesses a particular quality and in respect of its form (*λόγος*). The sense organ is then distinguished from the *δύναμις* which resides in it, since the organ is an extended magnitude, which *ἡ αἰσθησίς* is not. At this point it is stated that sensitivity in the abstract, or the sense, is *λόγος τις καὶ δύναμις* of the organ (*ἐκείνου*). In what has been said so far (*ἐκ τούτων*), is to be found the explanation of two things, (1) why excesses in the sensible objects destroy the sense organs, (2) why plants have no sensation. As regards (1), the sense is destroyed by excessive stimuli because it is put out of tune, its principle of organization is deranged. It is here reiterated that *ὁ λόγος* constitutes the sense. This seems to be a development of Aristotle's first definition of sense as a

μεσότης, which was apparently derived from his consideration of the sense of touch, for him the basic sense.⁶ That it is a development of the first definition, and not a substitution for it, is borne out by the clear identification of *μεσότης* at the conclusion of the passage as “a principle capable of receiving the forms of sensible objects without their matter,” and by analogy with the *μεσότης* of the *Ethics*, which is *ώρισμένη λόγω*.⁷ As regards (2), the non-existence of sensation is equated with absence of a *μεσότης*.

It is therefore precisely in virtue of the presence in them of a mediety, now defined as a principle capable of receiving the forms of sensible objects without their matter, that some living things are endowed with sensation. Again we are not immediately concerned with Aristotle's success or failure in his attempt to escape by this device from the materialism of earlier accounts of perception, but rather with his linking of the term *μεσότης*, by reference to the distinction between form and matter, with sensation and perception, and so with that discriminative power (*τὸ κριτικόν, ὁ διανοίας ἔργον ἔστι καὶ αἰσθήσεως*)⁸ which is the common ingredient in the highest as well as the simplest acts of cognition.

⁶ J. L. Stocks has made this passage and another (426a 27-b 7) the occasion for an article, “ΛΟΓΟΣ and ΜΕΣΟΤΗΣ in the *De Anima* of Aristotle” (*Journal of Philology*, XXXIII [1914], pp. 182-194) which was brought to the attention of the writer by Sir David Ross, after the first draft of the present paper was completed. Stocks here makes the suggestion that Aristotle in defining touch as a *μεσότης* was conscious that the flesh is not strictly the organ, but rather the medium, of touch; and that the proper generalization from his assertions about touch is that not the organs, or the actual sensations, but the media (*τὰ μεταξύ*) of the other special senses partake in a mean degree of the qualities apprehended. He thinks that *λόγος*, rather than *μεσότης*, really defines the act of sensation. His interpretation of *μεσότης* as defining a negatively qualified medium of sense permits him to regard the field of *πάθος* and *πρᾶξις*, for which a *μέσον* is determined by the *λόγος*, as a similar negatively qualified medium in ethics, and he therefore arrives at an ingenious analogy between the *μεσότητες* of Aristotle's psychology and ethics. Stocks concentrates attention upon the transference of form from matter to mind, or from mind to matter. He does not connect the use of *μεσότης* both in the *Ethics* and the *De Anima* with the prominent place given to *αἰσθησίς* in the *Ethics*. The present writer sees an analogy between the association of responsiveness with *μεσότης* in the *De Anima* and the responsiveness of emotion informed by judgment in the virtue of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

⁷ *Eth. Nic.* 1106b 37.

⁸ *De An.* 432a 16.

The principle by which Aristotle explains the special senses is retained for the doctrine of the unity of sense by which he accounts for our perception of the common sensibles, for concurrent perceptions relating to the same object and for our perception that we perceive. A pair of contraries determines the range or field of one sense, at the extremities of which they lie, while the mean, which possesses the contraries in equipoise, occupies the centre; "but more than one pair of contraries may be found within the same field, the mean being equally central to all of them."⁹ The term *μεσότης* is not directly related to the term *ἡ κοινὴ αἰσθητική* in the *De Anima* (the latter expression itself occurs only once in that book), but it is stated that *τὸ ἔσχατον* in the realm of sense is a single mean (*μία μεσότης*) and the words *ἡ αἰσθητικὴ μεσότης* are used as if *μεσότης* were a technical term expressing the essence of sense.¹⁰ The passage in question occurs, interestingly enough for our present purpose, in the chapter in which Aristotle makes the transition from theoretical to practical intellect:

τὸ μὲν οὖν αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅμοιον τῷ φάναι μόνον καὶ νοεῖν· ὅταν δὲ ἥδη ἡ λυπηρόν, οίον καταφᾶσα ἡ ἀποφᾶσα, δώκει ἡ φεύγει· καὶ ἔστι τὸ ἡδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τὸ ἐνέργειν τῇ αἰσθητικῇ μεσότητι πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡ κακὸν ἢ τοιαῦτα. καὶ ἡ φυγὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ ὅρεξις τοῦτο ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν, καὶ οὐχ ἔτερον τὸ ὄρεκτικὸν καὶ φευκτικόν, οὔτε ἀλλήλων οὔτε τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ· ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι ἄλλο. τῇ δὲ διανοητικῇ ψυχῇ τὰ φαντάσματα οίον αἰσθήματα ἵπτάρχει. ὅταν δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἡ κακὸν φήσῃ ἡ ἀποφήση, φεύγει ἡ δώκει (διὸ οὐδέποτε νοεῖ ἄνευ φαντάσματος ἡ ψυχή), ὕσπερ δὲ ὁ ἀὴρ τὴν κόρην τοιανδὶ ἐποίησεν, αὐτῇ δὲ ἔτερον, καὶ ἡ ἀκοή ὡσαύτως, τὸ δὲ ἔσχατον ἔν, καὶ μία μεσότης, τὸ δὲ εἶναι αὐτῇ πλείω (De An. 431a 8-20).

The point at issue here is a comparison between the unity of sense perception and the unity of practical judgment. Three situations are indicated: (i) that in which a central faculty of sense co-ordinates the impressions of the special senses, (ii) that in which the bare perception that an object is pleasant or painful is the equivalent of pursuit or avoidance, (iii) that in which the mental image takes the place of sensation in the thinking soul, and the

⁹ See J. A. Smith's note on his translation of the *De Anima* 424a 6, Oxford translation of Aristotle's Works, vol. III.

¹⁰ See R. D. Hicks' note to *De An.* 431a 10.

soul's affirmative judgment of good or bad in regard to it is the equivalent of desire or aversion. The acknowledged unity of sense perception is used to illustrate the unity achieved when in desire or aversion it is a single faculty of thought (not one tendency overcoming another tendency) which affirms or denies. Case (ii) is the rudimentary form of case (iii). It is therefore in this rudimentary case that we have $\dot{\eta}$ αἰσθητικὴ μεσότης, the sensitive mediety, represented here as performing a quasi-synthesis of the sensible and the pleasant, or the sensible and the painful. Thus, in the *De Anima*, we have an indication of the part played by perception in the ethical theory of Aristotle. For a more precise account of the relation of *αἰσθησις* to practical judgment we must turn to the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

According to Burnet the systematic use of the term *μεσότης* underlying what soon becomes a broader use in the *Ethics* is that in which it is explanatory of the formal cause. The *γένεσις* and *φθορά* of virtue arise in its subject matter, the emotions, according to a ratio (*κατὰ μεσότητα*), i. e., goodness from what is not goodness and evil from what is not evil, just as, for example, the organic tissues arise *κατὰ μεσότητα* from what is inorganic, the opposites, hot and cold, moist and dry.¹¹ This analogy coincides with what has been regarded as a characteristic contribution of Aristotle to early ethical theory, namely that the emotions are morally neutral and must neither be thwarted ascetically nor exploited naturalistically, but moderated in a proportion, a proportion relative to us, which will make our virtue the complete fulfillment of the nature proper to us.¹² The association of the term *μεσότης* with the formal cause is obviously fundamental. It appears in the psychological theory of the *De Anima* no less than in the philosophy of nature of the *De Generatione et Corruptione*, in that *μεσότης* in the *De Anima* is a principle which receives the forms of sensible objects without their matter. There are some considerations, however, which suggest that it may be a mistake to press the basic analogy at the expense of the more closely related psychological one. In the first place, while the idea of the neutrality of the emotions may be an interesting one to a modern philosopher in reaction equally from Victorian asceticism

¹¹ J. Burnet, *The Ethics of Aristotle*, pp. 72-73, on *Gen. Corr.* 334b 2.

¹² W. D. Ross, *Aristotle*, p. 195.

and contemporary naturalism, still the idea is implicit rather than explicit in Aristotle. It is, of course, implied in the passage where he points out that virtue is not a *πάθος* but a *ἔξις*.¹³ Secondly, balance, or even emotional control, is not the *whole* content of Aristotelian virtue. Even the citizen virtue of the first four books of the *Nicomachean Ethics* involves a reference to judgment, and, on the other hand, in the fuller account of the cognitive processes of the moral situation given in Book VI virtue is never quite transcended, but itself implies a capacity for judgment.¹⁴ It is quite possible that Aristotle's postponement of his discussion of the intellectual element in virtue has resulted in its failing to assume its full importance for many readers. This in turn may explain why the use of the term *μεσότης* in the *Ethics* is not ordinarily more closely associated with the use in the *De Anima* where it appears in *αἴσθησις* at the very foundation of all cognition. It is submitted that the notion of perceptive discrimination is what underlies the use of *μεσότης* in the definition of virtue, and that it is in this sense that virtue is in its essence and by definition (*κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα*) a *μεσότης*.¹⁵

The discussion of virtue as a *μεσότης* is introduced in Book II when Aristotle, having established the genus of virtue, that it is a *ἔξις*, turns to a consideration of its differentia. Virtue is called a mediety because it aims at a middle quantity, an equilibrium, in emotion and action (*μεσότης τις ὅρα ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή στοχαστική γε οὖσα τοῦ μέσου*),¹⁶ but it is a middle quantity relative to us, and the discussion of this relativity immediately brings into prominence the importance of perceptive discrimination in ethics.

¹³ *Eth. Nic.* 1105b 19–1106a 2. We are also told that there are certain *πράξεις* and *πάθη*, forms of action and emotion, which do not admit of quantitative distinction because some of them in their very names imply vice (*Eth. Nic.* 1107a 8-17).

¹⁴ The present context is not suitable for a discussion of the assignment of the “disputed books”; it will be enough for the immediate purpose that there is no dispute as to Book VI being “the genuine outcome of the mind of Aristotle” (St. G. Stock, Introduction to the Oxford translation of the *Magna Moralia* and *Ethica Eudemia*, p. xix).

¹⁵ *Eth. Nic.* 1107a 6.

¹⁶ The *τις* is used in exactly the same way when *αἴσθησις* is defined as a *μεσότης* in the *De Anima* (424a 4) as when *ἀρετή* is similarly defined here (*Eth. Nic.* 1106b 27).

The doctrine that vice consists in excess or defect appears as a corollary, and the complete definition of virtue is then stated with its reference to a *λόγος* and to ὁ *φρόνιμος* pointing forward to Book VI:

ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἔξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ωρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ φῶν ὁ *φρόνιμος* ὁρίσειν (Eth. Nic. 1106b 36).

It is significant that at the crucial moment of the definition *μεσότητης* is the active principle of virtue in operation just as it is of perception in the *De Anima*, a capacity for achieving a quantity between extremes. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the ensuing passage where a verification of the theory that virtue is a mean is attempted by reference to a list of virtues, the effect of the exposition is that the theory came first and the consideration of the accepted virtues as a sequel. The descent to particularity involves a transition from the general theory of the mean to its corollary, that each virtue is a *μέση* *ἔξις* between two vices which are its extremes. It is not proposed to repeat here the time-honored academic exercise of exhibiting the failure (in some cases admitted by Aristotle himself) of the trinitarian scheme of virtues and vices—with its customary conclusion that the corollary may be dismissed as a rather unsuccessful extension of the general theory. Rather let us turn to the conclusion of the discussion of the principle of the mean in the *Nicomachean Ethics* where, after some remarks to the effect that it is difficult to be good, because in every case it is difficult to find *τὸ μέσον* and especially *τὸ μέσον πρὸς ἡμᾶς* in particular cases, Aristotle finally says that in practical ethics *the decision rests with perception*:

ὅ δὲ μέχρι τίνος καὶ ἐπὶ πόσον ψεκτὸς οὐ βέδιον τῷ λόγῳ ἀφορίσαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν αἰσθητῶν· τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἔκαστα, καὶ ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις¹⁷ (Eth. Nic. 1109b 20; cf. 1126a 36).

¹⁷ W. Jaeger connects the *αἰσθησις* of this passage, not with the *αἰσθησις* of the *De Anima*, but with the medical *αἰσθησις* of the *περὶ ἀρχαίνης λητρικῆς*. He states (*Diokles von Karystos*, p. 47, a reference for which I wish to thank Dr. Ludwig Edelstein) that Aristotle *takes over* the conception of *αἰσθησις* from the author of this treatise, referring to Hippocrates, *De vet. med.*, 9: δεῖ γὰρ μέτρον τιὸς στοχάσασθαι· μέτρον δὲ οὐτε ἀριθμὸν οὔτε σταθμὸν ἄλλον, πρὸς δὲ ἀναφέρων εἰση τὸ ἀκριβές, οὐκ ἀν εὑροις ἄλλ' ἡ τοῦ σώματος τὴν αἰσθησιν. While not wishing to deny the influence of medical analogy upon Aristotle's ethical thought, the writer would

It is in this passage that the connection between the ethical and psychological theories is most clearly indicated, for this perceptive scrutiny of the particulars of the moral situation is an integral part of virtue itself. The real evidence for a connection between the *De Anima* and the *Nicomachean Ethics* is the existence of a doctrine of "moral sense" underlying the use of *φρόνησις* in the *Ethics*.¹⁸

It may be as well to meet at once the difficulty sometimes raised that the announcement that *αἰσθησις* is to hold the scale suggests that while the particularity of the moral situation is to have full weight, the universal aspect may be lost sight of. It is, of course, a great merit of Aristotle's ethical theory that it recognizes that the moral situation is concrete, that it has to do with particulars;

nevertheless call attention (i) to the verbal echo in <ἢ *αἰσθησις* κρίνει τὰ *αἰσθητά* in the *De Anima* and ἐν τῇ *αἰσθήσει* ἡ *κρίσις* here, and (ii) to the circumstance that the reference to *αἰσθησις* does not come in chapter 6 of Book II, where the matter of diet relative to individual needs is compared to the situation in ethics (the natural medical context) but in chapter 9 where the difficulty of *στοχάζεσθαι τοῦ μέσου* is illustrated by reference to Calypso and Helen, and where the general reference is psychological rather than medical. In his *Aristotle*, p. 44, n. 1, Jaeger speaks of the Aristotelian mean as "a conscious return" to the ethics of measure of Plato's *Philebus*, which "rest on a transference into the mental sphere of contemporary mathematical views in medicine." It may be worth observing that *μεσότης*, in so far as it is a Platonic word, occurs in the *Timaeus* (32 A and 43 D) where it is, first, the mean term of the proportion which is "the best of bonds," "that which makes itself and those which it binds as complete a unity as possible"; and secondly, in a much vaguer context concerned with the birth of the sensations (*αἰσθήσεις*) in the myth of creation. Either of these passages *might* have a poetic and literary association with Aristotle's adoption of the term *μεσότης* to describe the bond between the perceived object and the perceiving mind, and in any case the Aristotelian technical term is *μεσότης* not *μέτρον*. It is the purpose of this paper, as has already been pointed out, to deal less with the historical derivation of Aristotle's views than with the co-existence in his mind of a whole complex of related psychological and ethical concepts. To say, however, as Jaeger does in *Diokles von Karytos*, that Aristotle "den Begriff der *αἰσθησις* . . . übernimmt" from the author of *περὶ ἀρχαῖς ιητρικῆς*, seems to be an exaggeration which neglects the elaborate treatment in Book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics* of the relation between *αἰσθησις* and *φρόνησις*.

¹⁸ Burnet recognizes the presence of an Aristotelian theory of "moral sense" (p. 107), but he does not seem to relate the uses of *μεσότης* in the *De Anima* and the *Ethics*.

but it is not everywhere considered that his theory does equal justice to the universal aspect of ethics.¹⁹ Our first answer will be that *αἰσθησις* has to do with the assimilation of form, not matter, as we have seen. The sensible forms of the *De Anima* are the forms of sensible things, the qualities in them which constitute them what they are, the red of the red thing, the sound of the resonant thing, the flavor of the flavored thing. Each of these qualities, taken in itself, is a universal (*καθόλον*), in Aristotle's language *τοιόνδε*, not *τόδε τι*.²⁰ The full answer can be obtained only by pursuing *ὁ φρόνιμος*, who has been awarded the arbitral position in Book IV, into Book VI, where *φρόνησις* is fully discussed.

Book VI begins with a reminder that we have still to consider how the mean is determined by the right rule. It proceeds to a discussion of practical and theoretical truth as relating respectively to the variable and the invariable, and it undertakes a comparison of human gifts relative to truth with a view to clearing up the nature and distinction of three things (or two, as one takes it) : *πολιτική*, *φρόνησις* and *σοφία*. The upshot is that the first two belong together, and *σοφία* is a product of the combination of *ἐπιστήμη* and *νοῦς*, the first having to do with what is mediated in knowledge, the second with what is immediate. In other words, philosophic wisdom (*σοφία*) is scientific knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*) based on intuitional reason (*νοῦς*) which supplies the starting points (*ἀρχαί*) of discursive thought. We may now return to *φρόνησις*, of which the distinguishing feature is that it is concerned with the ultimate particular fact (*τὸ ἔσχατον*), since the thing to be done is of this nature (*τὸ γὰρ πρακτὸν τοιοῦτον*). In this respect it is opposed to *νοῦς*.

ὅ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς τῶν ὄρων, ὃν οὐκ ἔστι λόγος, ἡ δὲ <φρόνησις> τοῦ ἔσχατον, οὗ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ' αἰσθησις, οὐχ ἡ τῶν ὁδίων, ἀλλ' οἵα αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι τὸ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς ἔσχατον τρίγωνον· στήσεται γὰρ κάκει. ἀλλ' αὖτη μᾶλλον αἰσθησις ἡ <ἢ> φρόνησις, ἐκείνης δ' ἀλλο εἶδος (Eth. Nic. 1142a 25-30).

¹⁹ Jaeger's account of the development of Aristotle's ethical theory expresses the view that the attainment of greater concreteness for ethics is a philosophical advance (see his *Aristotle*, pp. 239-40). He perhaps overstates his case, however, in his account of the paring down of *φρόνησις* in Book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (*Aristotle*, pp. 82-3). Cf. the remarks of Sir David Ross on p. 219 of his *Aristotle*.

²⁰ *Anal. Post.* 87b 28.

What we have here is a sort of hierarchy of *aiσθησις*: (i) *ἡ τῶν ιδίων αἰσθητῶν*, perception of the qualities peculiar to each sense; (ii) *κοινὴ αἰσθησις*, recognition of a particular shape, one of the *κοινὰ αἰσθητά*,²¹ or, according to Burnet, mathematical induction;²² (iii) *φρόνησις*, the apprehension of the ultimate particular in conduct. As soon as Aristotle abandons metaphor (e. g., the hitting of a mark or the tuning of a lyre, in *ἔστι τις σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ἀποβλέπων ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων ἐπιτείνει καὶ ἀνήσιν* in the second sentence of Book VI) and analogy (e. g., exercise and food in relation to the maintenance of health in Book II and Book VI) to give the fundamental explanation of the relativity of ethical judgments as expressed in his doctrine of the mean, his analysis leads him to the principle that "practical wisdom is concerned with the ultimate particular, which is the object . . . of perception" of a special kind, *φρόνησις*, i. e., apprehension of the ultimate particular in conduct.

We naturally look forward to finding in *φρόνησις* the cornerstone upon which the Aristotelian theory is founded, for, as we have already observed, it was with *ὁ φρόνιμος* that the ultimate decision was left in the formal definition of virtue, and we are told that it is *φρόνησις* which gives unity to the particular virtues, *ἄμα γὰρ τῇ φρονήσει μᾶς οὖσῃ πᾶσαι <ἀρεταί> ὑπάρξοντιν*.²³ It is perhaps disappointing, therefore, to find *φρόνησις*, which gives virtue its rationality, so exclusively concerned with means to the end. *ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τὸν σκοπὸν ποιεῖ ὀρθόν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τὰ πρὸς τοῦτον*,²⁴ or again *ἡ εὐβουλία εἴη ἀν ὀρθότης ἡ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον πρὸς τὸ τέλος οὗ ἡ φρόνησις ἀληθῆς ὑπόληψις ἔστιν*.²⁵ Putting the matter in terms of the practical syllogism, we find that in deliberation we work from the top downwards of the series of terms which lead to the end until we come to something which we can do. It is the part of *φρόνησις* to *see* that this last link in the chain, a particular act, is the means to the end. In this sense it is a form

²¹ *De An.* 418a 7 ff.

²² It makes no difference to the general argument to accept Burnet's rendering "that the ultimate constituent of figures arrived at by analysis is a triangle." That the last figure into which a complex figure can be analyzed is a triangle, i. e., that it takes three straight lines to enclose a space, is something which we simply *see*. The place of this perception as intermediate between i and iii is unaltered.

²³ *Eth. Nic.* 1145a 1. ²⁴ *Eth. Nic.* 1144a 7. ²⁵ *Eth. Nic.* 1142b 32.

of *αἰσθησις*, not the simple *αἰσθησις* of the qualities peculiar to one sense, but more like the perception (or, as we sometimes say, intuition) by which we see things in the process of mathematical analysis, although this too, because of our use of sensible figures as aids to thought, is closer to simple *αἰσθησις* than *φρόνησις* can be, since the latter brings us to the level of pure thought. The *φρόνησις* of ethical judgment is an intellectual, although not a sensuous, perception.²⁶ We simply *see* in exercising *φρόνησις* that this is the particular act which will serve as means to our end, the good for man.

To the question of how we grasp the end to which the means stand in relation we have Aristotle's formal answer that *ἀρετή* determines the end.²⁷ We have observed that *νοῦς* is the ingredient of theoretical wisdom which provides the immediate grasp of first principles upon which discursive thought or scientific knowledge is based. One would expect to find the equivalent of *νοῦς* in *φρόνησις*. Instead, we have been told that *φρόνησις* is opposed to *νοῦς* because the former has to do with the ultimate particular act and the latter with the universal limiting premise.

There is one passage in Book VI in which *φρόνησις* and *νοῦς* are brought very close together. Aristotle has pointed out that the same sort of man may be said to have *φρόνησις* and *νοῦς*. Remembering the association of *νοῦς* with first principles in theoretical wisdom, we look forward to its exercising a similar function here. However, the passage proceeds:

καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ' ἀμφότερα. καὶ γὰρ τῶν πρώτων ὅρων καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων νοῦς ἐστι καὶ οὐ λόγος, καὶ ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις τῶν ἀκινήτων ὅρων καὶ πρώτων, ὁ δὲ ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς τοῦ ἐσχάτου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου καὶ τῆς ἐτέρας προτάσεως· ἀρχαὶ γὰρ τοῦ οὐ ἔνεκα αὗται. ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἔκαστα γὰρ τὰ καθόλου· τούτων οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ αἰσθησιν, αὕτη δὲ ἐστὶ νοῦς (Eth. Nic. 1143a 35-b 5).

We have already been told (Eth. Nic. 1142a 25) that *φρόνησις* is opposed to *νοῦς* because the former has to do with the particular,

²⁶ This is as good a moment as any to point out that the writer is not overlooking the fact that Aristotle does not regard the intellectual virtues, of which *φρόνησις* is one, as *μεσότητες*. It is the total situation summed up in *ἡ ηθικὴ ἀρετή* which he compares to the perceptive situation, and it is *ἡ ηθικὴ ἀρετή*, not any single one of its ingredients, which he calls a *μεσότης*.

²⁷ Eth. Nic. 1144a 7-9.

the latter with the universal. Here it appears that there is a sort of *νοῦς* entering as an element into *φρόνησις*. This *νοῦς* is an *αἰσθητός*, an intellectual, not a sensuous, form of it. It has to do with particulars (the minor premises of practical syllogisms) in so far as they are starting points for the apprehension of the universal rules of conduct as embodying the good for man. We have here a parallel with the process of induction (*ἐπαγωγή*) in the realm of the theoretical. In induction, of whatever kind, we have a number of particular instances. The universal proposition of which we decide, after inspection, that each of these particulars is an instance, is not proved by them. We merely *see* or grasp the universal in the instances by means of *νοῦς*, our rational intuition. In the passage just quoted Aristotle seems to admit that there is a sort of practical induction and that *φρόνησις*, or the *νοῦς* entering as an element into *φρόνησις*, grasps the universal in the particular and apprehends the good for man.

This conclusion must be modified by, or brought into relation with, the fact that Aristotle insists that it is not *φρόνησις* but *ἀρετή* or *ἡθός* which makes what seems good to us the true good, or, in other words, he insists that the first principles of ethics are apprehended, not by perception (*αἰσθήσει*), nor by induction (*ἐπαγωγῇ*), but by habituation (*ἐθισμῷ τινι*). The three processes are all related and the earlier terms in the enumeration all enter as factors into the later, i. e., perception is a factor in induction, and perception and induction are factors in habituation. The fact of the dilemma which constitutes choice must be taken into consideration. If we are not habituated in the right way, we make too many wrong choices and we do not get the instances of right action in which we shall see the good and develop our eye.²⁸ Rather our moral vision will be distorted. It is to prevent waste of good instances that we must attend to the statements and beliefs of experienced and elderly people.²⁹ As Burnet says, "their experience has given them an eye for such things and they see aright." But, as he goes on, "it is the eye and not the experience which really secures the truth of these statements," and the pupil does not become a fully developed moral agent until his own discernment has achieved a certain independence.

²⁸ Cf. Burnet, Introduction to the *Ethics of Aristotle*, p. xxxviii.

²⁹ *Eth. Nic.* 1143b 11.

Thus we see that the doctrine of "moral sense" is not opposed to, but involved in, the doctrine that it is the $\eta\thetaos$ which gives us our vision of the good.

That we know what is right does not involve that we do it. This is Aristotle's criticism of what Socrates says in the *Protagoras*.³⁰ His own general account of the origin of motion is to be found in the *De Anima* and in the *De Motu Animalium*,³¹ and it becomes relevant in the *Nicomachean Ethics* in the discussion of incontinency in Book VII. We have already seen in Book VI (1139a 19) that $\eta\alpha\sigma\theta\eta\sigma\iota\sigma\ o\bar{u}\delta\epsilon\mu\bar{a}\bar{s}\ \dot{\alpha}\rho\chi\bar{h}\ \pi\rho\acute{a}\xi\epsilon\omega\bar{s}$, i. e., perception originates no action; but the point at issue there is a contrast between $\pi\rho\acute{a}\xi\bar{s}$ and $\kappa\bar{i}\eta\eta\sigma\iota\sigma$. We see from the *De Anima* that $\alpha\bar{i}\sigma\theta\eta\sigma\iota\sigma$ and $\bar{o}\rho\epsilon\bar{\xi}\bar{s}$ taken together will account for $\tau\bar{i}\eta\ \kappa\bar{a}\bar{t}\bar{a}\ \tau\bar{o}\bar{p}\bar{o}\bar{v}\ \kappa\bar{i}\eta\eta\sigma\iota\sigma$ of the lower animals, but we do not call a $\kappa\bar{i}\eta\eta\sigma\iota\sigma$ a $\pi\rho\acute{a}\xi\bar{s}$ unless it arises from an $\bar{o}\rho\epsilon\bar{\xi}\bar{s}$ moved by $v\bar{o}\bar{s}$. Again in Book VI (1139a 35) we have the dictum, $\delta\bar{a}\bar{n}\bar{o}\bar{v}\bar{a}\ \delta'\ a\bar{v}\bar{r}\bar{h}\ o\bar{u}\theta\bar{e}\bar{v}\ \kappa\bar{i}\eta\bar{v}\bar{a}\bar{v}$. This refers us once more to the *De Anima* and the double source of motion in $\bar{o}\rho\epsilon\bar{\xi}\bar{s}$ and $v\bar{o}\bar{s}$. There the cases of the continent and incontinent are quoted to show that (a) desire may be set aside by reason, because the former obey reason although they feel desire, and (b) action may be determined by desire in spite of the counsels of reason, because the latter yield to desire, although the intellect has issued an order against it.³² The case of conflict between reason and desire occurs in beings which have a perception of time. Desire takes the pleasurable of the immediate future for the absolutely pleasurable and prompts to indulgence. Reason out of regard for the more distant future bids us refrain.

In Book VII of the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle undertakes to deal $\phi\bar{u}\sigma\kappa\bar{w}\bar{s}$, i. e., in this case from the psychological point of view, with the problem whether incontinent people act knowingly or not, and in what sense knowingly. His solution is expressed in terms of the practical syllogism. We begin with the major premise, *everything sweet is pleasant*, and we have a minor premise, *this is a sweet thing*. On the intervention of desire,

³⁰ *Eth. Nic.* 1145b 23 ff.; *Plato, Protagoras* 352 B.

³¹ *De An.* 432a 15 ff. and 433a 9-434a 21; *De Mot. Animal.* 701a 7-33 and 703b 19.

³² *De An.* 433a 1-8.

which replaces the major premise with, *I want to taste something sweet*, the particular perception of the minor premise, *this is a sweet thing*, immediately renders the desire effective and the sweet thing is tasted. Now there may have been at the back of the mind of the incontinent person a knowledge that some sweet things are unhealthful, but the minor premise which does not coincide with desire, *this is a case of an unhealthful sweet thing*, does not emerge in a clear perception, and there is no action in this direction. This looks like the detailed working out for a special case of the germinal idea in the passage from the *De Anima* quoted earlier (431a 8-20), where stress is laid on the unity achieved in practical judgment, and it reinforces the case for a close relationship between the psychological and ethical theories.

The case in which Aristotle has undertaken a detailed analysis of the relation between deliberation and desire which is fundamental to his conception of the will ($\eta\ \delta\acute{ο}\kappa\tau\kappa\kappa\ \nu\acute{o}\nu\ \eta\ \pi\acute{p}\o\alpha\acute{i}\rho\acute{e}\o\i\eta\ \eta\ \delta\acute{o}\rho\acute{e}\xi\i\ \delta\i\alpha\i\no\eta\tau\kappa\kappa\eta\j$)³³ is a negative and a pathological case. Even its immediate converse, the case of the continent man, will not serve, since continence is not strictly a virtue. We may perhaps construct for ourselves the practical syllogism of the virtuous man. The minor premise is the outcome of his practical deliberation, and granting that his virtuous character has provided the major premise embodying the good for man, and a rational wish to coincide with it, he cannot be moved to action unless he has the perception that this is a particular case of the good for man. This is the domain of moral sense, the fusion of universal and particular, for, as always in a judgment of perception, the subject is particular and the predicate universal. Aristotle was supremely right in holding that this fusion is what determines action. The good will and the free will is the clear-sighted will. Although many will decry the suggestion that there is symbolism in Greek tragedy, the connection with being able to *see* which attaches to moral decisions is typified for the writer in the tragic action of Oedipus who put out the eyes which could not see.

We may now briefly sum up the results of the argument. (i) The doctrine of "moral sense," in so far as it is present in Aris-

³³ *Eth. Nic.* 1139b 4.

totle, does not mean that we have a general intuition of the good for man. The universal aspect of ethics must be left in the hands of those of good character and the statesman, who will doubtless frame maxims to illustrate it and embody it in the laws of the ideal state. These maxims and laws will in fact derive from the ethical experience of their individual authors. The individual practical intellect is deliberative and its conclusion is in one sense a particular conclusion; but the predicate of the practical judgment involves the universal and in that judgement we *see* what is right.³⁴ This is what is meant by making *aiσθησις* an ingredient in *φρόνησις* and, in one passage, equating *aiσθησις* with *νοῦς*. (ii) In the second place, in view of the prominence which is given to *aiσθησις* in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (especially in *Eth. Nic.* 1109b 23 and in Book VI in connection with *φρόνησις*) it seems natural to refer to the account of *aiσθησις* given in the *De Anima*. There we find that the essence of *aiσθησις* is *μεσότης*, by virtue of which it assimilates form apart from matter. It has therefore been submitted that this is the fundamental sense of *μεσότης* in the *Ethics*. If this significance is granted to the use of *μεσότης* in the definition of virtue, that definition becomes much more expressive of the quality of perceptive judgment which is an ingredient of first importance in virtue as conceived by Aristotle. What has heretofore been regarded as the general theory of the mean becomes a corollary of the doctrine that the exercise of virtue is a form of perception, just as the doctrine of the *μέσην ἔξις* has always been regarded as a corollary of the general theory. It is doubtful if there is much to be gained from an attempt to interpret moral perception rigidly in terms of Aristotle's theory of sensuous perception, because, after all, his explanation of the latter as a *μεσότης* is inadequate to us now either as physiology or psychology;³⁵ but, broadly, it is not nonsense

³⁴ Cf. W. D. Ross, *Aristotle*, p. 219: "Aristotle recognizes a secondary sort of practical wisdom which knows the right thing to do without arriving at it by a process of deliberative analysis—a wisdom about details which is found in those who have had a certain experience of life. . . . In this wide sense practical wisdom of the direct, unreasoned kind is a kind of perception; good is for well-brought-up people a kind of common sensible, as shape is for all men."

³⁵ It is even, perhaps, going a little far to treat his theory of the origin of organic tissues, as Burnet does, almost as if it were an intuitive prophecy of the principles of modern biochemistry. What Aristotle has

to compare the emotional sensitivity, informed by the power of judgment, of the virtuous man with sense perception. The virtuous man has an emotional and intellectual responsiveness to the good, a tendency for all his faculties, emotion, desire, thought, to converge in right action. One is tempted to coin an expression "wisdom of the emotions" in extension of the expression "wisdom of the body," popularized in physiology from the work of Dr. Cannon of Harvard, to describe the identification of equilibrium and critical balance, including reference to environment, with rightness and health. The Aristotelian doctrine of pleasure as the accompaniment of unimpeded activity of a natural state is a corroboration of the general view. To include, as Aristotle does, the contribution at the level of intellect to the attainment of the emotional balance characteristic of his virtues, we should perhaps speak less of *balance* and more of *sense of balance*. In fact, Aristotle seems to have expressed one truth in two ways when he spoke of virtue as a *μεσότης* in the field of emotion and action in the *Ethics* and when he described the unity of practical judgment in the *De Anima*.

A commentary on the success of Aristotle's application of the idea of *μεσότης*, however derived, to the definition of virtue is the recurrent undertone of opinion among his critics that he was "ill-advised" in his adoption of the principle of the Mean. It is not only that there has existed a misleading view of the Mean as a mere *medio tutissimus ibis* "due to the unfortunate isolation in which Aristotle's doctrines are commonly studied" (Burnet, p. 73), but even commentators who are fully aware that such a view is an inadequate expression of Aristotle's theory doubt whether the Mean is the "correct way" of expressing the "sane and true view" which mediates between the ascetic and naturalistic attitudes (W. D. Ross, *Aristotle*, p. 195). Is it not possible that this verdict of unsatisfactoriness is the result of it not having been considered that the notion of *μεσότης* was not first worked out by Aristotle from the existing medical and mathe-

in common with modern science may very nearly be reduced to (i) his grasp of the principle of scientific induction and (ii) his conviction that the ultimate expression of scientific knowledge is a formula of some kind, a ratio or proportion, a *λόγος* or a *μεσότης*; and (iii) his acute observations in natural science.

matical analogies as an ethical doctrine of the type implied, but was carried over from his psycho-physical theory of knowledge?³⁶ The analysis of virtue as a species of perception of the good in particular moral decisions is absolutely sound. We have no other way of access to goodness, the universal, than through the particular moral situations in which we strive to discern it. The classic objection that Aristotle's distinction is quantitative rather than qualitative is from one point of view removed, because the psychological theory makes the quantitative aspect of sense perception merely the means for the transmission of the qualitative, or, speaking more concretely, the point at which all distinctions

³⁶ Jaeger says (*Aristotle*, p. 332) that the ethics of Aristotle "is built on a very primitive theory of the soul, namely the division of it into a rational and an irrational part," and this is part of his argument for giving a late date to the first two books of the *De Anima*. But surely the broad doctrine of rational and irrational parts of the soul, although primitive, and here provisionally accepted and criticized by Aristotle, is one peculiarly relevant to ethical discussion. The general result of Jaeger's argument ("In ethics it remained convenient to work with the old ideas"; in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, or final version, Aristotle "thinks it necessary to apologize for thus simplifying his problem"; the statesman's knowledge of psychology is indicated to be the "minimum" of that science; the conception of "parts of the soul," although used, is criticized as "problematic") seems to be that he allows for a developed state of Aristotle's psychological theory as a *background* for the *Nicomachean Ethics*, but he thinks that no appreciable intrusion of such theory has taken place. One of his principal points, however, is that the *Nicomachean Ethics* contains an advanced and un-Platonic account of *φρόνησις*, and it has been the object of the present writer to connect this account of *φρόνησις* with the psycho-physical theories of the *De Anima* through the common occurrence in the ethical and psychological doctrines of the term *μεσότης*. The chief difficulty in regard to Jaeger's theory of Aristotle's philosophical "development" comes in connection with his placing of the *Eudemian Ethics* as intermediate between the *Protrepticus* and the *Nicomachean Ethics*. As the theory of *μεσότης* is present in the *Eudemian Ethics*, according to the present writer's view, a treatment of *φρόνησις* closely related to that of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is implied for the missing books of the *Eudemian*. It may be worth while to point out, since an examination of the use of *φρόνησις* in the *Eudemian Ethics* is not to be undertaken at the moment, that it is precisely in his contention for an early "Platonic" use of *φρόνησις* by Aristotle that Jaeger has been attacked by some of his critics (see M. C. Needler, *C. P.*, XXIII [1928], pp. 280-84, commenting on Gadamer's paper in the April, 1928, number of *Hermes*).

are quantitative is placed where the psychological becomes the physical. The analogy between sense perception and ethics is bound in the end to become unsatisfactory, however, for while Aristotle's analysis of sense perception conveyed some of the gross facts about it, it was an ideal construction and not really precise in its reference to reality. It contains no real anticipation of modern physiology beyond the general notion of a range with limits. It seems fairer, therefore, to judge Aristotle's ethical theory of the Mean, not in its details, but in its broad implication. It is submitted that what Aristotle meant by saying that virtue was in its essence and according to its definition a Mean was to point out that it is of the essence of virtue to be able to deal with the particular moral situation clear-sightedly.

E. HARRIS OLMS TED.

CLAUDIAN'S *IN RUFINUM* AND AN EPISTLE OF ST. JEROME.

In discussing the dissemination of Claudian's poems during the poet's own lifetime, Birt¹ advances the suggestion that the *In Rufinum* was read by St. Jerome, and influenced him in the composition of a notable chapter in one of his epistles,² a chapter in which Jerome laments the devastation of the Roman Empire by the barbarians. The suggestion is an interesting one, for though St. Jerome's indebtedness to Vergil and to other Roman poets who wrote before the second Christian century is substantial and well known,³ a connection with Claudian, if it could be established,⁴ would be almost⁵ the only link between the great Christian scholar and the pagan poetry of his own day.

In support of his theory, Birt adduces the following three parallels between Claudian's poem and St. Jerome's epistle:

I. Claudian, *In Rufinum*, II, 32: iam rubet altus Halys,
35: proterit imbellem sonipes hostilis Orontem; Jerome,
Epistles, LX, 16, 4 f.: quantae fluviorum aquae humano
cruore mutatae sunt! Obsessa Antiochia et urbes reliquae,
quas Halys, Cnydus, Orontes, Eufratesque praeterfluunt.

¹ T. Birt, *Claudii Claudiani Carmina* (= *Mon. Germ. Hist., Auct. Ant.* X [1892]), pp. lxxviii, 35, 48, 50.

² Jerome, *Epistles*, LX, 16; cf. C. N. Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture* (2nd ed., Oxford, 1944), p. 351.

³ Cf. A. Luebeck, *Hieronymus Quos Noverit Scriptores . . .* (Leipzig, 1872), pp. 105-17, 160-98; G. Grützmacher, *Hieronymus* (Leipzig, 1901-08), I, pp. 114-17; A. S. Pease, "The Attitude of Jerome towards Pagan Literature," *T. A. P. A.*, L (1919), pp. 150-67; H. C. Coffin, "The Influence of Vergil on St. Jerome . . .," *C. W.*, XVII (1923-24), pp. 170-72; J. Dziech, "De Vergili Cultu apud Hieronymum," *Eos*, XXXIII (1930-31), pp. 101-15; H. W. Linn, "The Dream of St. Jerome," *Class. Bull.*, X (1933-34), pp. 22-24.

⁴ Attempts have been made, on scanty evidence, to connect passages in Jerome's works with Claudian's *Gigantomachia* (cf. Luebeck, *op. cit.*, p. 199; Birt, *op. cit.*, p. 346, *ad fin.*; E. Arens, *Quaestiones Claudianae* [Münster, 1894], p. 21, n. 1), *In Eutropium* (cf. Birt, *op. cit.*, pp. lxxviii, 110; Arens, *op. cit.*, p. 17), and *Panegyricus Dictus Probino et Olybrio* (cf. Arens, *op. cit.*, pp. 20 f.; M. Petschenig, *Wochenschr. für Klass. Philol.*, XII [1895], col. 947).

⁵ Jerome makes a single reference to the translation by Avienus of Aratus' *Phaenomena: Comment. in Epist. ad Titum*, I (= Migne, *Patrol. Lat.*, XXVI, col. 607A); cf. Pauly-Wissowa, *R.-E.*, s. v. "Avienus," col. 2386, lines 61-65.

II. Claudian, *In Rufinum*, II, 434-37: *prodigiale caput . . . iam de cuspidē summa / nutabat, digna rediens ad moenia pompa.* / *Dextera quin etiam ludo concessa vagatur / aera petens;* 498 f.: *insatiabilis auri / proluvies;* Jerome, *Epistles*, LX, 16, 1: *Rufini caput pilo Constantinopolin gestatum est et abscissa manus dextera ad dedecus insatiabilis avaritiae ostiatim stipes mendicavit.*

III. Claudian, *In Rufinum*, II, 440 f.: *Desinat elatis quisquam confidere rebus / instabilesque deos ac lubrica numina discat;* Jerome, *Epistles*, LX, 16, 2: *Non calamitates miserorum, sed fragilem humanae condicionis narro statum.*

To this theory of Birt's, Arens devotes a chapter of his *Quaestiones Claudianae*.⁶ He impugns the probative value of Birt's three parallels on two different grounds: (1) as to the first parallel, which he discusses apart from the other two, he holds that any similarity of expression may be fully explained as arising from the identity of the subject-matter;⁷ (2) he attempts to set aside the remaining two parallels on grounds of chronology and of general probability.⁸ Since the latter arguments, if valid, would apply equally to all three parallels, and not merely to the last two, it may be well to examine them first.

Arens' chronological objection is based on the assumption that the *In Rufinum* was first published in 397 A. D.; if this were so, it could not possibly have influenced the composition of Jerome, *Epistles* LX, for the latter was written during the Summer of 396.⁹ We may dismiss this argument at once, for the date of 397 which Arens uses is that of the Preface to Book II of the *In Rufinum*, which preface was composed for the second presentation of the poem. The two books of the *In Rufinum* proper, together with the Preface to Book I, were first made public at Milan in the early part of 396.¹⁰ Since, as we have seen, Jerome wrote his sixtieth epistle in the Summer of that year, and since he was in frequent communication with friends in Italy throughout this period,¹¹ there is no chronological bar to the acceptance of Birt's theory. Anticipating objections to his dating of the *In Rufinum*,

⁶ Arens, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-21. ⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 17 f. ⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 19 f.

⁹ Cf. F. Cavallera, *Saint Jérôme* (Louvain and Paris, 1922), II, pp. 44-46, 158; Grützmacher, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 79 f.

¹⁰ Cf. P. Fargues, *Claudien* (Paris, 1933), pp. 15 f.

¹¹ Cf. Grützmacher, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 145-270.

Arens¹² offers an alternative argument: it is not to be supposed, he holds, that Jerome, writing in Bethlehem on Eastern affairs, would consult the works of a Roman poet on matters concerning which he could more easily and quickly have gained information on the spot. I doubt very much that Birt meant to imply that Jerome used the *In Rufinum* as a factual source; at any rate, such an implication would be wholly unwarranted. Jerome evidently had quite independent sources of information regarding political affairs in the East, for he links Rufinus' downfall with those of two other consulars: Timasius, whom Claudian never mentions, and Abundantius, to whom Claudian was not to refer until the publication of the *In Eutropium* some years later.¹³ Entirely apart from the question of borrowed factual material, however, is that of the borrowing of rhetorical *flosculi*. With regard to the latter point Arens' objection is without force. His final argument is based on the ground that Jerome "solet falsa poetarum carmina et vanas fabulas irridere et vilipendere."¹⁴ This line of reasoning is summarily rejected by Koch,¹⁵ and rightly so. Not only is Jerome's deep and continued interest in Roman poetry well known as a general trait,¹⁶ but the very chapter which we are discussing contains two quotations from Vergil and one from Horace! Thus the chronological and other external objections voiced by Arens are without any real cogency.

On the other hand, Arens' first objection, if we once more apply it to all three parallels, instead of confining it, as he does, to the first, appears to be very well taken. Aside from the common mention of the rivers Halys and Orontes, and of river-water reddened by human blood—and these three common elements alone scarcely seem to furnish sufficient ground upon which to base a theory of literary influence—there would appear

¹² *Op. cit.*, p. 19, n. 2.

¹³ Cf. Claudian, *In Eutr.*, I, 154-70, Fargues, *op. cit.*, pp. 23 f. Even in the passage from Jerome appearing in Birt's second parallel, the word *ostiatim* seems to indicate an independent source of information; Claudian nowhere speaks of a door-to-door canvass.

¹⁴ Arens, *op. cit.*, p. 20. How little Arens himself thought of this argument is shown by the fact that in the very next paragraph he holds that Jerome read Claudian's panegyric on Probinus and Olybrius.

¹⁵ *Phil. Wochenschr.*, XVI (1896), col. 301.

¹⁶ Cf. n. 3, above.

to be no correspondences between the two works which could not readily be ascribed to the identity of the subject-matter. Thus, despite any faults which one may find in Arens' methodology, one must, I feel, agree with his conclusion that Birt does not succeed, with the parallels which he offers, in convincing us that Jerome was influenced by the *In Rufinum* in writing the chapter under discussion.

It is the purpose of this note to reopen the question by calling attention both to a parallel between the two works which is noticed neither by Birt nor by Arens, and to certain circumstances of St. Jerome's life which, though I believe they may be quite pertinent, have apparently not been discussed in this connection.

The parallel is one which is noted by Mommsen¹⁷ in his discussion of the devastation of Greece by the Goths after the withdrawal of Stilicho's army in 395. Claudian (*In Rufinum*, II, 187-91) asserts the claim that, had Stilicho not been forced to withdraw,

prodita non tantas vidisset Graecia caedes,
oppida semoto Pelopeia Marte vigerent,
starent Arcadiae, starent Lacedaemonis arces;
non mare fumasset geminum flagrante Corintho,
nec fera Cecropiae traxissent vincula matres.

With Claudian's enumeration compare the words of Jerome, *Epistles*, LX, 16, 4, on the same general subject: *Quid putas nunc animi habere Corinthios, Athenienses, Lacedaemonios, Arcadas, cunctamque Graeciam, quibus imperant barbari?* With the possible exception of *oppida . . . Pelopeia*,¹⁸ Jerome's list duplicates Claudian's. This fairly extended parallel, together with the slight correspondence noted above in regard to the rivers, might perhaps incline one to agree with Birt's theory. These internal indications would be much more convincing, however, if external evidence could be adduced which would

¹⁷ *Hermes*, XXXVIII (1903), p. 107, n. 1.

¹⁸ By these words Claudian may simply anticipate the reference to Arcadia and Sparta in the next verse (as *Graecia* in the first verse quoted anticipates the references in the remaining four verses), or he may refer to the cities of Argolis; cf. Pauly-Wissowa, *R.-E.*, s. v. "Peloponnesos," cols. 382 f.

render it probable that Jerome should have sought a copy of the *In Rufinum* soon after the poem was published, or should have been sent a copy by a friend resident in Italy. I believe that such evidence is perhaps available.

In the year 395 Jerome was engaged in a violent controversy with John, Bishop of Jerusalem.¹⁹ The latter, to rid himself of a troublesome adversary, procured a sentence of exile against Jerome. This sentence was never carried out.²⁰ Jerome refers to it in two passages: *Contra Iohannem Hierosolimitanum* XLIII:²¹ *<Iohannes> fratrum exsilia postulat . . . potentissimam illam feram, totius orbis cervicibus imminentem, contra nostras cervices specialiter invitavit . . .*; *Epistles*, LXXXII, 10, 1: *Nuper nobis postularit <Iohannes> et impetravit exsilium; atque utinam implere potuisset.* Now the *fera* in question is identified by Rauschen²² and by Grützmacher²³ as Flavius Rufinus, the Praetorian Prefect of the East, against whom Claudian's invective *In Rufinum* is directed. This identification seems to me to be established almost beyond reasonable doubt.²⁴ To no one else in the East, in the period which we are discussing, could the terms *potentissimam* and *totius orbis cervicibus imminentem* have been so aptly applied.²⁵ Rufinus is known to have used banishment as a weapon in religious disputes.²⁶ Moreover, as Rauschen²⁷ points out, the presence in Jerusalem at this time of the Pilgrim Salvia (or Silvia), who was the Prefect Rufinus' sister, helps to account for John's success in obtaining the sentence of exile. The fact that the sentence was never carried out is most easily explained as being due to Rufinus' murder on 27 November 395.²⁸

¹⁹ Cf. Cavallera, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 193-220.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, I, p. 219.

²¹ = Migne, *Patrol. Lat.*, XXIII, col. 411C.

²² G. Rauschen, *Jahrbücher der Christlichen Kirche* (Freiburg, 1897), p. 460.

²³ *Op. cit.*, III, p. 12.

²⁴ Cavallera, *op. cit.*, I, p. 219, n. 2, seems to me unnecessarily cautious. His "On pense" apparently echoes the tentative language of Migne, *Patrol. Lat.*, XXIII, col. 411, n. 2.

²⁵ On Rufinus' supreme power in the East between the date of Theodosius' departure for the West (394) and the date of Rufinus' death (November, 395), cf. H. L. Levy, *The Invective In Rufinum of Claudius Claudianus* (Geneva, N. Y., 1935), pp. 18-26; cf. also *ibid.*, pp. 11-14.

²⁶ Cf. *Cod. Theod.*, XVI, 5, 29; Levy, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

²⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 460, n. 3.

²⁸ Cf. Levy, *op. cit.*, pp. 25 f.

It may also be noted that the word *fera*, which is not a regular part of Jerome's vocabulary of abuse,²⁹ and which is generally quite rare as an epithet applied to a human being,³⁰ is one of the terms which Claudio³¹ applies to Rufinus. I believe, then, that we may safely assume that the Praetorian Prefect Rufinus was the official who issued the decree of exile against Jerome.

If this assumption is granted, it becomes quite probable that Jerome should have taken a lively interest in a poem celebrating the downfall of his would-be oppressor. Easy forgiveness of his adversaries was by no means a trait of Jerome's character.³² A work of vigorous invective, an art in which Jerome himself was adept,³³ may be supposed to have been congenial to his tastes. I therefore suggest that either (1) Jerome, hearing of the existence of Claudio's invective against Rufinus, sent to Italy for a copy of it, just as he had, on an earlier occasion,³⁴ asked Paul of Concordia that there be sent him (then, too, he was in the Orient)³⁵ a work of the pagan³⁶ Aurelius Victor, which he desired *propter notitiam persecutorum*, or (2) that friends of Jerome's in Italy, perhaps members of the Anician family (who were Claudio's first patrons),³⁷ hearing of Jerome's

²⁹ Cf. S. Seliga, "Quibus Contumeliis Hieronymus Adversarios Carpserit," *Eos*, XXXIV (1932-33), pp. 395-412.

³⁰ Cf. *Thes. Ling. Lat.*, s. v. "ferus," col. 607, lines 55-59.

³¹ *In Ruf.*, I, 262.

³² Cf. Grützmacher, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 14, 271, 275; II, p. 179; M. Schanz, *Geschichte der Römischen Literatur* (2nd ed., Munich, 1914), IV, p. 492; Cavallera, *op. cit.*, I, pp. vii, 12.

³³ Cf. Seliga, *loc. cit.*; cf. also *idem*, "De Hieronymi Scriptorum Colore Satirico," *Charisteria Gustavo Przychocki . . . Oblata* (Warsaw, 1934), pp. 277-94. "L'Invective dans les Écrits de Polemique de Saint Jérôme" is the title of an unpublished study reported in *Rev. Ét. Lat.*, XIV (1936), p. 389.

³⁴ Jerome, *Epistles*, X, 3, dated about 380. Cf. Cavallera, *op. cit.*, I, p. 43, n. 2; II, p. 155; Grützmacher, *op. cit.*, I, p. 127.

³⁵ Cf. Jerome, *Epistles*, X, 3, *orientalibus mercibus*; Cavallera, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 154 f.

³⁶ Cf. T. Opitz, *Acta Soc. Philol. Lipsiensis*, II (1872-74), p. 203; Schanz, *op. cit.*, IV, 73. On Jerome's lack of active hostility towards pagans, cf. Grützmacher, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 275-77.

³⁷ Cf. Fargues, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-12. For a later connection between Jerome and the Anicii, cf. Jerome, *Epistles*, CXXX; Cavallera, *op. cit.*, I, p. 322; Grützmacher, *op. cit.*, III, p. 252.

near escape from exile at Rufinus' hands, sent him a copy of the poem in token of his deliverance.

The foregoing considerations, while admittedly falling short of furnishing conclusive proof, do, I suggest, render much more plausible the suggestion of Birt that St. Jerome was influenced by Claudian's invective *In Rufinum* in composing the sixteenth chapter of his sixtieth epistle. It would be quite in keeping with the character of the period in which Jerome and Claudian wrote, that strange era of endings and beginnings,³⁸ if we were to find that the first great master of newly-arising Christian scholarship,³⁹ in composing his lament for the collapse of the Roman world, borrowed a few touches from the pagan poet who was the last great singer of that world's fast-vanishing glories.

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³⁸ Cf. Cochrane, *op. cit.*, pp. 318-57.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 344.

NOTES ON ATTIC INSCRIPTIONS.

One finds in the European journals now reaching America an occasional lag in the mutual understanding of many epigraphical problems which during the war have been studied separately on two continents. For example, Cavaignac had not yet received the new edition of the *Anonymous Argentinensis*, published as T9 in Meritt, Wade-Gery, and McGregor, *The Athenian Tribute Lists*, I (1939), p. 572, when he used the old version to support again arguments about the calendar in 431 B. C.,¹ and—going back much earlier even than this—he suggests² the restoration [$\epsilon\pi\lambda$] $K|páte\tauos \ddot{a}p\chio]v\tauos$ in *I. G.*, I², 295, lines 1-2, in order to avoid what seems to him the difficulty of having the Panathenaia, with the change in the boards of Treasurers of Athena, fall between Pryt. I, 13 and Pryt. I, *ultimo*, as must be the case with the accepted restoration [$\epsilon\pi\lambda$] $\lambda|p\sigmae\acute{u}dos \ddot{a}p\chio]v\tauos$. He revives a restoration that has been abandoned since the days of Rhangabé, and which Jotham Johnson has shown to be technically incorrect,³ the syllabic division of lines making $\lambda|p\sigmae\acute{u}dos$ the only possible restoration.⁴

These are small matters to correct, but the discussion must be brought up to date in order to spare further effort in the championing of lost causes. Even more spectacular has been the disappearance of certain false evidence concerning the sequence of prytanies in the conciliar year of Athens brought about by Wilhelm's new reconstruction of *I. G.*, I², 166.⁵ There is no evidence that the prytany next to function after any current prytany was ever known in advance except during the next-to-last prytany of a year, when of course the name of the last prytany was known by

¹ "La chronologie attique 433-404," *Rev. Et. Gr.*, LVII (1944), pp. 41-60, especially p. 47.

² *Loc. cit.*, p. 46.

³ *A. J. A.*, XXXIII (1929), pp. 398-400.

⁴ Cavaignac (*loc. cit.*, p. 51, note) also assigns Prepis as first secretary to the year 422/1. His date in 421/0 and his relation to Menekles, also of that year, have been discussed at length in *A. J. P.*, LXII (1941), pp. 10-15.

⁵ "Attische Urkunden IV," *Wien. Sitzb.*, 1939, pp. 61-63 and Plate IX. Cf. also *Hesperia*, X (1941), pp. 332-33.

the simple process of elimination.⁶ Hence Kahrstedt's latest suggestion to use *I. G.*, I², 166 as proof that at one time the sequence of prytanies in a year was regularly determined at the beginning of the year is invalid and must be rejected by all who study the constitutional antiquities of Athens.⁷ Only in the year 408/7, by way of exception, does there seem to have been a prearranged order; here the prytanies took their turns in the reverse of the so-called official order: the first prytany was Antiochis and the tenth was Erechtheis.⁸ I have attempted elsewhere to resolve an apparent conflict of evidence about this year between *I. G.*, I², 118, which names Eukleides as secretary when Antiochis was the phyle in prytany—hence the first secretary of the year—and *I. G.*, I², 313, line 175, where the restoration has indicated Dorotheos as the first secretary.⁹ The following text was proposed as part of *I. G.*, I², 313, and I suggested that Dorotheos was secretary of the Treasurers of Athena, thus causing no conflict with *I. G.*, I², 118:

ταμίαι[ς λιερῶν χρεμάτον τῆς Ἀθεναῖς]
 ἐπὶ Εὔκ[τέμονος ἀρχοντος καὶ ἐπὶ]
 175 Δοροθέο[γραμματεύοντος παρέδομεν]
 κατὰ φσέ[φισμα τῷ δέμῳ ἀργύριον]
 ἡνποθεμ[ένους χρυσίον τὸ ἐν τῷ]
 Ὀπισθοδ[όμοι ἐν κοίται χαλκέι]
 ἐκ τῆς τε[τάρτες θέκες].

The restoration seems to me valid, but I wish to propose now, not that Dorotheos was secretary of the Treasurers, but that he served as secretary of the Council in some prytany other than the first. His name occurs, I believe, in *I. G.*, I², 120, which I re-edit here:

PREAMBLE OF A DECREE. The upper left corner of a stele of Pentelic marble, found near the Stoa of Attalos, and now in the Epigraphical Museum (E. M. 6818). H. ca. 0.18 m.; W.

⁶ See now *C. Q.*, XL (1946), pp. 45-46, for an example from 417 B.C. in *I. G.*, I², 94.

⁷ U. Kahrstedt, "Untersuchungen zu athenischen Behörden, IV: Bemerkungen zur Geschichte des Rats der Fünfhundert," *Klio*, XXXIII (1940), pp. 1-12.

⁸ W. S. Ferguson, "The Athenian Secretaries," *Cornell Stud. Cl. Phil.*, VII (1898), p. 26, note A.

⁹ See *Athenian Financial Documents* (1932), pp. 28-29.

ca. 0.13 m.;¹⁰ Th. 0.08 m. The fascia on which line 1 is inscribed and the moulding below it do not return across the lateral face. Part of the flat top is preserved.

The writing of lines 4 ff. (ΕΣΥ) is stoichedon with a chequer-unit which measures 0.015 m. across and 0.022 m. down. Letters in line 1 are Ionic and in lines 2 ff. Attic; the one preserved letter in line 3 is 0.02 m. high, and other letters are 0.01 m. high.

I. G., I², 120 +. A drawing, showing also the profile of the moulding at the top of the stele, is given by S. A. Koumanoudes, 'Εφ. Ἀρχ., 1885, Plate between pages 160 and 161.

408/7 Δωρρ[όθεος^{ca. 8} . . . ἐγραμμάτευεν]
θ [ε^oⁱ]
E [υ κ τ ε μ ο ν ε ρ χ ε ν] ΣΤΟΙΧ.
ἔδοχσ[εν τέι βολέι καὶ τοι δέμοι· . . .^{ca. 9} . . . ἐπρυτά] 41 (?)
5 νευεν, [Δορόθεος ἐγραμμάτευεν, . . .^{ca. 9} . . . ἐπεστάτ]
ε, Εὐκτ[έμον ἐρχειν, ----- εἰπεν -----]

Koumanoudes (*loc. cit.*, p. 164) thought it hazardous to suggest restorations in lines 1 and 3, but the examples of *I. G.*, I², 119, 123, and 124 make it extremely probable that the name of the archon should be supplied in line 3. A regular spacing of the letters allows a text in lines 4 ff. of 41 letters on a line. This is an approximate figure, and may have been less if ἐρχε was written in line 3, and either more or less if the spacing in line 3 was irregular. The retention of nu-movable is recommended by the reading from the stone in line 5. Although Kirchhoff warned that the final nu in this line might be the beginning of the name of the secretary (*I. G.*, I, Suppl., p. 68, no. 62a), it seems preferable to take the name in line 1 as that of the secretary, for Dorotheos is otherwise known to have been a secretary in the year of Euktemon (*I. G.*, I², 313, line 175, quoted above). The restoration of line 1 given here is supported by the new text of *I. G.*, I², 313. Indeed, it is not impossible that this inscription is the decree to which reference is made in *I. G.*, I², 313, line 176, the date of the decree being given by the name of the archon and by the name of the secretary (usual in dating decrees) during the prytany in which it was passed.

Inscriptions published in American journals during the war have also begun to figure in comment and review from Europe.

¹⁰ The height and width as here given are estimated from a squeeze and from the drawing published by Koumanoudes. The thickness is given by Koumanoudes, 'Εφ. Ἀρχ., 1885, p. 163.

A large part of the last *Bulletin Épigraphique* edited by the Roberts (Jeanne and Louis) and printed in the *Revue des Études Grecques* (LVII [1944], pp. 175-241) is concerned with epigraphical studies which have appeared in America. It is a characteristic *Bulletin*, learned, comprehensive, and of inestimable value to the student of inscriptions who needs a competent bibliographical guide. It is also subject to judgments which are not always justified and it frequently confuses the important with the trivial. Commenting on my restorations in *I. G.*, I², 70, for example, Robert says (p. 186), "les changements apportés à l'édition de Wilhelm sont infimes." This is a critical judgment which the reader can control only by exploring the facts for himself; Robert gives none of them. But the changes involve corrections in one fragment which allow the text of lines 11-17 to conform to the letters on the stone and which remove an unwanted solecism in epigraphical style; they eliminate an impossible embarrassment in the interpretation of constitutional procedure by reading $\dot{\epsilon}\nu\tau[\epsiloni\dot{\alpha}\nu\tau\epsiloni]$ $\dot{\epsilon}\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha i$ instead of $\dot{\epsilon}\nu\tau[\epsiloni\dot{\alpha}\epsilon\tau\epsiloni]$ $\dot{\epsilon}\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha i$ in line 28; and they remove what I consider a major blemish by substituting $h\epsilon[os\dot{\alpha}\nu\zeta\epsiloni\dot{\epsilon}\nu\mu\tau\tau]l\alpha\tau$ $h\alpha\dot{\alpha}\nu\alpha s$ for $\dot{\eta}E[\dot{\nu}\mu\tau\tau\dot{\epsilon}\alpha\tau]l\alpha\tau$ $h\alpha\dot{\alpha}\nu\alpha s$ in line 31. There is no defense for an assumed dittography or for reading a clear *daseia* as $\dot{\eta}$. These technical details and matters of interpretation may seem to Robert "infimes" and part of those "détails qui sont parfois de faible ou de nulle importance" with which he indicts the entire article. I mention only these three items from *I. G.*, I², 70; there are other corrections too, of lesser importance, and perhaps Robert noticed only these.

Minor points again draw attention in Robert's comment on *Hesperia*, XIII (1944), p. 253. He notes the re-publication of this text with the observation that I "discute sur la restitution de deux lignes et republie le document entier."¹¹ But principally he scorns the corrections of $\tau\alpha\tau$ to $\tau\alpha\mu$ in line 19 and of $[\dot{\epsilon}\pi\alpha\tau]\dot{\epsilon}\sigma\alpha i$ $\delta\epsilon$ to $[\dot{\epsilon}\pi\alpha\tau]\dot{\epsilon}\sigma\alpha i\delta\epsilon\kappa\alpha i$ in line 14. These are indeed trivial

¹¹ Robert does not print a new text, but he repeats the old one in its entirety, except for the citations, in *Études Épigraphiques et Philologiques*, pp. 62-63 ff. Where complete republication of a new text is possible it is usually desirable in order to avoid the necessity for cumulative references.

matters, but since the text ought to be as nearly correct as care and attention can make it I have felt that the corrections should be introduced. This was managed as inconspicuously as possible in footnotes—and if the text were to be re-edited I should do the same again. These changes, however, were not the reason for republishing the inscription. Robert had given his own readings of the opening lines, but his text and commentary left these erroneous conclusions: (1) that the decree sanctioned only the appointment of a theorodokos, (2) that the formula of resolution should be supplied in line 5, and (3) that lines 1-5 belonged to the clauses of motivation. These misconceptions had to be corrected, and after Robert's preliminary work the clue that indicated how it could be done was easily discovered. It was another example, to be added to the many which every epigraphist can recall, of the way in which one study aids another until after a time a text can be established in which more than one contributor has had a share.¹² But in the *Bulletin Épigraphique* there is no mention of this, no reference to restorations in the *Études* that had to be rejected or improved, only the statement that I added a *kai* and spelled *τόν* as *τόμη*. This is irresponsible reporting, and the Roberts can do better when they wish. Other similar examples occur, most of them hardly worth individual comment or rebuttal, but in their cumulative effect they do much to lessen one's confidence in the objectivity of the report.

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¹² See, for example, B. D. Meritt, *Epigraphica Attica*, pp. 119-29.

THE HERSFELD MANUSCRIPT OF FRONTINUS' *DE AQUAEDUCTU URBIS ROMAE.*

Ever since Bücheler's edition of 1858, it has been generally admitted that the codex Casinensis 361 (= C) is the source of all other surviving manuscripts of Frontinus' treatise *De aqueductu urbis Romae*. Therefore all other manuscripts are virtually worthless. Bücheler and others assigned the Casinensis to the thirteenth century rather than to the twelfth, and only Gundermann in *Phil. Wochenschr.*, 1903, p. 1455, followed by F. Krohn in his good edition (Teubner, 1922, p. III), accepted Peter the Deacon, librarian of Monte Cassino in the first half of the twelfth century, as the writer of the manuscript. A facsimile of the Frontinus text was published by Clemens Herschel in *The Two Books on the Water Supply of the City of Rome* (Boston, 1899), and again by Dom Mauro Inguanez, librarian of Monte Cassino, in *Sexti Julii Frontini De aqueductu Urbis Romae* (Monte Cassino, 1930), with important additions from the same manuscript, which secure beyond doubt the identity of the writer as Peter the Deacon. This makes it possible to give a much more accurate date for this manuscript than has been hitherto recognized. Peter the Deacon—who will be the central figure in a forthcoming study of the author—must have copied the *De aqueductu* in or more probably before the year 1137. For in this year he dedicated to abbot Wibald of Monte Cassino the *Liber de locis sanctis*, the autograph of which follows the text of Frontinus in the cod. Cas. 361, separated only by an excerpt from the fifth book of Varro's *De lingua latina*. Since Peter was compelled to leave Monte Cassino in 1128 and returned before 1133,¹ it seems safe to conclude that this, the earliest extant manuscript of Frontinus' work, was written in Monte Cassino during the thirties of the twelfth century, but not after 1137.


In his recent new edition of *De aqueductu* Pierre Grimal has re-examined the problem of the manuscript tradition.² He

¹ On this phase of Peter the Deacon's life cf. E. Caspar, *Petrus Diaconus und die Monte Cassineser Fälschungen* (Berlin, 1909), pp. 22-23.

² Frontin, *Les Aqueducs de la Ville de Rome*. Texte établi, traduit et commenté par Pierre Grimal (Paris, 1944), pp. XVI-XXI.

has collated, besides the Casinensis (= C), the Urbinas (Vaticanus 1345) (= U), the Vaticanus 4498 (= V), and the Middlehillensis 1706 (= M), copied from V. But while Bücheler and Krohn had declared V also a descendant of C, Grimal offers a different solution.

In a letter written in 1425 to Niccolò Niccoli, Poggio Bracigliani mentions a manuscript (or manuscripts?) in Hersfeld containing among other works Frontinus and *aliqua opera Cornelii Taciti*.³ Grimal rashly asserts that the Vaticanus 4498 is a copy of this lost codex Hersfeldensis and comes to the following stemma (*op. cit.*, p. XX):



He, like all others who have dealt with Frontinus in the last thirty years, has not taken into account the fact that something definite is known about the Frontinus Hersfeldensis.

In 1913 a copy of the inventory which a Hersfeld monk had in person brought to Poggio in 1425 came to light within a larger inventory (*Commentarium*) prepared by Niccolò Niccoli in 1431. This *Commentarium* was intended to be used by two Cardinal Legates about to depart for the North. Niccolò's *Commentarium* is found at the end of a Cicero manuscript now in the Pierpont Morgan Library. It was first published in a catalogue of the Florentine dealer T. De Marinis. E. Jacobs called scholars' attention to the document;⁴ it was republished by R. Sabbadini⁵ and in definite form by R. P. Robinson.⁶

But in the excitement over the information which the new document conveyed in regard to the text history of Tacitus' minor works, its relevance for Frontinus was forgotten. W. Aly, not knowing the actual text of the *Commentarium*, thought it possible that the Vaticanus 4498 was derived from the Hersfeldensis, because, like the latter, it contained Frontinus, the

³ Cf. Rodney Potter Robinson, *The Germania of Tacitus* (Am. Philol. Ass., Monograph V [1935]), pp. 2-3.

⁴ *Phil. Wochenschr.*, XXX (1913), pp. 701-702 (without reprinting it).

⁵ *Storia e critica di testi latini* (1914), pp. 4-5.

⁶ *Class. Phil.*, XVI (1921), pp. 251-255; cf. also his *Germania*, pp. 6-7.

minor works of Tacitus, and Suetonius' *De grammaticis*, though intermingled with other works and in a different order.⁷ If Aly had known the text of the *Commentarium*, he never would have made this suggestion, which has created so much confusion.⁸ Both Krohn⁹ and Hosius¹⁰ have ignored the whole question. Therefore it will be suitable to reproduce the part of the inventory which deals with Frontinus (taken from Robinson's edition, *Class. Phil.*, XVI [1921], p. 252).

In Monasterio hispildensi^a haud procul ab alpibus continentur haec opuscula. videlicet.

Repertus. Julii Frontini De aquae ductis quae in urbem inducunt liber .j.^b Incipit sic. PERSECVTVS ea quae de modulis dici fuit necessarium. Nunc ponam quemadmodum queque aqua ut principium^c commentariis comprehensum est usque ad nostram curam habere visa sit &c. Continet hic liber XIIj.

Repertus. Item eiusdem frontini liber incipit sic. Cum omnis res ab imperatore delegata interiorem^d exigat &^e curam, & me seu naturalis solicitude seu fides sedula, non ad diligentiam modo, verum ad morem^f commisso rei instigent, sitque mihi nunc^g ab nerva augusto, nescio diligentiore an amantiore rei .p. imperatore aquarum iniunctum officium &^h ad usum &c. Continet .XI. folia.

^a scil. hersfeldensi. ^b Incipit prologus iulii frontini in libro de aqueducto urbis romae **C.** ^c principum **C.** ^d intentiorem **C.** ^e et om. **C.** ^f ad amorem quoque **C.** ^g nunc mihi **C.** ^h et om. **C.**

A comparison between Hersfeldensis (= **H**) and Casinensis (= **C**) reveals far reaching differences. The title in **H** does not inspire much confidence: the form *aqua ductum* (plural *aqua ducta*), while understandable in the African inscription *C. I. L.*, VIII, 2728 = *I. L. S.*, 5795, cannot be by Frontinus. Panormita, who undoubtedly had seen a copy of the inventory of the Hersfeld monk, gives in a letter to Guarino a corrected version of the title “*de aqueductibus qui in urbem Romam inducuntur.*”¹¹

⁷ *Rh. Mus.*, LXVIII (1913), pp. 636-637.

⁸ E. g., Grimal, *op. cit.*, p. XVIII.

⁹ In his edition of 1922 and in his report on Frontinus, *Burs. Jahresber.*, CCXVII (1928), p. 105, where he even quotes the inventory.

¹⁰ Schanz-Hosius, *Röm. Literaturgesch.*, II (1935¹), pp. 798-799. Cf. also Kappelmacher, *R.-E.*, X, 1 (1917), cols. 604-605.

¹¹ Cf. Robinson, *Germania*, p. 3.

More important is the reversal of the order of the two books in **H**, where the first book follows the second (cf. also Panormita's letter, *loc. cit.*). All known manuscripts have the correct order of **C**.¹² This difference alone is sufficient to dispel Aly's hypothesis and Grimal's stemma. The variants in the text may be in part explained as errors of the Hersfeld monk or later copyists. But neither **V**'s wrong reading *aquarum* for *aqua ut* of **C** (in ch. 64) is found in **H**, nor does **V** have any of **H**'s faulty readings.

It remains now to be seen whether a closer examination of **V** will not enable us to clarify the relationship between **C** and **V**. The Casinensis is, especially in the beginning, full of lacunae, many of which Peter the Deacon indicated by leaving space. Attempts at filling in these gaps such as in chs. 2, 6, and 129 demonstrate that at least not all these lacunae were caused by gaps in Peter's model, but rather by reading difficulties which Peter was unable to overcome. If **V** belonged to a different family, we should have to expect a rather wide divergence between **C** and **V**, particularly in the extent of the lacunae. Instead **V** has exactly the same gaps as **C**, frequently filled with reckless "emendations" which almost always turn out to be preposterous distortions of an already badly damaged text. To call the readings of **V** "parfois aberrantes"¹³ is an inconceivable understatement. A few examples may illustrate this point:

ch. 2: *precosit ei adi...orua decurrit* **C**; *praepositi ad i<ll>orum decurrit* editors; *praecessit ei a divo Nerva decurrit* **V**.
 ch. 7: *statium preture* **C**; *spatium praeturae* editors; *statuit preturam* **V**.
 ch. 22: *frontem Saeptorum* **C**, editors; *fontem scipionum* **V**.

What does it matter then, in view of this helpless fumbling, that **V** in ch. 17 has skipped a line (*maiores—muniendi rivi*), where **C** is legible, or that **V** reads *inde* in the beginning of ch. 23, where **C**—correctly—has *quoniam*? For Grimal¹⁴ these are indications of an independent tradition! The method of **V** is—aside from his incredible carelessness—to change words which for any reason are beyond his grasp into words which he does understand, even if the resulting sentence is patent nonsense.

¹² Also the codex Ambrosianus I, 29 sup., written in Rome in 1454 (Sabbadini, *Studi Ital.*, XI [1903], p. 307), which seems to have hitherto escaped notice of commentators on Frontinus.

¹³ Grimal, *op. cit.*, p. XIX.

¹⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. XIX, n. 5.

It should be noted, in this connection, that Poggio himself, the discoverer of the Frontinus in Monte Cassino, emphasized the difficulties which he experienced in reading the Casinensis in a letter written on July 9, 1429:¹⁵ *Portavi volumen hoc (scil. cod. Cas. 361) mecum, ut transcribam libellum Frontini, cum sit mendosus, et pessimis litteris, adeo ut vix queam legere.*

Grimal has a hard time to find passages in which the readings of **V** should be adopted in preference to those of **C**. He refers to three passages in particular which seem to him improvements by **V**.

1) In ch. 14 he reads in **C**: *adiectiones sex*; **V** has *adiectiones VI*. The correct reading as suggested first by Iucundus is *adiectione sui*. According to Grimal, the error in **V** represents a stage of the text anterior to **C**. Since **V** has systematically changed numerals given by **C** in letters into numbers, the reading *VI* is the logical result of this method. Peter's model had *adiectione sui* in continuous writing, which Peter misunderstood as *adiectiones VI* and transcribed as *adiectiones sex*; **V** simply changed *sex* back into *VI*.

2) In ch. 8 **C** has: *Tepula concipitur via Latina ad decimum miliarium, deverticulo euntibus ab Roma dextrorsus milium passuum duu< m>*. **V** reads *XI* instead of *decimum* and *unum* instead of *duu< m>*. A. Rocchi in *Studi e documenti di storia e diritto*, XVII (1896), pp. 125-142, tried to show that the *deverticulum* meant by Frontinus was not the via Cavona at Ciampino, exactly ten miles from Rome, but a rather hypothetical road which reaches the via Latina between the tenth and the eleventh milestone. It was the height of pedantry on the part of Rocchi on the basis of this hypothesis to reject the reading *decimum* (which Ashby, *Aqueducts of Ancient Rome*, p. 159, and Van Deman, *The Building of Roman Aqueducts*, p. 149, maintain) in favor of the reading *XI*, a change which is unnecessary even if one accepts Rocchi's opinion concerning the *deverticulum*. To claim the *XI* of **V** as an argument for the autonomy of this manuscript is all the more astonishing if one sees how often **V** has corrupted numbers: one example is given in the very sentence here discussed (*unum* for *duu< m>*); cf., besides, ch. 14, where **C** has correctly *a septimo miliario*, and *sexcentos novem*, whereas

¹⁵ *Epistolae*, III, 37, ed. Th. de Tonellis, vol. I, p. 284.

V gives *VI* and *dVIIII* (= 509), or ch. 15, where **C** has *sex milia*, but **V** *X milia*.

3) ch. 7: *†fontin sub buspetrei stat im<mobilis> stagni mo<do> colore praeviridi.* **V** reads *fontium* and *buspene*. Grimal adopts the long accepted emendation of the second part by Schultz and gives as his text of the first part: *fontium <aqua> sub <rupi>bus pene statim <stat>*, etc. But the explanation by way of dittography is not warranted in this case since Peter left space before *stat*, and both *fontium* and *pene* are easily misread for what **C** offers.

To base the opinion of an independent origin of a manuscript on passages like these is nothing but begging the question.¹⁶ We may conclude that R. P. Robinson was perfectly justified when he said that "of the Frontinus mentioned in the *Commentarium* all traces appear to have been lost."¹⁷

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¹⁶ It would have been better if Grimal had refrained from introducing highly conjectural readings of his own into the text which deserve hardly a place in the apparatus or in the notes. For instance, in ch. 6 he reads *[extra Portam Tiburtinam]* for *extra portam RRA nam*, although he is compelled to declare that these words were interpolated after the third century, and in ch. 21 he chooses to bracket *[in regionem Viae Novae]*, again as a late antique interpolation, identifying the street with the road built by Caracalla. Instead he should have assumed that it was an earlier street unknown to us (cf. Platner and Ashby, *Top. Dict. of Anc. Rome*, p. 565). Unfortunately, we do not have a complete street list of Rome in the time of Trajan. But it should be remembered that at least one other *Nova Via* existed since old times between Forum and Palatine. In ch. 76 **C** has: *sed postquam Nero imperator Claudiam opere arcuato † ascus excepta usque ad templum divi Claudi perduxit*, etc. Grimal reads *a specu exceptam* and translates "eut capté au conduit." There can be little doubt that Bücheler's reading *ad Spem excepta<m>* is the right solution, especially if one compares the parallel passage in ch. 19: *Prius tamen pars Iuliae ad Spem Veterem excepta castellis Caelii montis diffunditur*.

Philologists who suffer from *horror vacui* had better keep their hands from this treatise. Whoever desires a clear picture of the text of Frontinus still must consult Krohn's and even Bücheler's editions, by no means replaced by Grimal's work. A good edition of the chapters dealing with the topography of Rome (*De aq.*, 1-22; 79-93) is found in R. Valentini and G. Zucchetti, "Codice Topografico della Città di Roma I," *Fonti per la Storia d'Italia*, LXXXI (1940), pp. 9-36.

¹⁷ *Germania*, p. 27, n. 4.

CICERO AND THE *TRACTATUS COISLINIANUS*.

It has more than once been suggested ¹ that the source of the passage on wit and humor in the second book of the *De Oratore* of Cicero ² is the anonymous epitome of an essay on comedy known as the *Tractatus Coislinianus* ³ (the source of which is itself a matter of doubt ⁴) or that the contents of both documents so nearly correspond as to justify the assumption of a very close relationship.

What actual resemblances are there? The first and most obvious is the common division of wit into content and expression. Lane Cooper, Atkins, and Bernays,⁵ among others, are inclined to emphasize this, yet it can of itself establish no sort of relationship, for it is clear that such antitheses were part and parcel of rhetoric and of much other ancient thought as well. It is exactly similar to that antithesis between word and act which appears explicitly about fifty times in Thucydides, and it is in fact the

¹ J. W. H. Atkins, *Literary Criticism in Antiquity* (Cambridge University Press, 1934), II, p. 138; J. E. M. Arndt, *De ridiculi doctrina rhetorica* (Kirchhain, 1904), especially p. 35.

² *De Or.*, II, 216-234 (introductory), 235-290.

³ This treatise, probably of the first century B. C. (so Kayser; but the evidence is slight, and it may well be of later date), was discovered by Cramer in a tenth-century MS (*codex Coislinianus* 120) in the De Coislin collection in Paris, and published in his *Anecdota* in 1839; it has also been published in Joachim Bernays, *Zwei Abhandlungen über die aristotelische Theorie des Drama* (Berlin, 1880), p. 137, in Georg Kaibel, *Comicorum graecorum fragmenta* (Berlin, 1899), I, 1, pp. 50-53, and elsewhere. It is discussed at length in W. J. M. Starkie, *The Acharnians of Aristophanes* (London, 1909), and in Lane Cooper, *An Aristotelian Theory of Comedy* (Oxford, 1924), more briefly in Atkins, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 138-143, in J. F. D'Alton, *Roman Literary Theory and Criticism* (London, 1931), p. 361, and in M. A. Grant, *Ancient Theories of the Laughable: The Greek Rhetoricians and Cicero* (University of Wisconsin Studies in Language and Literature, no. 21, 1924), pp. 100-31.

⁴ Some—e. g., A. P. McMahon (“On the Second Book of Aristotle's *Poetics* and the Source of Theophrastus' Definition of Tragedy,” *H. S. C. P.*, XXVIII [1917], pp. 1-46)—regard it as the work of an illiterate; others—notably Bernays, Arndt, Rutherford, Starkie, and Cooper—believe that it embodies genuine Peripatetic tradition.

⁵ Lane Cooper, *op. cit.*, pp. 89, 92; Atkins, *loc. cit.*; Bernays, *op. cit.*, p. 169, n. 1.

same type of antithesis as that between *φύσις* and *νόμος*. Rhetorical theory is a mass of such—*θέσις* and *ὑπόθεσις*, *θέσις* of *cognitio* and *θέσις* of *actio*, *πίστις ἐντεχνος* and *πίστις ἀτεχνος*, *πίστις ἐντεχνος* derived *ex toto* and that derived *ex partibus*, argument *ex inductione* and argument *ex ratiocinatione*, *probabilia* as opposed to *necessaria*, and so on. The division of wit into content and expression was at least as old as Aristotle,⁶ and must have been a threadbare commonplace by the time of Cicero; and even if, as some believe, Cicero had never read Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, he was certainly already aware of the content-expression antithesis in the figures of thought and speech, an antithesis here worked to death by the later Greek⁷ and Roman⁸ rhetoricians.

When we turn to examine details, no truly significant resemblance appears. Under wit derived *ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων*, the *Tractatus* lists nine divisions; Cicero enumerates twenty-six types of wit *in re*,⁹ and then six main heads under which these are to fall.¹⁰ In these two sets, Cicero's *exspectationes deceptae* (consisting of *discrepantia*,¹¹ "biter bit,"¹² and two types of *παρὰ προσδοκίαν* in situation, not verbal expression¹³) correspond to *παρὰ προσδοκίαν* in the *Tractatus*, as *similitudo* (consisting of *similitudo conlationis*¹⁴ and *similitudo imaginis*¹⁵) to *ὅμοιωσις*.

⁶ Cf. Aristotle, *Rhet.*, 1371b34–1372a1. H. Jentsch (*Aristotelis ex arte rhetorica quaeritur quid habeat Cicero* [Berlin, 1866]) believes that Cicero had not read the *Rhetoric*; Wilhelm Kroll ("Studien über Cicero's Schrift *De Oratore*," *Rh. Mus.*, LVIII [1903], pp. 552-97) agrees; contrast Friedrich Solmsen, "The Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric," *A.J.P.*, LXII (1941), pp. 35-50, 169-90; *idem*, "Aristotle and Cicero on the Orator's Playing on the Feelings," *C.P.*, XXXIII (1938), pp. 390-404. Certainly his knowledge of the *Ethics* and *Politics* was inaccurate and second-hand.

⁷ The authors in vol. VIII of Walz's *Rhetores Graeci*.

⁸ Rutilius Lupus, Aquila Romanus, Julius Rufinianus, and sundry *anonymi*.

⁹ *De Or.*, II, 264-290.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, II, 289; it is not easy to arrange all the subdivisions under these six divisions; two subdivisions (*consentaneum* in 283 and *sententiose ridicula* in 286) refuse to fit into the scheme at all; perhaps they belong to a hypothetical seventh class, on which cf. A. S. Wilkins and K. W. Piderit on 289.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, II, 281.

¹² *Ibid.*, II, 277.

¹³ *Ibid.*, II, 274; 284-5.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, II, 265.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, II, 266.

Neither correspondence should be urged as a proof of close relationship: if Professor X writes a Greek grammar and says the genitive of ἄνθρωπος is ἄνθρωπον, is he thereby indebted to Roger Bacon's thirteenth-century Greek grammar? As Kirby Flower Smith says in another connection, "one may speak of a 'gay Lothario' without incurring the suspicion of being acquainted with Nicholas Rowe even by name." The principle of unexpectedness was a commonplace emphasized since the day of Aristotle,¹⁶ while the concept of *similitudo*, another commonplace, was more likely derived from Cicero's rhetorical studies: as later rhetoricians might have put it, δομοίωσις πρὸς τὸν χείρονα¹⁷ is an obvious reflex of δομοίωσις πρὸς τὸν βελτίονα in the encomium.¹⁸ Of the other seven types of content-wit in the *Tractatus*, there is no trace in Cicero.

Arndt admits the lack of significant correspondence between the divisions *in re* and those ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων, but endeavors to show that the six divisions *in verbo* and the seven ἀπὸ τῆς λέξεως are closely related, indeed, are virtually identical. *Ambiguum*¹⁹ in Cicero, to be sure, corresponds clearly and definitely to δομονυμία, but this is the one precise correspondence between the two sets. We are on far less certain ground when Arndt explains σχῆμα λέξεως as equivalent to ἀντίθεσις (i. e., Cicero's *verba relata contrarie*²⁰), citing Aristotle's *Rhetic* 1410 b 29,²¹ and endeavors to identify παρονυμία with Cicero's *adnominatio*²² (for which the corresponding Greek term is παρονομασία); but σχῆμα λέξεως has

¹⁶ *Rhet.*, 1412a17-1412b29.

¹⁷ Cicero actually uses the phrase *similitudo turpioris* (*De Or.*, II, 289). On the close connection between rhetoric and the "academic" study of wit, cf. *infra*, notes 20 and 42.

¹⁸ Cf. Doxopater *apud* Walz, *Rhetores Graeci* (Stuttgart and Tübingen, 1832-6), II, p. 446.

¹⁹ *De Or.*, II, 250-4; already emphasized by Aristotle: *Soph. Elen.*, 165b30; *Rhet.*, 1404b37-39; *An. Post.*, 85b11.

²⁰ *De Or.*, II, 263; properly, this is a *figura*, but εἶδη of wit and *figurae* are confused in the *ad Herennium*, in Cicero, in Quintilian, and in Demetrius περὶ ἐρμηνείας: cf. M. A. Grant, *op. cit.*, pp. 105, 149 (n. 13), 153 (n. 55).

²¹ Cf. also Aristotle, *Rhet.*, 1401a1-7 and Cope-Sandys, *The Rhetoric of Aristotle* (Cambridge University Press, 1877), II, pp. 303-4, III, p. 110.

²² *De Or.*, II, 256; with this is associated *interpretatio nominis*: II, 257.

been correctly explained by Kaibel,²³ and *παρωνυμία* (which refers in the *Tractatus* to comic word-coinage) in the sense of *παρονομασία* occurs only in Aquila Romanus,²⁴ where the text is correctly emended to *παρονομασία*. Arndt further identifies *ἐξαλλαγή* in the *Tractatus* with Cicero's *unius verbi translatio*²⁵ (i. e., metaphor, *ἐξηλλαγένα ὄνόματα*²⁶) as does Kaibel.²⁷ This is possible only if Johannes Tzetzes' text of the *Tractatus* be read,²⁸ but both Arndt and Kaibel read the received text, where the meaning can only be "through a variation (*ἐξαλλαγή*) produced by voice inflection and similar means."²⁹ But if Tzetzes' text be read and Arndt's explanation of *ἐξαλλαγή* accepted, his interpretation of *σχῆμα λέξεως* becomes flatly impossible. In the remaining divisions *in verbo* and *ἀπὸ τῆς λέξεως* there are no correspondences: in the Greek treatise, comic substitution of a synonym (*συνωνυμία*), verbosity (*ἀδολεσχία*), and comic use of diminutives (*ἰντοκρίσμα*) have no connection with Cicero's verbal unexpectedness (*aliud exspectamus, aliud dicitur*³⁰), comic use of quotations (*versus interpositi*³¹) and proverbs (*proverbia*³²), and comic use of literal interpretation (*ad verbum accipere*³³), of allegory (*inmutata oratio*³⁴), and of irony (*verborum inversio*³⁵).

²³ *Op. cit.*, p. 51, n. 16, referring to Aristotle, *Soph. Elen.*, 166a10-14; Starkie's explanation is similar.

²⁴ Karl Halm, *Rhetores Latini Minores* (Leipzig, 1863), pp. 30, 32. The corruption arose from the false form *παρωνυμασία*, on which cf. Spalding on Quintilian, VI, 3, 53. For *παρονομασία* as opposed to *παρωνυμία*, cf. Alexander, *De Figuris* (Walz, *Rhet. Graec.*, VIII, 477) and Herodianus, *De Figuris* (*ibid.*, 595).

²⁵ *De Or.*, II, 261.

²⁶ Cf. Aristotle, *Poet.*, 1457b3, 1458a6, 1458b2-3; *Rhet.*, 1404b8.

²⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 51, n. 15.

²⁸ *Prooemium A*, IV, 17 (*apud* Kaibel, *op. cit.*, p. 9), where *ἐναλλαγήν* was originally read for *ἐξαλλαγήν*, and *τῇ φύσει καὶ τοῖς δμογενέσι* is attached to *κατὰ σχῆμα λέξεως* (which seems impossible: cf. Bernays, *op. cit.*, p. 176). Starkie (Introd., p. lvii) explains *ἐξαλλαγή* as *παρονομασία, παραγραμματισμός*, which seems even less likely than Arndt's and Kaibel's view.

²⁹ And so Lane Cooper (*op. cit.*, p. 236); but *δμογενής* in the sense (almost) of *τοιοῦτος* is odd. Bernays (*op. cit.*, p. 177) explains *δμογενῆ* as "Wörter, deren Begriffe zu derselben Gattung aber zu verschiedenen Species gehören"; this, however, trespasses on the domain of *συνωνυμία*.

³⁰ *De Or.*, II, 255-6.

³² *Ibid.*, II, 259-260.

³¹ *Ibid.*, II, 257.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, II, 261.

³² *Ibid.*, II, 258.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, loc. cit.

Since the divisions *in re* and *ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων* have no significant common features, and since of those *in verbo* and *ἀπὸ τῆς λέξεως* only one pair clearly corresponds, Arndt's *congruunt catalogus Coislinianus et Ciceronis disputatio* (p. 35) is an overstatement.

Of course, it is true that neither author is attempting to work from first principles in order to construct a universally valid theory of the psychological basis of laughter; by the one, wit is considered solely as it applies to the comic playwright, by the other, it is discussed in its rôle as an adjunct of rhetoric, as an additional means of holding an audience, of making them *benevolos et attentos*. Accordingly, one might argue (as does Arndt) that Cicero took from the *Tractatus* only so much as served his immediate purpose, omitting what was suitable only for the stage, as, for example, *φορτικὴ χρῆσθαι ὁρχήσει*. The only item derived from the *Tractatus* would in that case be *ambiguum* (*δμωνυμία*). But a good many of the divisions of *λέξις* and *πρᾶγμα* could have been transferred bodily: although the number of diminutives in Latin falls far below that in Greek, *ὑποκόρισμα* might well have been employed somewhere,³⁶ as might *παρωνυμία*³⁷ and others; even *ὅταν . . . λαμβάνῃ* could have been adapted to Cicero's purpose, considering the frequency in the Roman courts of jests made at the orator's own expense,³⁸ and *φορτικὴ χρῆσθαι ὁρχήσει* could, in a pinch, have been adapted to refer to vulgar or indecent gesticulation, in which Cicero indulged at least once in his career:³⁹ for that matter, the *actio* of many a Roman orator was not far removed from *ὅρχησις*.⁴⁰

The only resemblances, then, are the common division into content and expression, the correspondence of *ambiguum* and *δμωνυμία*, and a common emphasis⁴¹ on *τὸ ἀπροσδόκητον*, all three already emphasized by Aristotle. Considering how widespread

³⁶ A diminutive appears in a particularly unpleasant witticism in *De Or.*, II, 262; it is, however, an example of wit *ex inversione verborum*, and the point does not depend on the use of a diminutive form.

³⁷ Cf. such Latin examples as those in Plautus, *Trin.*, 988; *Persa*, 830; *Capt.*, 775; *Cure.*, 506; *Poen.*, 991, 1197, etc.

³⁸ Noted (with disapproval) by Quintilian (VI, 3, 82).

³⁹ *Ibid.*, VI, 3, 25, with H. E. Butler's note (Loeb edition, II, p. 450).

⁴⁰ *Brut.*, 225 (*saltatio*), 303; cf. also 216.

⁴¹ But not a common treatment; in the *Tractatus*, verbal *παρὰ προσδοκῶν* is ignored, whereas in Cicero its treatment is quite elaborate.

were the leading ideas of rhetorical theory, one cannot regard such coincidence as remarkable: some slight similarity was practically inevitable. Cicero was dealing with a topic which, he realized, had been thoroughly canvassed by the Greek rhetoricians,⁴² one indication being the fact that he makes no claim to originality: if he had had any such claim to make, we may be sure that Cicero was not the man to hide his light.⁴³ Nor is it conceivable that, with an abundance of treatises from which to choose, he should have turned to a rather obscure essay on a form of literature of which (theoretically, at least) he disapproved on ethical and moral-didactic grounds.⁴⁴

Cicero's interest in literary theories of tragedy and comedy must have been languid at best. He knew the Greek and early Roman⁴⁵ drama well, and could quote them appositely, but there is no evidence in any of his writings that he was interested in dramatic criticism as such. It is most likely that he had never read Aristotle on tragedy; it is even less likely that he had ever seen the *Tractatus*.

⁴² *De Or.*, II, 217: Arndt regards this passage as an allusion to Theophrastus and Demetrius of Phalerum; but it is possible that the books here referred to were merely collections of anecdotes like Dean Ramsay's *Reminiscences of Scottish Life and Character*: cf. Wilkins *ad loc.* J. M. Edmonds (*The Characters of Theophrastus* [London, 1929], Introd., p. 6) remarks that the *ἡθικαὶ χαρακτῆρες* of Theophrastus introduced a vogue for light literature; this together with Theophrastus' and Demetrius' treatises *περὶ γέλοιον* (cf. Diogenes Laertius, V, 46; Athenaeus, VIII, 348; Christ-Schmidt, II, 1, p. 65), various treatises *περὶ κωμῳδίας*, and, of course, the New Comedy, must have stimulated an interest in the rhetorical study of wit. But the connection between wit and academic rhetoric was as old as Gorgias (Aristotle, *Rhet.*, 1419b2-7; cf. M. A. Grant, *op. cit.*, p. 18).

⁴³ He is proud, for example, of his original treatment of prose-rhythm: *Or.*, 226.

⁴⁴ *Tusc. Disp.*, IV, 69; *De R. P.*, IV, 11; but he enjoyed Aristophanes (*De Leg.*, II, 37) and it was Cicero who described comedy as *imitationem vitae, speculum consuetudinis, imaginem veritatis* (*De R. P.*, IV, 13; cf. Donatus, *De Com.*, *apud* Kaibel, *op. cit.*, p. 67; for the later history of the phrase, cf. J. W. H. Atkins, *English Literary Criticism: The Mediaeval Phase* [Cambridge University Press, 1943], pp. 32-3) although he denied the name of poet to the comic dramatist: *Or.*, 67. On Cicero and comedy, cf. further M. A. Grant, *op. cit.*, pp. 96-9.

⁴⁵ Cf. Wilhelm Zillinger, *Cicero und die altrömischen Dichter* (Würzburg, 1911); Ernst Schollmeyer, *Quid Cicero de poetis Romanorum iudicaverit* (Diss., Halle, 1884).

There seems at present no good reason for departing from the notion⁴⁶ that Cicero's main source—apart from his own long and varied experience in the court-room⁴⁷—was the *περὶ γελοίου* of Theophrastus or that of Demetrius of Phalerum. It is possible that in his discussions of style Cicero did not directly use Theophrastus' *περὶ λέξεως* but some intermediate source based upon it;⁴⁸ the same possibility, of course, holds true for the *περὶ γελοίου*.

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⁴⁶ Christ-Schmid, II, 1, p. 79, n. 4. Doubtless there was some connection with Panaetius as well: cf. G. C. Fiske, *Lucilius and Horace* (University of Wisconsin Studies in Language and Literature, no. 7, 1920), chap. 2; *idem*, "The Plain Style in the Scipionic Circle" (*ibid.*, no. 3, 1919), pp. 62-105.

⁴⁷ Cicero himself was notorious for the vigor of his wit and repartee: some thought he went too far (Quintilian, VI, 3, 2-3; Plutarch, *Cic.*, 27, 1) but not so Quintilian (VI, 3, 3), far less Cicero himself (*pro Planc.*, 35). Every witty saying current in Rome came to be attributed to him (*ibid.*), including some he never uttered (*ibid.*; Quintilian, VI, 3, 4; cf. Spooner and Jowett). C. Trebonius, one of the murderers of Caesar (Caesar, incidentally, claimed to be able to distinguish a true Ciceronian *mot* from a false: *Ad Fam.*, IX, 16, 4), made a collection of Cicero's witticisms (*ibid.*, XV, 21, 2), as also did Tiro (Quintilian, VI, 3, 5). On Cicero's oratorical practice, cf. Paul Faulmüller, *Ueber die rednerische Verwendung des Witzes und der Satire bei Cicero* (Grünstadt, 1906).

⁴⁸ Cf. Ludwig Radermacher, "Theophrast *περὶ λέξεως*," *Rh. Mus.*, LIV (1899), p. 376.

TWO NOTES ON THE GREEK DANCE.

I. "THE FOX."

In Greek and Roman literature a female Dionysiac dancer is sometimes called a *βασσάρα*, or *βασσάρη*, or *βασσαρίς* (Athenaeus, V, 198 E; Aeschylus, II, pp. 386-7 [Loeb]; Anacreon, frag. 57 [Loeb]). The word *βασσάρα*, *βασσάρη* also denotes a fox (Lycophron, 771; Hesychius, s. v. *βασσάρη*; *Et. Mag.*, 190, 52). Herodotus, in naming the animals of Libya (IV, 192) uses *βασσάριον* with similar meaning. Again, *βασσάρα* means the characteristic garment of the Thracian Bacchantes, probably originally made of fox-skins (Anacreon, frag. 29 [Loeb]; Hesychius, s. v. *βασσάραι*). Anacreon (frag. 76, line 6 [Loeb]) uses *βασσαρέω* to mean "take part in a Dionysiac dance."

On a highly significant inscription of the second century of the Christian era, discovered recently near Tusculum, and now in the Metropolitan Museum in New York, there is a list of members of a Dionysiac *thiasos*, in which not only names, but also "degrees" or grades of initiation are given. Among the members, four are ranked as "Chief Foxes"; two are men (*ἀρχιβασσάροι*), two are women (*ἀρχιβασσάραι*).¹

The ancient writers are aware that *βασσάρα* is a non-Greek word, and they speak of it variously as Thracian, Phrygian, Cyrenian, Libyan, or Lydian. In general, they seem to favor a Thracian origin. In Thrace, of course, the fox was a particularly sacred animal. It figured not only in the cult of Dionysus, but as a totem animal as well. The fox-skin garments and caps affected by Thracian worshippers were not merely warm clothes; for the skin of an animal, when worn in primitive religious ceremonies, is always of ritualistic significance.

It is known that the Thracians practiced tattooing.² Fre-

¹ Achille Vogliano, "La grande iscrizione Bacchica del Metropolitan Museum," *A. J. A.*, XXXVII (1933), pp. 215-31.

² Herodotus, V, 6; Cicero, *De Off.*, II, 25; Pausanias, IX, 30; cf. Wilhelm Tomaschek, "Die alten Thraker," *Wien. Sitzb.*, CXXVIII (1893), No. IV, pp. 101, 117; William Ridgeway, *The Early Age of Greece* (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1901-31), II, pp. 482-98; Gawril Kazarow, *R.-E.*, s. v. "Thrake, Religion."

quently the device used was an animal, with totemistic or ritualistic implications. A fragmentary cylix of the fifth century, found on the Acropolis at Athens, depicts a Thracian woman attacking Orpheus.³ Upon her right upper arm is tattooed a schematic representation of an animal variously interpreted as a stag or a goat. The legs of the creature, as depicted, are certainly too short for a stag. Beyond that, the identity of the animal is difficult to determine; but the head and neck do not resemble those of a goat. It seems to me that the drawing rather suggests a fox.

As it happens, we have a record of a Greek dance called "the fox"—ἀλώπηξ. Hesychius defines it as follows: ὅρχησίς τις. καὶ ἀλωπεκία μώμων, ὡς Σοφοκλῆς (usually emended to ὡς Σοφοκλῆς Μώμων). ὅπερ ἔστιν ἐν σώματι πάθος γενόμενον. Commentators have generally agreed that the last clause is an intrusion, and that it probably indicates a confusion of ἀλωπεκίας, -ον, with ἀλωπεκία, "mange" (common to foxes and other animals). The word ἀλωπεκίας is used also by Lucian (*Pisc.* 47), in a passage referring to the proposed branding of false philosophers with the representation of a fox or an ape: Parrhesiades tells Philosophy that she will soon see a great many ἀλωπεκίας ἡ πιθηκοφόρος. It seems to me that in Greek the word ἀλωπεκία must denote "wearers of the representation of a fox," whether they be branded or tattooed or masked. Perhaps Lucian's usage is even a sort of pun, with a side reference to the Bacchantes. I believe that the gloss of Hesychius, corrupt as it is, permits us to infer that Sophocles used the plural ἀλωπεκίαι to denote dancers—i. e., "fox dancers"—or the dance itself. It is not uncommon to find a plural noun used as the name of a dance—for instance, *πινακίδες* (Pollux, IV, 103), *δάκτυλοι* (Athenaeus, XIV, 629 E); and, named for the participants, *σκῶπες* (Hesychius, *s. v.*), *ναλκάδαι* (Hesychius, *s. v.*), *καλλιβάντες* (Hesychius, *s. v.*), *ὑπογύπωνες* (Pollux, IV, 104).

On the marble drapery found in the shrine of Despoina at Lycosura,⁴ eleven female figures wearing animal masks and foot-gear run along in a rapid processional dance, to the music of

³ A. B. Cook, *Zeus* (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1914-40), II, pp. 121-3 and Fig. 76; Furtwaengler-Reichhold, *Gr. Vasenmalerei*, I, 284.

⁴ Guy Dickins, "Damophon of Messene," *B. S. A.*, XIII (1906-7), pp. 392-5 and Plate 14.

lyre and double flute. The marble drapery seems to be a reproduction of actual embroidered drapery offered to the goddess in earlier times, and to reflect ritual practices of great antiquity. Despoina, "the Lady," is an old deity of fertility, a "Mistress of Animals," among other things. We know that mystery rituals had a place in her cult; probably the "dancing beasts" of the drapery participated in them. At least one of the figures on the drapery (and perhaps two) wears a fox-mask.

Several terracotta figurines of the early Iron Age, found in Cyprus, portray votaries wearing or removing animal masks. Some of these figures wear a rough, shaggy garment suggestive of an animal's skin. At least one of the votaries wears a mask which looks very much like the head of a fox.⁵

There seems to have been a great deal of animal mummery, with or without masks, in primitive worship throughout the Mediterranean region. Sometimes, as on the Lycosura drapery, various animals are imitated in one procession, and at other times all the mummers portray one type of animal. Evidently there was fawn, goat, horse, bird, and other mummery in the Greek worship of Dionysus. Among the names of Greek dances which are preserved, several are the names of animals—"lion," "owl," "boar," etc. In like manner, a dancer is sometimes called a "bear," a "raven," a "griffin," etc., and certain priests and priestesses (presumably dancers also) are called "bees," "colts," "bulls," "doves," etc. Titles of comedies are frequently animal names, usually with reference to a singing and dancing chorus of animal mummers. Evidently participation in ritualistic mummery was from earliest times considered and called a dance.

I believe, then, that, in the terminology of the dance, *βασσάρα* and *ἀλώπηξ* may be two different words, one native Greek and one foreign, for virtually the same thing—participation in, or a participant in, fox mummery in honor of a divinity of fertility and animal life. Variant terms for the participants seem to have been the plural nouns *βασσάραι*, *βασσάροι*, *βασσαρίδες*, *ἀλωπεκίαι*. The mummery may have contained little actual mimicry of the animal—cf. our "fox trot." As in other types of beast mum-

⁵ John L. Myres, *Handbook of the Cesnola Collection of Antiquities from Cyprus* (Metropolitan Museum, 1914), p. 342, No. 2077.

mery, the participant, in early times at least, must have identified himself with the animal whose skin or mask or attributes he wore, and hoped to acquire some of the animal's characteristics for himself. In later times the mask would disappear or become a cap, the garment would become merely a conventionalized representation of the animal's skin, and the mummery would be rather symbolical than realistic.

One odd bit of corroboration for our hypothesis may be seen in the fact that a city of the Thracian Chersonese was called *'Αλωπεκόνησος*, and that a coin-type of the city was a *βασσάρα*—a dancing Bacchante.⁶

Quite evidently the fox and fox mummery were of more importance in Thracian religion than they were in that of Greece. This would be natural in view of the fact that the fox is more of a northern than a southern animal; however, the fox was common enough in Africa and in the Peloponnesus, as we are aware from Greek literature. Lycosura, of course, is in the Peloponnesus; and Cyprus had cultural connections with Africa.

It is an arresting thought that the legend of the Thracian Orpheus, playing and singing so beautifully that wild animals followed him (Euripides, *Bacch.* 561-4; Pausanias, IX, 30, 3-4), may be merely a poetic record of primitive beast mummery in Thrace, in which the masked and skin-clad performers, representing beasts of many types, followed a musician. The rocks and trees which also are said to have followed Orpheus may be a later elaboration.

II. "POURING OUT THE BARLEY."

Among the obscure names of Greek dances which have been handed down to us is *ἀλφίτων ἐκχύσεις*—"the pouring out of the barley meal." Athenaeus (XIV, 629 F) includes it in a list of "comical" dances of various sorts, but gives no further information on it.

In India, at a festival of the Nāgas, or serpent divinities, bruised rice is poured out on the ground, and the figure of a snake is molded or traced in it. An all-night dance then takes place, over and around the meal, during which the leader of the dance

⁶ Lewis R. Farnell, *Cults of the Greek States* (Oxford Univ. Press, 1896), II, p. 335.

imitates the writhing of a serpent.¹ In other parts of India, sandalwood powder or turmeric is used in much the same way.²

A similar element is found in the snake dance of the Hopi Indians. Before they take the snakes out of the "snake pit," the Hopi sprinkle corn meal on the ground or on the plank covering the pit, in such a way that the meal looks like a snake; and they then proceed to dance upon and around the corn meal, stamping heavily. Also, corn meal is poured on the ground after the snake-carrying, and the snakes are thrown on it.³

The physician Galen once visited the island of Lemnos to test stories that the earth of that place was efficacious in curing snake-bite and the bites of savage beasts, and in offsetting the effects of poisonous drugs (*De Temp. et Fac.*, IX, 1, 2). He found the priestess gathering the earth with various ceremonies, including throwing wheat and barley on the ground, and "doing certain other things prescribed by the ritual of the place." Surely among these must have been rhythmical movements around the poured-out grain. The rite looks like sympathetic magic, performed to invoke serpent-power in the earth to combat the poison of a wound or bite.

The dance called "the pouring out of the barley meal," then, could be an old serpent dance. It would have been originally of deep and dread significance. Later, as civilization developed, and as the fear of poisonous serpents lessened, it would have become merely a *tour de force*—one of the many "dances over a pattern on the floor" which are found in various parts of the world. With its exaggerated writhings and contortions of the body, it could have become Athenaeus' "comical" dance. It may have developed ultimately into a mere game—as our hop-scotch has done, although it, too, was originally a snake dance over a pattern on the floor.

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¹ J. P. Vogel, *Indian Serpent-Lore* (London, Probsthain, 1926), p. 275.

² *Ibid.*, p. 279.

³ D. H. Lawrence, *Mornings in Mexico* (New York, 1931), pp. 156, 170; Walter Hough, *The Moki Snake Dance* (Santa Fe Railroad, 1901), pp. 6, 9; John G. Bourke, *The Snake Dance of the Moquis of Arizona* (Scribner's, 1884), pp. 165-6.

REVIEWS.

Servianorum in Vergili Carmina Commentariorum Editionis Harvardiana Vol. II, quod in Aeneidos libros I et II explanationes continet. Edited by EDWARD KENNARD RAND, HOWARD TAYLOR SMITH, JOHN JOSEPH SAVAGE, GEORGE BYRON WALDROP, JOHN PETERSEN ELDER, BERNARD MANN PEEBLES, ARTHUR FREDERICK STOCKER. Lancaster, Pa., Lancaster Press, 1946. Pp. xxi + 509. \$5.00. (Special Publication of the *American Philological Association*.)

The appearance of the first volume of the "Harvard Servius" is reassuring evidence that the editors are making steady progress towards their announced objectives and encourages us to believe they will one day bring the great enterprise to completion. Optimists who may have hoped for new light on Vergil may be disappointed. Experienced hunters in the wilderness where the traces of ancient and mediaeval text-traditions must be sought will be ready to share the unexpressed disappointment of the editors that their magnificent palaeographical and critical efforts have not yet availed to settle "the Servius Question" or clear up as many of the smaller textual vexations, especially in the DS text, as might have been hoped. But disappointment is the wrong note to sound. The editors have presented a definitive edition of the "true Servius" and disentangled from it as well as can possibly be expected the text of another important commentary on Vergil, whether it be the work of Donatus or somebody else. In the welter of mediaeval scholia, here are two rocks to cling to. Vergilian scholarship cannot help but benefit. The students of other text-traditions, the sifters of other scholia collections, and students of mediaeval culture generally will profit beyond calculation. It may be necessary to wait some time still before one should attempt to make a fair appraisal of the new edition. This is only the first of five projected volumes. The editors have not published their prolegomena or even summarized for us their final opinions on many important matters. The rest of the *Aeneid* and the commentary on the *Bucolics* and *Georgics* pose textual problems of a different kind from those of *Aeneid* I-II. The following review must consequently be thought of as having a definitely provisional character.

Was a new edition of Servius necessary? Probably no one, from the time of Scaliger to the Harvard editors, who ever made a serious attempt to decide how much of the text in his hands was actually that of Servius, has ever doubted that a good edition of Servius would one day have to be made. At least, a dozen attempts have been made to do this, starting with Iacobus Rubeus in 1475 and ending with Thilo and Hagen (1881). The history of Servius scholarship and, in particular, of the "Servius Question," has become so familiar of later years, chiefly through learned papers contributed by the Harvard editors themselves, that only the briefest summary need be

given here. The vulgate Servius of the Middle Ages corresponds approximately in content and scope to what is now accepted as the commentary of Servius. There was also in restricted circulation, however, a version containing much additional material. The *editio princeps* (1471-72) reproduced the vulgate text. In 1600, however, Pierre Daniel, having found a few manuscripts of the longer form and becoming convinced that this was the true Servius, so published the text and thus posed the "Servius Question." Daniel's view remained unchallenged until the middle of the last century, when Thilo and others decided once more in favor of the shorter Servius (S) and dismissed the additional material of Daniel (DS) as mediaeval interpolations. Thilo's edition, based on this hypothesis, presented a readable version of S but introduced confusion into DS, parts of which printed in italics were allowed to remain on the page and parts arbitrarily dismembered and relegated to his labyrinthine apparatus. From 1911 the cause of DS was taken up again, not on the basis that DS was Servius but rather that DS represented another independent ancient commentary on Vergil, in fact, a commentary from which S had derived a great part of his material. Several scholars, notably the late Professor Rand, cautiously began to point to St. Jerome's teacher, the great Aelius Donatus, as the possible author of DS. This last view was impressively challenged in 1924 by A. H. Travis, who demonstrated that DS differed from Donatus' Terence commentary so much in style that the two works could hardly be considered the work of the same man. Meantime, however, the new Servius had been launched. In his original announcement in 1938, Professor Rand made it plain that the new edition, which had been suggested by a Harvard seminar project, would not be based on any hypothesis regarding the worth or identity of DS. Its purpose would be to present for the first time the authentic text of S and of DS and to present them in a format that should permit the reader to take in at a glance the content of both commentaries and their relation to each other. Statements by the editors since Professor Rand's death and the edition itself indicate that this conservative purpose has been religiously adhered to.

One of the serious charges against Thilo is the fact that he failed to profit from the advances that in his day had already been made in the field of palaeography and text criticism. Professor Rand remarked several years ago, that, after contemplating the *selva oscura* of Thilo's prolegomena and apparatus, one felt there should be inscribed above it

Lasciate ogni speranza, voi ch'entrate.

The Harvard editors have let in more than a little light and, although they have withheld their own prolegomena for the present and are extremely chary of details in their preface, they give us the bare outlines of a history of our two commentary texts. In addition to Servius (S), the fourth century bequeathed to later times another complete commentary on Vergil. In the seventh or eighth century some learned person, presumably an Irishman, conflated these two works producing the form of text eventually discovered by Pierre Daniel. Manuscripts of the DS type seem never to have been very numerous, although Daniel had access to more than we have now. The present text depends upon a ninth century codex written at

Fulda (C), a ninth century book from Fleury, and readings taken by Daniel from lost books of Fulda.

The text of Servius proper (S) had a wide circulation throughout the Middle Ages. Of the large number of extant manuscripts, Thilo selected about a dozen, mostly German and Swiss, that were accessible or appealed to him. Thilo was an able Latinist and produced a usable text of Servius, but, while calling many manuscripts to witness, he never actually penetrated the secret of the tradition. The present editors have found that most of Thilo's manuscripts and most others, with the exception of one small and very important group, trace their ancestry back to an archetype designated by the editors as *a*. This book probably came from Ireland (although it is not explicitly so stated or suggested by the editors). The *a* family is subdivided into γ (among whose books is the famous Bernensis 363), and β (β^1 including Thilo's A and K; β^2 consisting of two fine books of Tours: Paris. 7959 and Trev. 1086). The clear analysis of the tradition makes it possible for the editors greatly to simplify the apparatus. They find it necessary to cite only eight (five of the ninth century) of the known manuscripts belonging to the *a* group.

A major discovery by the Harvard editors is group σ , which consists of three manuscripts only: Vaticanus Latinus 3317 (V), written in the splendid Beneventan script of Montecassino of the end of the tenth century; Guelferbytanus 2091 (W) written in Italian Gothic of the late thirteenth century; and Neapolitanus Bibl. Publ. 5 (N), an early tenth century Beneventan book written, perhaps, in Naples. V, which originally had the complete commentary on the *Aeneid* at the end of the codex, now extends only to *Aen.* I, 35, but W has been shown to be a copy of V made before the mutilation occurred. Although N's text is not pure (there being an admixture of γ readings), it nevertheless affords valuable support for W in many passages. Thus, in addition to the evidence of *a*, the modern editor now has the testimony of an Italian family of considerable antiquity and purity. The nature and importance of this group has been discussed at some length by one of the editors, Arthur F. Stocker.

The control of this manuscript material has enabled the Harvard editors to reconstruct as good a text of Servius as it is probably possible to secure. As already indicated, the major operation performed by the editors has been the separation of the two ancient commentaries S and DS. What this means to the student is apparent at every turn. Thilo, having made up his mind that the longer text represented an interpolated version, was alert to distinguish all such "interpolations" from the true Servius by means of his italics. In cases where the vulgate S and the text of DS were quite different or DS the longer, Thilo's treatment was all right. A good example is the commentary on *Aen.*, II, 7. With his mistaken conception of DS, however, Thilo was lost when he came to sections of text in which the DS manuscript corresponded verbatim to his vulgate Servius. Here DS was treated simply as another witness to the text of Servius. The service performed for the reader in cases like this is remarkably illustrated in the Harvard edition of passages like *Aen.*, I, 720. One could multiply examples indefinitely, but readers or users of the new Servius will be doing it constantly for themselves (in a chorus of *Deo gratias*). DS is obviously still of inestimable value for the re-

constitution of the text of S, for it may be looked upon now without misgivings as representing the source of S in many passages. S also acquires a new importance as chief among the *testimonia* of DS.

The disentangling of these two texts is the most sensational change between the "old" and the "new" Servius. Less striking to the casual reader, but ultimately of great importance, are the hundreds of "small" changes necessitated or suggested by the editors' increased knowledge of the manuscript tradition. As Professor Rand stated in his original announcement, it has been necessary to alter Thilo's text on every page. Many alterations are not significant, of course, although necessary. With their present knowledge of *a* and *σ* the editors can, at least, be sure that they are clearing away mediaeval stylistic underbrush and bringing the text in detail back to Servius, even when they are faced with a choice between *a* and *σ*. Demonstration of this would be tedious and unnecessary. But it will be of interest to note some of the services performed for the text of S by the discovery of the value of *σ*. In the S preface to *Aen.* I, ed. Harv. p. 1, l. 10 (Thilo, p. 1, l. 9), Bernensis 363 alone reads *ab illo hoc*. All the other (*a*) manuscripts and Thilo read *ab hoc*. The *σ* manuscripts: *uirgilio ab hoc* V *uirgilius ab hoc* W. It seems plain that Vergil's name used as an explanatory gloss over *illo* in *σ*, later displaced *illo* (helpfully put into the nominative *uirgilius* by W), but entered the text at the wrong place. B's *lectio difficilior* would seem to be the right one. On *Aen.*, I, 1, VW back up the *inania sentire* of C against miscellaneous distortions by the rest of *a* and support Thilo too, who elected to follow C. At *Aen.*, I, 2 *σ* agrees with the DS manuscripts in having the *pro ad Italiam venit* omitted by *a* (again supporting Thilo). On *Aen.*, I, 3 (Harv. p. 12, l. 2) W has the DS reading *conclusit* against *a*'s *complexus est*. A most interesting case is *Aen.*, I, 4 (Harv. p. 12, l. 5), in which VW and the *a* manuscript Ta have *insequantur* against the *insequebantur* of the rest of *a* (and Thilo). Similarly VW support C in reading *dum "dummodo"* at the end of the comment on *Aen.*, I, 5, against the rest of the manuscripts. V breaks off at *Aen.*, I, 35, but W and N continue to furnish valuable information to the end of *Aen.* II.

DS has profited greatly from re-editing, although many puzzling passages remain in spite of valiant efforts by the editors, their colleagues, and friends. Some passages despaired of by Thilo have yielded to the greater knowledge and superior technique of the modern scholars, but nearly a score of "daggers" point to still troublesome places. In the attack on these cruxes many experts have joined the original editors. A note like the following gives a vivid glimpse of this corporate undertaking:

(*Aen.*, I, 2. The DS text reads in part: . . . quidam hic *profugus* *participium* *volunt*, sane non *otiose* *fato profugum* *dicit* *Aeneam* *verum* *ex disciplina* *Etruscorum*. *est enim* *in libro* *qui* *inscribitur* *Terrae Iuris*† *Etruriae* *scriptum* *vocibus* *Tagae eum* *qui genus a* *periuris* *duceret* *fato extorrem et profugum esse* *debere* . . .)

The note in the Harvard apparatus is as follows:

28 *terrae iuris*] *C vel ruris ss. C² terrae ruris f litterae iuris*
Bergk. p. 12 Thilo, sed melius fort. Terrae Haruspicina Etruriae

(cf. *ad VIII* 398) *vel* Terrae Haruspiciū <dictatum XII pueris principum> Etruriae (v. P. W. K. *ad v. Tages et Pease ad Cic. De Div. II* 50) *vel* Terrae Iuris Etruriae (Pease) *vel* Terrae Ius Etruriae (Nock) *vel* ingeniosissime Terrae vel Ruris (*id quod ad Tages nomen, quasi τὰ γῆς spectat*) Etruriae (Whatmough).

By way of plunging one more dagger into the corpse, the reviewer would like to vote in favor of *Terrae Iuris Etruriae*, the text of C supported by Professor Pease. Just how hopeless some of the problems seem to be can be appreciated from a note like that on *Postvotam* (*Aen.*, I, 720, Harv. p. 295, l. 17):

17 *Postvotam*] *Dan. Fv Postvotam coni. Cuper.* (*Observ.*, 1670, II, 2, p. 164) *Schoell.* *Nescimus an, Peasio adsentiente, Postvotam retinendum sit, sub quo vocabulo vernaculum aliquod ut *postvufeta latere potest* (Whatmough).

All this concerns details. The DS text appears for the first time in the Harvard Servius truly *melior et auctior*, with its individuality definitely established, and in condition to facilitate the further pursuit of the Donatus question and similar matters.

The new edition formally adds forty-one words to the *vita Virgilii* (Harv. p. 3, ll. 69 ff.):

periit autem Tarenti in Apuliae civitate. nam dum
Metapontum cupid videre, valetudinem ex solis ardore
contraxit. sepultus est autem Neapoli, in cuius tumulo
ab ipso compositum est distichon vale:

Mantua me genuit, Calabri rapuere, tenet nunc
Parthenope. eecimi paseua, rura, duces.

The couplet appears in other vitae (Philarg. II, Brummer p. 48; Gudianus III, Brummer p. 65). The rest has hitherto been known only from late manuscripts of Italian provenance. Thilo printed it in his apparatus and indicated a lacuna at this point in the text. Doubtless a full justification for the inclusion of these lines in the text of Servius will be given in the prolegomena of the editors. At present one cannot help raising the question: may this material not be merely a piece of south Italian tradition that has crept into the south Italian manuscripts of Servius but which has no serious claim to authenticity? The *σ* manuscripts, two of which go back to the tenth century, are now the oldest authorities for this fragment of Vergilian "biography." If the words had formed part of the original text of Servius, however, it is strange that no trace of them is left in the *α* group of manuscripts.

There is one further feature of the new Servius that should not pass unnoticed. In the *testimonia* the editors have made notable advances beyond the work of Thilo, in particular in having turned to good account their knowledge of modern research in the field of mediaeval glossaries.

Being deprived of the reviewer's usual function of pointing out misprints, I should merely like to suggest that in future volumes the apparatus to the S text might be cut down or considerably simplified by the exclusion of orthographical minutiae and many items of purely palaeographical interest. Anything significant of this sort would presumably be discussed in the prolegomena or final preface.

The Harvard editors have much unfinished business on their hands. They have staked out many claims in an important and interesting field of investigation. Students of all branches of classical and mediaeval studies must wish them long life and success. Their first volume is eloquent testimony to their capacity for cooperation, just as it is fresh evidence of the vision, insight, and wisdom of their late friend and chief Professor Rand.

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A. W. PICKARD-CAMBRIDGE. *The Theatre of Dionysus in Athens*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1946. Pp. xvi + 288; frontispiece; 141 text figures; 3 maps.

The venerable author, who in his *Dithyramb, Tragedy, and Comedy* (1927) has given such a complete presentation of the origins and beginnings of early Greek drama, has here followed up with an excellent survey of the history of the theater of Dionysos Eleutherios in Athens, from the earliest to the Roman periods. He discusses the theater before Lycurgus in Chapters I-III, the Lycurgan Theater in Ch. IV, the Hellenistic in Ch. V and the Theater in the Roman Period in Ch. VI. Ten appendices to Chapters IV and V contain much valuable information on details. An excellent Summary in Ch. VII clearly states the results of the investigations. They are built partly on those of other scholars, from Doerpfeld to Roy Flickinger and J. T. Allen, partly on fifty years of the author's own observations and study during a number of visits to Athens.

The book is distinguished by a clear, conscientious, and fair presentation of all evidence available in monuments, literature, and inscriptions. For the theater building Pickard-Cambridge uses mostly the exhaustive research of E. Fiechter, *Das Dionysos-Theater in Athen*, Vols. I-III (1935-36), in *Antike griechische Theaterbauten*, V-VII.

In contrast to Fiechter or to such authors as A. von Gerkan, Pickard-Cambridge does not aim at describing minutely the succeeding forms of the theater. "It is a very hazardous proceeding to conjecture from the marks, etc., on each stone and the condition of its surface, what exactly was done with it at various periods, some two thousand years ago." He rightly omits whatever "would contribute little that is of human interest" (p. 149). The buildings are for him a setting for the drama.

Pickard-Cambridge thus dedicates the whole of Chapter II to the evidence of the plays of Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, and Aristophanes, carefully examining play for play. I feel that he devotes a little too much space to the long-settled question of whether actors and chorus were on the same level (pp. 49 ff.). Apparently the author has only recently broken away from the absurd idea, still adhered to in his edition of Haigh's *Attic Theatre* (1907; see pp. 128, 132 f., 140 ff., 165 ff., 172), that the actor on a stage and the chorus in the orchestra performed simultaneously in the same performance (see p. 165). Pickard-Cambridge, indeed, still believes in the physical separation of the actors from the chorus in the Hellenistic period, when the chorus "only sang *intermezzi* unconnected

with the action and did not need to come into contact with the actors." "Henceforth the play was acted on the stage (with or without choral interludes in the orchestra)" (pp. 71 f.; 269). But these interludes were certainly also acted in the same place as the dialogues, whether it was in the orchestra in conservative Athens or on the stage in the later, more progressive theaters newly built in the Hellenistic period.

For the controversial problems of scenery, stage properties, and machinery much useful material has been collected from literary passages, which are soberly weighed. Particularly good is the discussion of the *eccyclema* (pp. 100-122, cf. p. 266) with the list of passages from lexicographers and commentaries (pp. 115-118, 30 numbers). We need such a collection of passages, and I had long ago planned one as a supplement to my theater books. I believe that Pickard-Cambridge is right in maintaining that heavy loads were not thrust forward on a platform, but were shown by throwing open the front wall of the scene building. On the other hand some use of a simple platform on wheels is certain for Euripides and Aristophanes. See August C. Mahr, *The Origin of the Greek Tragic Form* (1938), pp. 101 ff., Fig. 27.

The interpretation of the literary passages by Pickard-Cambridge is, of course, not always the same as that of the reviewer. I do not believe that there often was an altar in front of the house (pp. 47, 131 f.), for it would have been a duplicate of the altar in the center of the orchestra, around which the acting and dancing of the chorus took place. I also do not believe in any stock sets or conventional scenic arrangements in the Athenian theater of the fifth century (see pp. 46, 52, 54, 59, 69, 265 f.) made for the stage building and its decoration. There can only have been a scaffolding consisting of beams and timber, on which each year different painted scenery was fixed. These decorations certainly reflected and perhaps influenced decisively the development of perspective painting. The swift and logical development of the arts of architecture and painting during the fifth century does not allow the assumption that anything remained stationary during the time of the great tragic poets, whose demands on the scene painters also must have been one of the elements which influenced the development of the arts.

On the other hand I believe that not before the death of the great dramatic playwrights, when the drama had taken an established form, did a definite form of the scene building, the Paraskenion-theater with two side buildings and a center building with a porch as a conventional symbol for palace or temple, develop. This stabilization is reflected in the fourth century vase paintings illustrated in Figs. 9-32. While Pickard-Cambridge rightly rejects them as a source for the fifth century theater, he wrongly denies that the "aedicula" in the center of many is evidence for a porch in front of the central doorway in the fourth century (p. 266). It is, in my opinion, the fourth century form, the one which evolved from the necessities of the plays of Euripides and his followers and was erected in stone in the Lycurgan theater.

There are some mistakes in the interpretation of the mythological figures of these vases also. The amphora in the Jatta Collection with Antigone and Heracles (Fig. 13, pp. 85 f.) has been convincingly

explained by Robert (*Oidipus*, I, pp. 381 ff., Fig. 51) from the *Antigone* of Euripides. The boy behind Creon is not "an attendant," but the son of Haemon and Antigone. He was acknowledged by his grandfather with the help of tokens in the box carried by Ismene. The ending was not "unknown," but happy, as Heracles when he appeared as *deus-ex-machina* in the "aedicula," that is, in his shrine, being the son-in-law of Creon could not plead in vain for forgiveness. The satyr on the krater with Iphigeneia in Tauris (Fig. 14, p. 86) signifies the Dionysiac festival in which tragedies were played, and perhaps also alludes to the satyr play which followed. The attendant of Iphigeneia on the krater in Naples (Fig. 19, p. 90) is not elderly but a young girl in her teens. Myrtilus on the situla in Villa Giulia (Fig. 23, pp. 93 f.) was not bribed by Pelops, who rather won with the help of Poseidon's divine horses in the older version followed in the Olympia East Pediment.

The *Periaktoi*, which Pickard-Cambridge (p. 126) rightly calls a simple and crude device, he also denies wrongly to the classical period (pp. 234 ff.).

The discussion of the Hellenistic Proskenion building is the least satisfactory part of the book. Pickard-Cambridge states rightly (p. 185) that "the proskenion was only built when it was required to support a stage for actors." He thus assumes that from the first the action took place on a raised stage at Priene, Oropos, and Sicyon, but it is wrong to include also Epidaurus (p. 190, note 2, and pp. 209 f.), which was built without a stage in the fourth century. The confusion in the conception of the development is clearly shown in Fig. 76 (p. 217), where the earliest half-columns in Assos and Delos are put at the end, the full round columns of Athens at the beginning. The order has to be reversed.

The reliefs discussed in Appendix II (Figs. 77-84, pp. 218 ff.) have nothing whatever to do with the Greek Hellenistic theater. They belong to the southern Italian farce and the Roman comedy and tragedy. The theater of Segesta is a monumental development, datable about 100 B. C., of the Assteas stage (Figs. 83-84).

Most of the wallpaintings (Figs. 87-88, 95-97, 99-111, 116-119, pp. 225 ff.) have nothing whatever to do with the Hellenistic theater, and they ought not to have such a big place in the book. The discussion of the three first Pompeian styles is unsatisfactory. Vitruvius published his book before 14 B. C., and therefore blames, not the third style, which is after his time, but pictures of the late second style like those of the Villa of Livia and the Farnesina. There is no trace of the second style in Alexandria before the Roman period. The old derivation of this style from other sites than Rome ought now to be generally abandoned.

The Boscoreale frescoes (Figs. 89-94, pp. 227 ff.) on the other hand are in my opinion the work of a scene painter, who worked for the Roman owner of the villa in about 50 B. C. The Romans did not like painted scenery, as the story of Apaturius (Vitruvius VII, 5, 5-7) shows. These painters, therefore, were free to work for the rich Romans in the manner described by Vitruvius (*ibid.*, §2 and V, 6, 9): tragic, comic, and satyric scenes were painted on the wall. The motifs enumerated by Vitruvius agree with many of the Boscoreale frescoes. The big doors are not those leading into a garden but city entrances in a size too large in comparison with the houses behind

them; thus they are imitated from practicable stage doors. All other Roman wall paintings show persons in the landscape or against the architectural background. In Boscoreale the actors were the persons seen against the original painted screens. The Dionysiac masks allude to the festival in honor of Dionysus, which the Greek drama always continued to celebrate. The pillars which separate the single scenes are the pillars which separated the *thyromata* of the late Hellenistic high stage, into which the painted *pinakes* were inserted. The picture of Iphigeneia in Tauris (Fig. 115, p. 232) seems to me to show at least a reflection of a Roman imperial stage in its rich fourth style setting, but here also there is nothing Hellenistic. It is not possible to use such late evidence for the Hellenistic period. Vitruvius speaks of his own time. Pickard-Cambridge says himself that Vitruvius' and Pollux' statements on the function of the three doors (pp. 238 f.) cannot refer to the fifth century. It is, on the other hand, difficult to separate the Hellenistic from the Roman period. The valuable Appendix on theatrical performances outside Athens from the third century B. C. (pp. 240-246) rightly includes also the imperial period.

The chapter on the Theater in the Roman Period suffers from the fact that much material belonging to it has been used before. The reconstructions of the Neronian theater (Figs. 128-129) are unfortunately those of Doerpfeld and Schleif without a stage, although Pickard-Cambridge knows that there must have been one in the low Roman form in this period (pp. 254 ff.). The later bema of Phaedrus was probably never decorated with the reliefs Figs. 132, 135-6, while the fragments Figs. 133 and 134 do not belong to the visible front of the bema at all. The reliefs came from the four sides of an altar and were only used as building stones, as the cutting off of the upper part with all heads clearly shows.

But despite many differences of opinion in details the goals of this book and of the reviewer's *History of the Greek and Roman Theater* are similar, with the difference that Pickard-Cambridge intended to restrict himself to the one Athenian theater, while the reviewer tried to give a comprehensive picture of all the Greek theaters. But while, on the one hand, Pickard-Cambridge goes far beyond the Attic boundaries, I have, on the other hand, always come back to Athens, even when, in the Hellenistic and Roman periods, it is no longer leading but slowly following the Hellenistic-Asiatic and Roman trends. That our goal is similar can at once be inferred from the fact that 58 of Pickard-Cambridge's 145 illustrations are the same as the same number among my 566 illustrations. Pickard-Cambridge has asserted that my book "only imperfectly filled" the place of my German *Denkmaeler zum Theaterwesen* (p. vi). I wish to refute this assertion. The *Denkmaeler* is a systematic collection of monuments. The *History* gives the history of the theater as a reflection of and a reaction to the demands of the classical writers, of the Hellenistic actors, and of the luxury-loving Romans. It did not intend to fill and does not fill the place of the older book. Comparing it with an objective mind to the book of Pickard-Cambridge, I honestly believe that my interpretation of figurative monuments is better, while he surpasses me by far in the knowledge and interpretation of literary monuments.

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Unione Accademica Nazionale. *Inscriptiones Italiae, Academiae Italicae Consociatae ediderunt.* Vol. XIII — *Fasti et Elogia.* Fase. I — *Fasti Consulares et Triumphales, curavit ATILIO DEGRASSI.* Roma, La Libreria dello Stato, 1947. Text, pp. xxxi + 574. Tabulae et Indices, civ plates + pp. 575-680 of text.

The great undertaking of the United Italian Academies was planned to provide a publication of the Latin inscriptions of Italy which should conform to modern requirements and avail itself of present-day technical resources: in particular, should use photographs and drawings in place of types. The advantages of such a mode of presentation need no emphasis for those who know B. D. Meritt's *Epigraphica Attica* (Martin Classical Lectures, IX, 1940, e. g. p. 20: ". . . the practice of publication now recognizes that majuscule text set in type must give way, in the interests of accurate presentation, to the line drawing and the photograph"), for what he says regarding Attic inscriptions is essentially, *mutatis mutandis*, true of the Latin inscriptions of Rome and Italy. Neither the exacting requirements of the new method of publication nor the conditions of the time conduce to speed, and at the present rate of progress some centuries may elapse before the volumes devoted to the various parts of Italy are all available to scholars: but, fortunately for the present generation, those directing the undertaking decided to deviate for once from the topographical framework, to devote one volume, numbered XIII, to a particular category of epigraphical document, *Fasti et Elogia*, and to entrust its preparation to Attilio Degrassi. In 1937 the first installment of this volume appeared: fasciculus III, *Elogia*; circumstances of a material nature have delayed until now the completion of the present fasc. I (p. 347 would appear to have been composed as early as 1935, since the volume of the Oxford *Livy* which was produced in that year is not cited; the slip in giving the name of one of the co-editors of earlier volumes of the *Livy* seems to have been a visual one); fasc. II is to contain the calendars, and its eventual appearance (not actually imminent) should complete a self-contained, homogeneous unit within the projected larger whole: three classes of more or less official archives of the Roman State will have been rendered available for the general use of scholars.

Circumstances have combined to swell the contents of the present fascicule as compared with *C. I. L.*, I², 1: fresh or inadequately known epigraphical documents have come to light, such as the *Fasti Ostienses*, the *F. Teanenses*, and the *F. Magistrorum Vici*; new portions have been added to the *F. Capitolini*; and with regard to the important question of the architectural setting of some of these monumental records, as will appear below, progress has been pronounced.

The main sections of the present fascicule are devoted to:

1. *Fasti consulares et triumphales Capitolini.*
2. *Fasti feriarum Latinarum.*
3. *Fasti Antiates maiores.*
- 4-16. *Fasti municipales.*
- 17-34. *Fasti collegiorum et privatorum hominum.*
- 35, 36. *Fasti triumphales praeter Capitolinos.*

These are followed by the reconstituted lists of magistrates and triumphs; the full indices; and, with separate title, the 104 plates, partly photographs taken from the stones, partly line-drawings, partly (in cases where unintelligent modern rubrication renders photographs from the stones deceptive) photographs from squeezes. A few plates supply graphic documentation, restorations, and plans, and also reproduce the plaster reconstitution of the F. Capitolini which Degrassi prepared for the Augustan Exhibition, an important prelude to this work.

It is not necessary to enlarge upon the technique of publication exemplified in this production: those using it will soon become familiar with its merits and will be grateful for what has been so generously and competently provided. Nor would it be requisite or profitable here to embark upon the far-reaching historical significance and implications of this unique material, as to which its Editor says (p. xv): ". . . has omnes quaestiones de origine, fide, auctoritate antiquissimorum fastorum . . . , utpote quae a fastorum editione alienae sint, alio loco persequi licebit; hic satis erit exemplum quam accuratissimum fastorum proponere," — a task quite sufficient in itself, which few epigraphists of our times — even with the able technical assistance here available — would have had either the courage to undertake or the skill and patience to carry to completion.

Such documents are among the most obvious instances of inscriptions which require to be envisaged not merely in two dimensions but in three, as elements in architecture; and not merely that, but in their topographical setting, as possessing a specific function in a definite local environment. It is clear that the great expenditure of both archival research and physical effort which their creation must have involved, as well as the degree of official approval which they imply, possessed some special motivation; in each instance, even if they resulted from the initiative of private benefactors, they presuppose a public or semi-public edifice of some sort, which the competent authorities deemed a suitable medium for their carving; though it is rare to find an instance in which, as in the case of the Fasti Feriarum Latinarum (see Degrassi, p. 143), the find-spot provides a clue to the ancient setting. In the instance of the Fasti Triumphales Barberiniani (Degrassi, p. 345), the provenance is not known; but subject-matter, kind of stone, and style of lettering lend plausibility to the conjecture that these records of the deposition of palms by victorious commanders were actually carved upon the wall of the Capitoline Temple at various times after it had been restored in the period of Sulla (it is purely due to chance that the triumphs recorded on the surviving blocks extend only from 43 to 21 B. C.); or, as I would suggest, on some appurtenance to the great temple, possibly the altar, which would have been less subject to damage by subsequent fires. The limitation of the provenance of all the classes of records included in this volume of *Inscriptiones Italiae* to an area of the Italian peninsula within several days' reach of Rome itself (Degrassi, pp. 167-8) suggests close relations with the life of the Capital, which in fact are implicit in the nature of their contents.

A position of distinction, on several grounds, is assumed by the (so-called) Fasti Capitolini (the adjective denotes their location in Renaissance and modern times only); and it is peculiarly fortunate

that Degrassi's researches, which started as an edition of the text, should have led him, with the collaboration of the architect Guglielmo Gatti, to a consideration of their monumental setting: the conclusions of these investigators, which had not been anticipated at the time that the bulk of Degrassi's work was being set up in type, are merely recapitulated on pp. 17-19, but have been fully presented in the *Rendiconti* of the Pontifical Roman Academy of Archaeology, XXI (1945-6), pp. 57-122, a publication which thus becomes, for practical purposes, a supplement to the epigraphical presentation: L. B. Holland (*A. J. A.*, L [1946], pp. 52-9) and L. R. Taylor (*C. P.*, XLI [1946], pp. 1-11) had been led in the same general direction (cf. Degrassi, p. 571), so that American readers are already acquainted with some of the points at issue. We do not enter into controversial matters, but it will be generally recognised as proven that these inscriptions were carved upon the inside walls of the two lateral passages of the arch at the southeast corner of the Roman Forum which commemorated the victory at Actium; and this conclusion confers upon these fasti a position of unique significance.

To those with memories of a certain length, it is humiliating to recall the practical unanimity with which some two generations of scholars followed the dicta of their leaders as to the original location of the Capitoline Fasti—a flagrant instance of mass-suggestion, which may be in part explained, but cannot be entirely condoned, by the comparative inaccessibility and intractability of the material evidence. Rather than linger over an unedifying spectacle—*et nos in Arcadia!*—, it appears more profitable to turn to the fresh topographic-historical vistas opened out by the work under review, especially since the restraint with which the Italian colleagues have expressed themselves has left others free to carry the line of reasoning somewhat further. When it was thought that these inscriptions had constituted a feature of the exterior walls of the Regia, the reason for their presence was found—though with somewhat halting logic—in the relation of the Pontifex Maximus to the official Annales. Now, however, a different explanation must be sought. Degrassi and Gatti's work will stand in the history of these studies as a classical example, at the very center of the Roman world, of the effectiveness of architectural epigraphy: but it is permissible to proceed still further, and to ask the questions: What was that function of the arch which motivated the carving of the inscriptions? and, What relation did the inscriptions bear to this function?

Both arch and inscribed records are intelligible if the structure spanned the ceremonial route leading to the Capitoline Temple, the course followed by (1) the supreme magistrates on assuming office, (2) the triumphal processions, and (3) the progress at the Secular Games. The lists recorded the successive occasions upon which the street which was eventually spanned by the arch was thus used. And here, some clear thinking is required. The venerable route passed from the valley of the Colosseum (as it eventually became), over the ridge connecting Palatine and Esquiline—where it was joined by a street from the former of these two hills—, descending into the valley of the Forum; there is the authority of Varro (*De L. L.*, V, 47; Festus, p. 372 L.) for stating that its slope from the residence of the Rex Sacrorum down to the Regia,—in other words, from the

crest of the saddle between Palatine and Esquiline to the edge of the valley of the Forum—, was commonly called *Sacra Via* (we add, occasionally by the poets *Sacer Clivus*). Varro's own proposal to apply the term *Sacra Via* to the whole extent from the Sacellum Streniae to the summit of the Capitoline Hill in the general sense—for this is surely what he means by *arx*—was doctrinaire and did not win general acceptance in antiquity; in order that the term should have been used as it was, in both literature and inscriptions, for indicating the location of residences and places of business,—and there is also the collective noun *sacravientes* of Festus (pp. 190-1, L.)—, its topographical connotation must have been restricted and definite. Its use by our contemporaries, as in Degrassi's plan, pl. I, and the text of his article, and also in both text and plans, pls. III, IV of Lugli's recent volume, for the stretches of road at and near the Forum, is misleading.

In front of the Regia, at a point which was marked (as is now generally recognised) by the Arch of the Fabii, the route to the Capitol diverged to the left, in order to pass between the Regia and the Aedes Vesta, to skirt the south side of the Forum, and to reach the juncture of the Clivus Capitolinus with the Vicus Jugarius, from which point the processions would follow that clivus up to the area before the Capitoline Temple. This branch, from the Regia to the southeast corner of the Forum, is aligned not with the later Forum but, roughly, with earlier monuments and in particular with the south side of the Regia itself, which it skirts. The right-hand branch—which was no longer a part of the ceremonial route—followed the north side of the Forum, eventually reaching the juncture of the steep ascent to the Arx (in the narrower sense) with the street that led to the Campus Martius. The ceremonial processions, then,—magistrates, triumphators, and celebrants,—having as their goal the Capitoline Temple, would naturally have followed the left-hand street, passing between the Regia and the Shrine of Vesta. And it appears that the short stretch of this from its point of bifurcation by the Arch of the Fabii as far as the Forum was sometimes included in the denomination *Sacra Via*; as indeed was only natural, in everyday speech. This is the setting of Ovid, *Tristia*, III, 1, 27-30: “*Haec sunt fora Caesaris*,” *inquit*, / “*haec est a sacris quae via nomen habet*, / *hic locus est Vesta, qui Pallada servat et ignem*, / *haec fuit antiqui regia parva Numae*.” Coming from the Forum of Caesar, the poem would have crossed the great Forum obliquely to its southeast corner, in order to reach this thoroughfare, the Shrine of Vesta and the Regia. And this was Martial's understanding of the route followed by the predecessor of his own volume: for, surely with Ovid's lines in mind, he writes (I, 70, 3-5): *vicinum Castora canae / transibis Vesta virginemque domum*; / *inde sacro veneranda petes Palatia clivo*, where the mention of the Temple of Castor leaves no room for doubt as to the route to be taken, though the Flavian poet is less precise as to the exact point at which the *Sacra Via* assumes its name. It was natural that Horace's steps on his (real or pretended) way to Caesar's Gardens on the unfortunate morning described in *Sat.*, I, 9 should have brought him—in the opposite direction—along this thoroughfare. But what is more important, topography supplies the setting for those noble lines of his, *Od.*, III,

30, 8 f.: *dum Capitolium / scandet cum tacita virgine pontifex*: for whether the priest and priestess started from their ritual posts at the Regia and the Aedes Vestae respectively or from their official residences, the Domus Publica (as it seems) and the Atrium Vestae, on their way to the Capitol, this is the route which they would have followed. It was in parts a very narrow thoroughfare: but this quality was inherent in *vetus illa forma* of the city (Tacitus, *Ann.*, XV, 43, cf. Cicero, *De Leg. Agr.*, II, 96). The solemn cadences of Horace's ode confer upon the recurrent ceremonial procession a symbolical significance, as the visible token of the eternity of Rome: a significance possessed also, for the thoughtful observer, by the inscribed lists of the three classes of functionaries who passed this way. (Documentation available in Platner-Ashby and *R.-E.*, s. v. "Sacra Via.")

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LOUIS E. LORD. *Thucydides and the World War*. Published for Oberlin College by Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1945. Pp. xiv + 300. \$3.50. (*Martin Classical Lectures*, XII.)

It is altogether appropriate that Louis E. Lord should himself produce a volume in the series which he did so much to found. Professor Lord has devoted a lifetime not merely to the teaching of Classics at Oberlin College but to the promotion, throughout and beyond this continent, of the cause in which he so firmly believes. Although he has retired from active teaching, most classicists know of and many have benefited from his distinguished work as Chairman of the Managing Committee of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens, a position which, fortunately, he continues to hold.

This book, I suspect, is the result of many years of thought, which the author has only now committed to paper. It contains eight chapters, not all of which were delivered as lectures in the series. Chapters IV-VI, a summary of Thucydides' narrative, have been added and provide Lord with an opportunity to point to the more significant features in the *History*; chapters II and III ("Thucydides' Athens" and "The Setting") were written to give background to the general reader. Chapter VII ("The *History*," including sections on science, economics, digressions, style, character sketches, and the mind of Thucydides) is, I imagine, based upon an actual lecture (Lord does not say). The first and last chapters ("Thucydides and the Writing of History" and "Thucydides and the World War") are "substantially two of the lectures as they were delivered" (p. xi).

To the lay reader this book will prove interesting and provocative throughout. The student who is already on intimate terms with Thucydides, however, will find his attention more strongly focused upon the original lectures (chapters I, VIII, and VII), though he will derive profit from the rest.

Chapter I is in fact an essay on the philosophy of historical writing and the fate which history has suffered through the ages. Lord is particularly scornful of the "scientific" (economic, geographical,

sociological, psychological) historians of the nineteenth century and of the incredibly conceited and ignorant apostles of the "new history," an unwelcome twentieth century importation from Germany.

Lord urges a return to common sense, i. e., to the principles of such men as Thucydides, son of Oloros. "Causes are the most important object of the historian's research" (p. 22). "Future historians will increasingly be inclined to confine themselves to specialized branches or single periods" (p. 23). "History can never become an exact science" (p. 23). "History must deal chiefly with personalities" (p. 25). "To believe that history can be written objectively is a palpable illusion" (p. 26). "Political history will always be the dominant type" (p. 30).

Thucydides is then fitted into these principles and Lord is well pleased with the result. In addition, Thucydides' achievement is more remarkable in that he reported contemporary history, which only a profound mind could do successfully. (As I read p. 33 I wonder if Lord is familiar with Buchan's history of the First World War.)

The first chapter is useful to all students of history. It is the product of logical thought and a wise contemplation of centuries of historical writing.

Before passing on I raise a question concerning the term "civil war" as applied to the conflict between Athens and Sparta (p. 33). This is common practice and makes effective material for lectures; but I have often considered the nomenclature misleading. It is true that Hellene fought Hellene; yet the Greek *polis*, as a sovereign unit, is the equivalent of the modern state. The *stasis* of 411/10 B. C. in Athens was true civil war. The Peloponnesian War was a fight to the finish between two independent powers and their allies; it was as much "civil" as the War of 1812.

Chapter II gives a sketch of Thucydides' life and the spirit of Athens during the war, with emphasis upon the inquiring skepticism of men like Euripides. "The Setting" is a short account of the rise of the Athenian empire, the Spartan regime, and the course of the war. Here there are certain details which I should dispute. I am reluctant to believe, for example, that it was Spartan inertness of character that prevented her from taking the lead against Persia (p. 52); we have been too credulous in accepting Corinthian testimony (I, 68-71). Spartan foreign policy was based not upon inertness but upon deliberate isolation. The framers of that policy may have been selfish, they may have been misguided; they were also intelligent and full of guile.

Again, although the Delian League may have been a "haphazard, loose arrangement" (p. 53), yet the casting of the weights into the sea (Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.*, 23, 5) surely indicates a permanent alliance. The student should be directed to the recent work of Larsen, which sheds considerable light upon the original constitution (*Harv. Stud. Class. Phil.*, LI [1940], pp. 175-213). On p. 54 I do not follow the distinction between the "something over two hundred cities, each of which contributed money annually but managed its own affairs," and "cities like Carystus and Naxos," which paid tribute. In any case, this is not consistent with the doubtful statement (p. 55) that "these free Greek cities . . . were forced to maintain a democratic, as opposed to an aristocratic, constitution."

Whatever the allies may have thought, to say that about 450 B. C. Persia was "not even a vague danger" (p. 55) is quite false. Lord ignores the campaigns of the Eurymedon, Cyprus, and Egypt; when opportunity finally recurred (in the Deceleian War) the Persians were quick to seize it. Pericles envisioned an empire that was to bestow the benefits of peace not merely upon the people of Athens (as Lord says on p. 57), but upon the states of Hellas; permanent protection from the Persian neighbor was one of these benefits.

The seventh chapter lays stress upon the comprehensive nature of Thucydides' work. Especially noteworthy is the fact that Thucydides did not neglect the economic aspects in history; as Lord remarks (p. 185), the skeptics should read the *History*. In the treatment of digressions the statement (p. 188) that Thucydides for once "almost descends to Herodotus' level" will raise many an eyebrow. Lord finds Thucydides' style crabbed and difficult, "a heroic and only partially successful effort to create concise and artistic prose in a new medium" (p. 195).

Lord feels that Thucydides does not pass judgment on the morals of his characters (p. 213). Would he not call the terrible indictment of war and its effect upon men's characters in III, 82-83 a moral judgment? Further, my impression is that Thucydides thoroughly disapproved of the character of Alcibiades (cf. VI, 15, 3-4; 28), though he may have respected his intellectual talents.

In March, 1943, Lord wrote chapter VIII, "Thucydides and the World War," in which he takes the Athenian at his word ("... the events which have happened, and the like events which may be expected to happen . . .") and draws the many parallels between the Peloponnesian and the Second World Wars. Lord fully recognizes the dangers in such an undertaking; nevertheless he has constructed an interesting narrative, which by its very nature invites debate (rather than criticism).

To my mind Lord is scarcely just to the "sleepwalkers in the British government" before 1939 (p. 235). These sleepwalkers lead him to Nicias, who is likened to Stanley Baldwin, and who appears in a very bad light here and elsewhere in the book. Yet Nicias was not a stupid man and, despite his misfortunes and errors in Sicily (although he was not "solely responsible for the disaster"), his record had been a good one and his policy before the western expedition would have saved Athens from destructive losses, not once, but many times. Thucydides, who could not condone inept failure, writes of Nicias (VII, 86, 5), *ἥκιστα δὴ ἄξιος ὁν τῶν γε ἐπ' ἐμοῦ Εὐλάρνων ἐs τοῦτο δυστυχίας ἀφικέσθαι διὰ τὴν πᾶσαν ἐs ἀρετὴν νενομιμένην ἐπιτήθεντιν.*

The flamboyant and often repulsive Cleon of Thucydides and Aristophanes does not suggest to me the peaceful, if gullible, Neville Chamberlain. Cleon was the man who prevented an honorable peace and to describe the Peace of Nicias as brought about in part by appeasers (e. g., Nicias, p. 243) is to misunderstand the issues of the Archidamian War. The Peace was an Athenian triumph, constructed upon the policies of Pericles himself and consummated by the heir to his statesmanship, Nicias. The Peace failed not because it was bad in itself, but primarily because a despicable man of extraordinary abilities, Alcibiades, meant it to fail.

Lord's prophecy of what would follow the campaigns of 1943 has proved remarkably accurate. His picture of our post-war world, based upon Thucydides and stated with daring, is a striking likeness. His vigorous indication of the menaces which he sees to our democratic system deserves attention.

The text is followed by "Notes," which supply ample documentation. The "Bibliography" lists the most important and best known studies of Thucydides; of these Lord gives a succinct opinion. Schwartz is dismissed scornfully (p. 273) and Cornford wrote "probably the worst book on Thucydides in English" (p. 274). The "Indices" are copious and built with care. A small and rather cramped map completes the volume.

The book is well made, the print is excellent and the proof has been conscientiously read. Many a reader will stumble over "interpretive" on p. 6. There is some confusion concerning the spelling of "Chalcis" (pp. 120, the map and its index) and "Chalcedon" (pp. 53, 287, the map and its index). Were there nine ephors in Sparta (p. 58)? The statement on p. 79 that Thucydides "devotes the last thirty chapters of Book I" to the *pentekontaetia* is wrong.

I should question Lord's (or rather Jowett's) translations of two passages of Thucydides. Of V, 1 (*αἱ μὲν ἐνιαύσιοι σπονδαὶ διελέλυντο μέχρι Πυθίων*) Lord writes (p. 124), "The truce came to an end . . . but no fighting was indulged in until after . . . the Pythian Games." The Greek must mean the exact opposite, that the truce came to an end and there was a state of war until after the *Pythia*. On p. 204 a clause from VIII, 86, 4 (*καὶ δοκεῖ Ἀλκιβιάδης πρῶτος [v. l. πρῶτον] τότε καὶ οὐδενὸς ἔλασσον τὴν πόλιν ὀφελῆσαι*) is rendered as follows: "Alcibiades did 'as eminent a service to the state as any man ever did'." The text, it seems to me, means that Alcibiades was second to none *at that time* in aiding the state; either he was the first (*πρῶτος*) to benefit Athens in her crisis or this was the first time (*πρῶτον*) that he did the state a service.

It is not an adverse criticism to say that this book will arouse discussion and disagreement. The casual and informal style allows Lord free expression of his opinions, whether they be immediately pertinent or not. The reader may consider that the illustration of Agricola's death, which appears intermittently in the first chapter in various forms, is overdone. Yet such passages, along with the incisive comment, especially in chapters I and VIII, must have been effective and witty before an audience. I am sure the listeners relished Lord's forthright references to the pedagogical quacks who profess the "new education."

This is a book which I have enjoyed and which I shall have no hesitation in recommending. "I realize that these lectures are not in the same class with the eleven fine scholarly volumes which have preceded this one" (p. xii). But there are various types of scholarship and Professor Lord is entirely too modest.

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DAG NORBERG. *Syntaktische Forschungen auf dem Gebiete des Spätlateins und des frühen Mittellateins*. Uppsala, A.-B. Lundquistka Bokhandeln; Leipzig, Otto Harrassowitz, 1943. Pp. 285. 10.50 kr. (*Uppsala Universitets Årsskrift*, 1943, no. 9.)

In the past two decades, especially since the publication in 1929 of Professor Muller's challenging *Chronology of Vulgar Latin*, research has been active in the fascinating field which lies open to Romance philologist and Latinist alike in the borderland of language revealed by the written texts which actually exist in the Merovingian Age. It is in this field that Dr. Norberg, one of the younger members of the faculty at the University of Upsala, long a center of linguistic studies, has made an important and solid contribution in these penetrating syntactical investigations.

Perhaps in order to avoid the use of a term which has become highly controversial, the author, it is true, does not employ the expression "Vulgar Latin" in his title but speaks rather of "late Latin" and "early mediaeval Latin syntax." The late Latin which is the object of his interesting and fruitful researches is, however, not the literary tongue, but rather the language of chronicles, laws, and official documents. His examples are taken most commonly from the *Monumenta Germaniae Historica*, though a wealth of other material of the Merovingian period is also drawn upon and illuminated by illustrative parallels from Latin literature from Plautus to Pliny.

The book consists of seventeen chapters, preceded by a very full bibliography, conveniently divided into 1. Texte and 2. Sonstige Literatur and followed by indexes, 1. Sachindex, 2. Wortindex, and 3. Stellenindex.

In Chapter I (Einleitung) we have an extremely clear and thoughtful discussion of the whole vexed question of the relation of the written language of the 6th, 7th, and 8th centuries to the popular, spoken language of the same period. Here, as is perhaps natural to a Swedish scholar, Norberg adopts "the middle way." Although he gives full credit to "dem Amerikanischen Romanisten H. F. Muller¹ und seinen Schülern Taylor,² Pei³ und Sas"⁴ for the great and permanent service that they have rendered in emphasizing the fact "dass man im Latein der Merowingerzeit die organische Entwicklung der lebendigen Sprache deutlich erkennen kann," Norberg directs a penetrating criticism toward the more extreme positions taken by this school of Romance philologists. In particular he attacks their view that the Latin, e. g., in the Diplomas of the Merovingian kings from the earlier half of the 8th century was almost identical with the contemporary spoken language—in Pei's words (p. 357) "a tongue which bears every mark of being not merely

¹ H. F. Muller, *A Chronology of Vulgar Latin* (Halle, 1929). See also Muller's recent book, *L'Époque Mérovingienne, Essai de Synthèse de Philologie et d'Histoire* (New York, 1945).

² P. Taylor, *The Latinity of the Liber Historiae Francorum* (Diss., New York, 1924).

³ M. A. Pei, *The Language of the Eighth Century Texts in Northern France* (Diss., New York, 1932).

⁴ L. F. Sas, *The Noun Declension System in Merovingian Latin* (Diss., Columbia University, Paris, 1937).

written, but spoken as well, and spoken not by an intellectual élite alone, but by the vast mass of the population."

In this connection Norberg shows most interestingly (p. 17) how such an idiom of documentary language as that which occurs in the *Formulae Marculfi* (which were probably written in the first half of the 8th century): *idcirco vindedisse me tibi constat et ita vindedi villa* (2, 19, p. 89, 13) or *Constat me a vobis accepisse, et ita accepi, debere et debeo, hoc est solidos tantos* (2, 26, p. 92, 22) can be traced back through more than 500 years with little change to the 2nd century after Christ where it appears several times in the wax tablets from Dacia published in *C.I.L.*, III, 2, pp. 921 ff., e. g., 12 (p. 949) *Vero III Quadrato cons. IIII kal. Junias quinquaginta L commendatos Lupus Carentis dixit se accepisse et accepit a Iulio Alexandro, quos ei reddere debet sine ulla controversia.*

With much acumen, it seems to me, Norberg points out that the meaning of the linguistic reform instituted and carried out by Pepin and Charlemagne depends on a difference between the written and the spoken language. As he says, "Wenn man am Hofe der Merowingerkönige wirklich so, wie man schrieb, gesprochen hatte, fehlte überhaupt jeder innere Grund, die Schriftsprache zu reformieren. War aber damals die Schriftsprache eine Mischung von Reminissenzen aus der älteren Schriftsprache und Vulgarismen, die sich aus der Volkssprache eingeschlichen hatten, so versteht man leicht, dass eine sprachliche Reform notwendig war."

So, for example—to give a single illustration—from a linguistic point of view it seems to this reviewer that Norberg is almost certainly right in criticizing the theory (of Muller, Pei, and Sas) that the confusion of case usage found in written documents of the Merovingian period mirrors the actual state of the living speech. After the speakers of Vulgar Latin had once developed the convenient two-case system which later characterized Old French and Old Provençal—a *casus rectus* and a general *casus obliquus*—it appears improbable that they would have continued to use in daily speech the old six-case system of the classic tongue.

According to Norberg the Latin that has been preserved from the Merovingian time is in large part a *Kunsterzeugnis*, yet the many offences against classic norms which are to be found in Merovingian Latin are to be attributed chiefly to the influence of the *Volkssprache*. He rejects decidedly the view of Ferdinand Lot⁵ that the "errors" of these late Latin texts are due merely to ignorance on the part of their compilers.

The author's chief purpose, as it emerges from this excellent historical introduction, is to throw new light, by the investigation of certain selected problems of syntax, on the obscure but fascinating time of transition (Übergangszeit) from Latin to Romance (ca. 600-800 A. D.). As he observes (p. 24), "Die Latinisten schliessen, wie Thesaurus Linguae Latinae, ihre Forschungen meist mit dem Jahre 600 ab. Die Romanisten aber scheinen mehr geneigt, Rückschlüsse aus dem romanischen Material zu ziehen als das Zeugnis des vorromanischen Lateins zu verwerten." This neglect of so important a

⁵ *Archivum Latinitatis Medii Aevi*, VI (1931), p. 140.

period he attributes to the erroneous idea that the texts which actually are extant from the Merovingian Age are purely an artistic product.

In the second chapter (*Zur Geschichte der lat. Deklination*) we have an exceedingly careful, detailed, and well-considered treatment of the phonetic, morphological, and syntactical circumstances through which the six Latin case forms were gradually reduced in Old French and Old Provençal to two, in the other Romance languages to one. A point of particular interest to classicists (and indeed to Indo-Europeanists generally) is Norberg's explanation of the use of the form in *-as* in Gallo-Romanic for nominative as well as accusative (Old Prov. *rosas*, Old French *roses*, while nominative *li mur*, e. g., is distinguished from the Obliquus *les murs*). This phenomenon, Norberg thinks, can have nothing to do with a supposed general pressing forward of the Accusative as a Universal Case because otherwise in Gaul the distinction between Nominative and Accusative is strictly maintained. Its origin is rather to be sought in the Italic dialects in which the IE ending *-as* in the nominative plural of the first declension had been preserved. This Oseco-Umbrian provincialism had gained a certain currency in the Roman empire generally and finally in Gaul suppressed altogether the old ending *-ae*.

It would obviously be impossible within the compass of a review even to summarize the content of the remaining fifteen chapters. But it may be said briefly that chapters III-X deal with various special case uses, chapters XI-XIII with the history of deponent and reflexive verbs and certain other voice uses, the next three chapters with the prepositional infinitive, the history of the conjunction *quod*, and the use of adverbs and prepositions as conjunctions, and the final chapter contains an interesting discussion of some types of "contamination" in subordinate clauses.

The essential originality of Norberg's method consists in the fact that he not only clarifies the idioms which he finds in his late Latin texts by setting them against a background of similar uses in earlier Latin authors, especially those that have something of the "volkstümlich" in their style, such as Plautus or Petronius, but also in almost every chapter shows how the particular syntactic usage that he is discussing appears in the Romance languages. His examples are taken most commonly from Old French and Old Provençal, occasionally also from Italian, Spanish, or other Romance dialects. This continuance of the construction in Romance proves, our author believes, that the idiom in question, as it occurs in our late Latin texts, belongs to the living speech. Thus the reader sees not only the rooting of the usage in ancient Latin but also its flowering in Romance.

Of especial interest to the present reviewer is chapter XI (*Zur Geschichte der deponentialen und reflexiven Verben*). The author starts from the perfectly sound premise that Latin "passive" verbal forms had from the beginning middle meaning and that accordingly *nascor*, *morior*, *sequor*, and other deponents are in reality inherited *Media tantum*. The uncertainty in the use of deponents which we find in post-classical writers he attributes to the fact that in popular speech the deponents were gradually disappearing. Active forms of deponent verbs occur (as for example *nascere* and *morire*) and on the other hand new deponents are created on the analogy of those

that were inherited. In fact in latest Latin deponential forms are found from almost any verb you please. This free use of deponents in late Latin authors Norberg considers the reaction of the written language against the loss of deponents in the spoken language.

The misuse of the deponent form was also, according to Norberg, a literary reaction against the extended use in everyday speech of reflexive verbs. As the old middle forms of Latin were replaced in the living language by reflexives, the complex workings of creative analogy brought about many new reflexive constructions in which both the accusative and the dative of the reflexive pronoun function. It is of great interest to note that these new constructions fall into the familiar groupings of the Indo-European middle voice uses—verbs of emotion, of movement, of utterance, of change of condition, etc. Sometimes the reflexive is even added quite pleonastically to a verb that is already middle in form, as in *Kleine Texte zum Alexanderroman*, ed. Pfister, p. 2, 32: *tantum pelles pecorum sibi vestiuntur*.

Good and well-documented as this chapter is, Norberg slips occasionally into the all too common error of considering a verb passive merely because it is in a form which is usually called so. On p. 166, for example, having cited as of special interest the phrase *iuratus se*, occurring in a Lombard document of the year 764, he comments: "Hier steht das Reflexivpronomen einer passivischen Form beigefügt, was ja eigentlich dem Wesen des reflexiven Pronomens ganz widerspricht." But *iuratus* is really not passive even in Classical literature. It commonly means "having sworn." Cf. Plautus, *Rudens*, 1372-73:

Gr. non tu iuratus mihi es?

La. iuratus sum et nunc iurabo siquid voluptati est mihi.

Harpers' Latin Dictionary admits a deponent form of *iuro*. But what we actually have is not so much a deponent verb *iuror* as a survival in Latin in certain instances of the original capacity of the Indo-European participle in *-tos* to be of any voice, active, middle, or passive.

The late Latin idiom that the phrase *iuratus se* illustrates is thus seen to be not the addition of a reflexive pronoun to a passive verb but the use of reflexives with intransitives. An interesting instance of this idiom is cited by Norberg on p. 160 from the *Peregrinatio Aetheriae* 25, 7: *recipit se episcopus et vadent se unusquisque ad hospitium suum*, with the comment: "Offenbar hat hier *recipit se* eingewirkt." No doubt *se recipere* may have had some influence on the use of *se radere* in this particular passage. More important, however, in this and other similar reflexive expressions, which, as Norberg indicates (p. 161), are the precursors of Ital. *andarsi*, *venirsi*, Old French *soi en aler*, *soi venir*, Span. *andarse*, *irse*, *venirse*, is the general tendency of the verbal idea "go" toward the middle voice or the reflexive construction, a tendency which manifests itself from Homeric Greek *γέομαι* to modern Neapolitan *io me ne vag'* "I'm going," *vui ve n'iat'*? "You're going?"

The book is beautifully printed on excellent paper and is remarkably free from misprints. The author writes a fluent and idiomatic German. His dissertation (*In Registrum Gregorii Magni Studia Critica* [Upsala, 1937, 1939]) laid a secure foundation for the present

work, one of the best features of which is a careful regard to questions of textual criticism. It is illuminating to note in how many instances both mediaeval scribes and modern editors have "corrected" interesting late Latin idioms out of existence.

In the almost total eclipse of culture on the European continent in these recent war years, it is gratifying indeed that the Swedish universities have been sponsoring works of such thorough and sound scholarship as the book under review.

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MARIE DELCOURT. *Oedipe ou la légende du conquérant*. Paris, Librairie E. Droz, 1944. Pp. xxiv + 262; 16 figs. (*Bibliothèque de la Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres de l'Université de Liège*, CIV.)

This book is not a philological or literary work, but a study of certain aspects of Greek folklore and mythology. It is rather more comprehensive than might be imagined from its title and, in a way, supplements other works by the same author in the same general field. Its contents may be inferred from the headings of the chapters, of which there are eight. After an introduction of twenty-four pages she discusses in turn: *l'enfant exposé*; *le meutre du père*; *la victoire sur la Sphinx*; *l'énigme*; *le mariage avec la princesse*; *l'union avec la mère*; *les épilogues*; *les mythes et la mémoire*. Three appendices follow, entitled: I. *Légendes et cultes d'enfants jumeaux*; II. *Les contes d'animaux en Grèce*; III. *La valeur religieuse du butin dans les poèmes homériques*.

As to Oedipus, the author states her belief near the beginning (pp. xii f.): "Oedipe n'est ni une figure historique ni un dieu mineur anciennement humanisé. Il est le type même de ces héros d'origine essentiellement — sinon uniquement — rituelle, dont les actes sont antérieurs à la personne."

The Oedipus story, or rather the first part of it, she thinks, originated in a religious rite by which deformed infants, which were supposed to be a danger to the whole people (cf. Laius) were done away with for the safety of the community, for Oedipus was exposed because of a deformity of his feet. That this was done in consequence of an oracle was a later invention. The exposure of the afflicted child was either in a chest cast into the sea as in the case of Perseus, Telephus, and others; or on a mountain like Oedipus. The story of the pierced ankles she thinks absurd, and that the recognition of Oedipus by the scars was an invention of Euripides. She has no proof of this, or that the name Labdacus (which she explains as *boîteaux*) was invented and inserted in the Theban genealogy, the physical defect of the grandson being transferred to the grandfather. In fact in all of this there is much conjecture, which seems to the reviewer to be a weak point in the book. When a child was exposed and survived the ordeal he attained great honor. Oedipus is the only example of a child exposed by his father.

The conflict between Oedipus and Laius, she thinks, was a ritual contest for power between men of two generations, a contest in which

the younger man always triumphs and the vanquished must die; that the idea really goes back to a time when the right of succession was by murder,—a practice which had disappeared in Greece in historical times, but which persisted in Latium in the case of the priest of Nemi, slain by his successor. It was only in later times that parricide was regarded as a crime; and when it occurred father and son were represented as unknown to each other.

Closely associated with this struggle between the men of two generations, she says, was marriage with the princess, who is sometimes the daughter of the king, and sometimes his widow. The contest for her hand might be in the form of a race, as in the case of Oenomaus and Pelops, or some other test. There are various stories in which the hero wins the hand of the princess after performing some feat and so succeeds to the throne. That the widowed queen was the mother of Oedipus was an independent development of later date. No other instance occurs in Greek mythology.

The Sphinx was not a slayer of men but an erotic demon, as were the Sirens, and she may be found so represented in Greek art. The riddle was a later addition to the story, or a substitution to explain the victory of the man over the beast. It appears in folklore in two contexts in the struggle against the monster, and in the winning the hand of the princess. To be successful the hero must know a password, or have the right answer to a question. That an oracle decreed death for the defeated Sphinx was a later addition.

The author points out that there are variants in the Oedipus story, e. g. 1. he rules without loss of sight (Homer and Hesiod); 2. he dies blind (Aeschylus); 3. he blinds himself (the invention of Sophocles or of one of his immediate predecessors). Myths take on variants when the original cause of the story ceases to be understood. They develop from rites, or are invented to instruct. The desire to persuade comes when rites or customs begin to be disregarded.

This summary will give some idea of the book. It is apparent that the author has read extensively, but in her treatment of her material she uses her imagination freely. The very nature of the material, however, makes absolute proof impossible. The book is fully documented.

Misprints are rather numerous where Greek is quoted. Thus on p. 162 $\xi\epsilon\gamma$ should be $\xi\epsilon\epsilon\nu$; p. 162, n. 1 and again p. 184, n. 3 $\Sigma\epsilon\nu$ should be $Z\epsilon\nu$; p. 213 $\bar{\eta}\bar{\delta}\nu$ should be $\bar{\eta}\bar{\delta}\nu$; p. 213 $\text{Bo}\omega\tau\omega\iota$ should be $\text{Bo}\omega\tau\omega\iota$; p. 240 $\tau\epsilon\bar{\nu}\chi\epsilon\bar{\epsilon}\sigma\bar{\nu}\lambda$ should be $\tau\epsilon\bar{\nu}\chi\epsilon'\bar{\epsilon}\sigma\bar{\nu}\lambda$; p. 213, n. 1. $\text{Ko}\omega\bar{\nu}$ should be $\text{Ko}\omega\nu$; accents are lacking on $\bar{\sigma}\nu\iota\omega\iota$ p. 162, n. 1; $\bar{\iota}\pi\omega\iota\omega$ p. 213; and $\bar{\alpha}\rho\bar{\alpha}\beta\eta\sigma\epsilon\bar{\delta}\epsilon$ p. 240.

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JEAN HUMBERT. *Syntaxe grecque*. Paris, Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1945. Pp. 396.

This syntax is designed to meet the needs of students of grammar and literature in the Facultés and the upper classes of the Lycées. The lack of a suitable textbook in French, the author feels, has resulted in a weakness on the part of the students which manifests itself sometimes in slavish dependence on formal rules and sometimes

in vagueness caused by the application of principles which are too broad. The present work aims to bring the rules of Greek syntax into line with general principles and to define the categories of usage more precisely. The treatment of the subject is not primarily historical and most of the material is taken from the verse and prose of the fifth and fourth centuries. Attic and Epic usage are often compared, however, and some features of the language are traced backward to Indo-European and forward to the spoken Greek of the present day (e. g., the prepositions).

The eleven chapters into which the book is divided deal with agreement, number, demonstrative pronouns, personal pronouns, voices, moods in independent clauses, tenses, moods in dependent clauses, cases, prepositions and verbal prefixes, negatives. The chapter on demonstratives includes not only the familiar *οὗτος*, *οὐδε*, *ἐκεῖνος*, and *αὐτός*, but also the indefinite *τις*, the poetic *μν* and *νν*, and a detailed treatment of the article. Reflexive pronouns and possessive adjectives are treated in the chapter dealing with personal pronouns. The omission of any treatment of relative pronouns as such, apart from their incidental appearance in relative clauses, must be considered a gap in the work. A short discussion of case-attraction of relative pronouns might also have been helpful, especially in a book which takes special account of the difficulties encountered by young students.

In the treatment of the verb strong emphasis is placed on the predominant rôle of aspect as against relative time, and the subject is developed with equal thoroughness for the indicative and other moods in principal as well as in subordinate clauses. The sections on the imperfect, aorist, and perfect tenses are excellent. That on the future offers more ground for criticism, because of the rather speculative character of the comparison between the Greek future and the corresponding tense in Latin and French (p. 113), and also because of a certain over-indulgence in the dangerous words *subjectif* and *objectif*. The existence of distinctions of aspect in certain futures (*ἔξω*: *σχήσω*, *περιθρέξομαι*: *περιδραμοῦμαι*) is well treated on p. 134, but no mention is made of the similar and better attested distinction between passive futures and middle futures used in a passive sense (Kühner-Gerth, I, pp. 170 f., but more especially pp. 113 ff.). The infinitive is well treated on pp. 142-54, where special attention is given to the element of time in statements, the element of aspect in commands and wishes, and the concurrence of the two factors after *ἐλπίζω*, *όμολογῶ*, *δύνυμι*, etc. On the historical side the treatment of the infinitive is more questionable. On p. 98 it is said that in comparison with the other moods the infinitive is of recent origin and presupposes powers of abstract thought which could exist only among speakers of high intellectual development. Reasoning of this kind is seldom safe. The real innovation, I believe, consists not in the fact that Greek has infinitives, but in the fact that these infinitives show morphological distinctions of tense and voice. Infinitives as mere names of action exist in nearly all Indo-European languages, regardless of the cultural level of the speakers or of their capacity or incapacity for abstract thought.

In the syntax of the cases there is much to praise and little to censure, though here also I object to the distinction of "abstract"

and "concrete" usages as a ground on which to explain the late development or early disappearance of certain case-forms (pp. 237 f.). The descriptive side of case-syntax is handled with good judgment and thoroughness, and there are no important omissions except perhaps the lack of sections on the genitive and dative with compound verbs ($\epsilon\xi\epsilon\lambda\alpha\nu\tau\alpha\tau\eta\gamma\eta\tau$, $\epsilon\pi\beta\sigma\eta\lambda\epsilon\eta\tau\alpha\tau\eta\tau$, etc.). Some of these constructions appear incidentally along with closely related types, but the half-chapter on verbal prefixes is concerned with the semasiology of these prefixes and not with their case-regimen.

The final chapter, on the negatives $\sigma\bar{o}$ and $\mu\bar{n}$, is thorough, orderly, and very valuable.

The author has wisely followed the practice of glossing all the passages quoted as examples of usage, and the translations are accurate and well adapted to their purpose of helping to illustrate the points under discussion. It is regrettable that as much cannot be said with regard to accuracy in citing passages by chapter and paragraph, but unfortunately it seems difficult to abstain from serious criticism on this matter. On p. 49 Plat. Theaet. 174 A should be cited as 173 C; on p. 96 in § 143 the missing cross-reference is to § 326; on p. 122 the reference to Kühner-Gerth should read I., p. 157 instead of II., p. 157; on p. 135 the passage from Ar. Lys. is 634; on p. 191 Dem. 18, 24 should be cited as 18, 64; on p. 207 Xen. Cyr. should be cited as Xen. Cyn.; on p. 219 Plat. Ap. 32 B should be cited as 22 B; on p. 231 the cross-reference should be to § 278 rather than to § 268; on p. 247 Dem. 318, 8 should be cited as 18, 258; on p. 278 Ψ 635 should be cited as Ψ 677; on p. 280 in the remark Plaut. Asin. 530 should be cited as 830; on p. 285 Lyc. 104 B should be cited as Plat. Menex. 241 B (see Kühner-Gerth I., p. 443); on p. 286 O 34 should be cited as o 34; on p. 304 Dém. 238, 12 $\delta\epsilon\pi\tau\alpha\tau\eta\eta$ should be cited as Dém. 18, 38 $\delta\epsilon\pi\tau\alpha\tau\eta\eta$; on p. 314 Plat. Theaet. 173 B should be cited as 173 D; on p. 315 in § 471 the cross-reference to § 441 should be to § 442; on p. 323 Plat. Phaed. 98 C should be cited as 66 E; on p. 328 A 110 should be cited as A 214; on p. 333 Dem. 278, 23 should be cited as 18, 154; on p. 359 the passage from Demosthenes is 42, 23. On p. 79 read $\pi\epsilon\pi\tau\alpha\kappa\tau\alpha$ for $\pi\epsilon\tau\alpha\kappa\tau\alpha$; on p. 158 in Dem. 18, 176 read $\epsilon\phi\epsilon\sigma\tau\eta\kappa\tau\alpha$ for $\dot{\alpha}\phi\epsilon\sigma\tau\eta\kappa\tau\alpha$; on p. 168 read $\dot{\alpha}\pi\kappa\tau\alpha\tau\alpha\delta\eta$ for $\dot{\alpha}\pi\kappa\tau\alpha\tau\alpha\delta\eta$; on p. 173 in Xen. Cyr. 2, 4, 15 $\dot{\alpha}\tau\iota$ is probably corrupt; on p. 187 Xen. An. 7, 6, 31 should be cited as 7, 6, 43 with $\dot{\alpha}\pi\theta\alpha\eta\tau\alpha\tau\alpha$ for $\dot{\alpha}\pi\theta\alpha\eta\tau\alpha\tau\alpha$; on p. 247 in Aesch. Ag. 814 read accus. $\phi\theta\alpha\eta\tau\alpha$ for gen. $\phi\theta\alpha\eta\tau\alpha$; on p. 302 in § 442 read: $\epsilon\xi$ *devant voyelle et è* *devant consonne*; on p. 209 in § 437 the dialectal distribution, according to Buck, *Greek Dialects*, § 135.4, should be: $\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ (or equivalent forms with extension - ς) in Attic-Ionic, Lesbian, Doric; $\epsilon\nu$ (ν) with accusative of goal in Arcado-Cyprian, Thessalian, Boeotian, and Northwest Greek. For sporadic examples in Doric see Thumb-Kieckers, *Griechische Dialekte*, I, pp. 108, 142, 182.

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PAULA PHILIPPSON. *Thessalische Mythologie*. Zürich, Rhein-Verlag, 1944. Pp. 195; 1 plate; 1 map.

Miss Philippson stresses the importance of Thessaly in the history of Greece, for it was in Thessaly that Greek invaders first settled and mingled with the Aegean aborigines. The union of the two peoples brought Hellas into being and the Hellenic view of the world as manifested in myth and cult. Hence, she believes, many features of historic Greek mythology and religion have a Thessalian origin. In her task of revealing Thessalian origins in the second millennium B. C. she necessarily relies upon the literature and coins of historic times and must, not always convincingly, distinguish earlier from later traditions.

She finds that the Earth-goddess and her male consort were of supreme importance in prehistoric Thessaly. This goddess was still to be seen in Pherae in historic times under the name of Pheraea, who was sometimes identified with Hecate. As her worship spread southwards she was given different names: Demeter, Hera, Artemis; and these names developed into distinct goddesses. Likewise, her original consort, named Posidan, i. e. Earth's husband (known also as *Gaieochos*), became not only Poseidon, but also Zeus, Hades, Cronus, Hermes, Asclepius, Chiron, Peleus, and Admetus.

In developing her argument Miss Philippson gathers material from many sources and in a number of details shows genuine insight. But one remains sceptical about her main conclusions. What can one say about her many identifications of divine beings? She may be right, but the chain of argument is extremely weak in places. And when she says (p. 41) that Zeus Hypatus, Thyechous, and Poseidon-Erechtheus were one and the same, the reader wonders why these deities were distinguished in the Athenian worship of the fifth century B. C.

Her etymologies are very dangerous. She revives the ancient interpretation of Demeter as Earth-mother and holds that *Da* = *Gaia*. So far as I know, this etymology is no longer accepted. And if *Da* cannot be *Gaia*, then Posidan cannot be Earth's husband. Moreover, could the compound have been formed in this way, even if we suppose that she is right about the two elements in it? Would it not be *Daposis*, a *tatpuruṣa* compound? I cannot think of an example in which the dependent element is final. *Philadelphos* might be cited, but it can be interpreted as a *bahuṛihi* compound, "whose sister is beloved." It is amusing to reflect that while Miss Philippson can get "Earth's husband" out of *Posidan*, A. B. Cook finds that it means "Lord Zeus."

There are some misinterpretations of Greek sentences. Pausanias, VIII, 2, 3, ὁ μὲν (Κέκρωψ) γὰρ Δία τε ὄνομασεν "Υπατον πρῶτον, is translated (p. 41), "Der aber hat Zeus als erster Hypatos benannt." But *γάρ* cannot mean *aber*, only *denn*. A few lines later she speaks of "Hypatos, den Kekrops zuerst 'Zeus' nannte," and adds that Pausanias' words can also be understood in this way, citing Eusebius, *Praep. Evang.*, X, 9, 22. But it seems to me that context and word order demand her first interpretation, except her *aber*, and that neither ancient nor modern reader or hearer could understand it otherwise.

Later (p. 75) she quotes Hesychius, *s. v. Φεραία*· 'Αθήνησι ξενικὸς θεός· οἱ δὲ τὴν Ἐκάτην, and translates, "Pheraia: in Athen (ist sie) eine ausländische (fremde) Göttin; denn diese (verehren) die Hekate." The second clause is better interpreted, "but some say that she is Hecate." Again the authoress appears to be vague about particles and, like some other scholars, appears to think that any one of them can mean most anything. It is true that sometimes a clause introduced by δέ contains an explanation or corroboration of the preceding clause, often of an emphatic word in it; though δέ in itself has no causal force, but merely sets off its sentence or clause as a different thought. But the δέ clause above is certainly not of that type, which would not be elliptical or introduced by οἱ δέ, which in lexicographers and commentators always means another group that has an opinion on the subject in hand.

Concerning a fragment of Heracleides (Mueller, *G. G. M.*, I, 107), ἀναβαίνοντι τῶν πολιτῶν οἱ ἐπιφανέστατοι . . . ἐπιλεχθέντες ἐπὶ τοῦ ἵερέως, she makes the statement, "Jünglinge sind vom opferweinenden Priester . . . ausgesucht." But the sentence must mean that the men, however selected (probably by the citizens), went up to the priest.

The authoress is inclined to recur to the language of German idealism, to such statements as "Jede Offenbarung ist der Einbruch zeitlosen Sinns in einen zeitlichen Ablauf, innerhalb dessen sich dies Sein expliziert (p. 62)." And there is much about the eternal and ideal, about entelechy, *Weltanschauung*, and the like. She also tends to use the terms "mythology" and "religion" interchangeably. Though her title is *Thessalische Mythologie*, she deals with cult as well. But though myth bears an obvious relation to religion, since both are concerned with the gods, it is a mistake to suppose that the myths embody beliefs about the gods or constitute a theology. Rather, myth's attitude toward the gods is very different from religion's; one can say that much mythology serves as an outlet for men's unconscious hostility toward the gods. We have two sets of phenomena before us that must not be confused.

The book contains a plate of coins and a map, but lacks an index.

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BERTIL AXELSON. Textkritisches zu Florus, Minucius Felix und Arnobius. Lund, Gleerup, 1944. Pp. 68. (*K. Humanistiska Vetenskapssamfundets I Lund Arsberättelse*, 1944-1945, no. I.)

Axelson is already well known as a careful Latinist of the school of Löfstedt and it is a pleasure to welcome his work again on the American scene.¹ The present fascicle contains what would once have been described as *coniectanea* but actually deserves the title it bears,

¹ During the war years he has published among others the following articles which are known to the reviewer: "Einschränkendes *tamquam*," *Eranos*, XLII (1944), pp. 2-56; "Eine Ovidische Echtheitsfrage," *ibid.*, XLIII (1945), pp. 23-35.

and if it is something less than as brilliant as some of the productions bearing the former title that defect of virtuosity is more than compensated by a solid critical approach and a rational procedure. The emendation of Arnobius, III, 31 (p. 53) will serve as one example of Axelson's procedure. The text of Marchesi:²

quodsi accipit res fidem, nulla est ergo Metis filia, nulla Victoria est, nulla Iovis elata de cerebro, inventrix oleae, nulla magisteriis artium et disciplinarum varietatibus erudita

is made to read

nulla est ergo Metis filia, nulla Victoria est, nulla Iovis enata de cerebro, inventrix oleae nulla, nulla magisteriis artium et disciplinarum varietatibus erudita.

The emendation begins with a change of the MS *ellata* to *enata*, which is felt to be an improvement *palaeographically* and *linguistically*. The criterion of *style* is applied in a citation of the parallel *Capite Iovis enata* from II, 70. The *sense* of the passage is consulted in modifying the punctuation so that *Iovis enata de cerebro* is no longer a qualifier of *inventrix oleae*. Finally the *metrical* superiority of *enata de cerebro* over *inventrix oleae* is offered in support of all other considerations. Thus the forces of *palaeography*, *linguistics*, *stylistics*, and *metries* are marshaled under the command of *sense* and it remains only to test the result by "critical judgment." The reviewer is of the opinion that the addition of *nulla* is somewhat arbitrary, *enata* is possible, and the punctuation is a definite improvement.

As an introduction to the seventeen passages of *Florus* which are subjected to criticism, a brief introduction to the MS tradition is sketched.³ The observation that the testimony of Iordanes (one member of the A class), when it is in agreement with the C class, should be considered as decisive in matters where B (the other member of the A class) is demonstrably subject to error (p. 14), is most just.

I should regard *hostibus suis morte sua commortui* (I, 13, 7) as a piece of preciousity to be expected of *Florus* and comparable to Gorgias' ἀθάνατος ἐν ἀσωμάτωσι σώμασι ξῆ οὐ ζόντων, and an emendation *morte s<e>va* (p. 3) as unnecessary and improbable since *saevus* is a word never used by *Florus* in the positive degree. On the other hand the supplement (p. 3) *orationis antiquae, <set> satis efficax ad concordiam fabula* (I, 17 [23] 1) not only improves the sense of the passage by making the first two words descriptive rather than possessive, but is supported by a third parallel (II, 13, 50 *cruenta [vox], sed docta et ad victoriam efficax*) in addition to the two already cited. *Florus* delights in the sound of his own phrases and seldom allows one to drop without repeating it. A prime example of this propensity is his use of *non* (or *nec*) *contentus*, which he repeats fourteen times. Thus the defense (p. 8) of Malcovati's reading *non* with C (II, 8, 3) is fully justified as a fifteenth example. Similarly,

² Turin, 1934.

³ Axelson had previously made a number of contributions to the criticism of the *Florus* text in his lengthy review of Malcovati's edition in *Gnomon*, XVII (1941), pp. 266-77.

the sense restored by reading *nisi ne <inultus> periret* (II, 18, 9) is recommended by *nec inultus occubuit* (I, 38, 18) in addition to the closer parallel cited (p. 12). Conversely the lack of any possible parallel for the MS reading *Romana vis* (I, 45, 14) recommended by Borneque,⁴ adopted by Malcovati, and here (p. 6) defended, militates against the possibility of the correctness of this text. This striking phrase appears nowhere else in Florus and *vis* cannot be found in this sense (might? Axelson translates "Heer"). *Punici belli vis* (I, 22, 9) is something quite different.

The defense of *vilisque mortis* (MS B, I, 22, 35, p. 4) as genitive of quality and of *hoc, et sub oculis* (MS N, II, 17, 8, p. 11) so punctuated, should be accepted. A change of punctuation (*ludibundos, plerosque qui*, I, 26, 1) neatly corrects a misconception (p. 5).

Malcovati should have affixed the obel at II, 9, 3 but the slight change involved in *primum leve et modicum, tumultu maiore quam bello* (p. 9) gives us readable Latin. Another much vexed passage, *unde et nata Livio Druso aemulatio accesserat* (II, 5, 4) can hardly be regarded as healed by the acceptance of Mommsen's deletion of the name and the change to *incesserat* (p. 6) even if the resulting pleonasm can be justified.

Axelson charges (pp. 13 f.) the editors of Florus with an excess of devotion to the principle of the *lectio difficilior* and convincingly defends the *quibusdam salmacidis fluvius infestior* (II, 20, 8) of class C. To substitute *quadam* in *quidam forte quasi docta* (II, 20, 6) is less convincing since *fors* is not so used by Florus.

Manifestusque voltu fuisse, quasi . . . vellet (II, 13, 83) is still somewhat strange Latin, but as explained (p. 10) it is intelligible, and rids us of an intolerable *ita*.

I see no justification whatsoever for emending (p. 6) *cum to ut* (I, 34, 4) since it can be understood as circumstantial rather than concessive. Forster⁵ translates: "When they offered to withdraw from all participation in the war" and thus meets all of Axelson's objections.

Four passages of the "Vergilius Orator an Poeta" are next taken under consideration. At 183, 14 f. (Rossbach's page and line)⁶ Axelson would insert Halm's *ille* as necessary to the sense but places it, *metri gratia*, behind *tune*. Also at 183, 17 he rescues the MS *Africæ corona attingeret* on the basis of the equivalence of *attingeret* to *contingeret*. The defense of the MS *ille-gentium populus* is not at all convincing. I cannot see how it is in any way parallel to the phrase *rex regium*. Rossbach's conjecture of *ad quae* for *atque* at 184, 11 is defended on the basis of the infrequency of introductory *atque*, and *actus tibi* (184, 14) is suggested instead of *tui* to make it possible to understand *actus* as action rather than charge. I regard as especially clever the supplement *semper in templis otiosum <sem>per reginae deae sistra pulsantem* for *peregrinae deae* (185, 3).

⁴ *Les Clauses Métriques Latines* (Lille, 1907), p. 342.

⁵ E. S. Forster, *Lucius Annaeus Florus Epitome of Roman History* (Loeb Classical Library, 1924).

⁶ It would be well now to cite this work according to Malcovati's paragraphs. Also for the Epitome a citation on the basis of the four book division, regardless of the authenticity of this division, makes reference easier since the divisions are smaller and Arabic numerals are used for paragraphs.

Seventeen passages of Minucius Felix are subjected to criticism. In this case the fact that we must rely upon a unique MS throws the critic back upon the resources of style and subjective analysis.⁷ In five passages (13, 2; 17, 7; 19, 4; 31, 5; 37, 7) the sense is markedly improved by repunctuation, usually resulting also in an improved rhythm. The MS reading is defended in four passages (*sicut ostenderant* 7, 3; *order* 18, 10; *eo* 19, 4; *gaudere* 40, 4). It is difficult to see in 7, 3 how *ostenderant* can be made to bear the sense of *monuerant*. New readings are offered as follows: *ut <non> ipsius* 4, 4; *is[d]em* 19, 4; *agnita* for *ignita* 23, 7; *vindice* for *iudice* 5, 8; *si* for *sed* 34, 10; *qui* for *quae* 36, 5; *intrepidus* for *inridens* 37, 1; *error* for *mors* 37, 7; and *nec* for *ut* 40, 1. These are for the most part felicitous and based on sound reasoning. In 29, 8 *pura mente* is explained as meaning *sola mente* and in 26, 8 *iam* is defended but transferred to precede *perdit*. Especially acute is the reading *quod nec <c>a<r>itas pati mollior nec cogi servitus durior* (28, 10) where *caritas* takes the place of an *aetas*, the inappropriateness of which as the antithesis of *servitus* no one seems previously to have felt.

The twenty-two passages from Arnobius which are here discussed represent suggestions already put forward by the author.⁸ These suggestions are here given a fuller justification than was possible in the original note. In six passages the MS tradition is defended: *satis clausis* 1, 62; *saltitare et cantare* 2, 42; *alitem, taurum* 4, 26; *et iacit* 5, 21; *omni festinatione* 7, 46; *erexit* 7, 51. One deletion is made (*se* 1, 15) and the punctuation is once changed (*forma, corporalis nulla* 1, 31). The other suggestions involve for the most part the modification of a single word (*faciat* for *faciamus* 1, 41; *novit* for *noluit* 1, 60; *peius* for *prius* 2, 44; *inviolabili* for *memorabili* 2, 73; *nostris* for *vestris* 3, 2; *tam existimare* for *existimare* 3, 11; *absolvi* for *ablui* 4, 24; *prolibus* for *fluoribus* 5, 14; *accedit* for *accedens* 5, 21; *nobis* for *vobis* 5, 24; *significari* for *significare* 5, 40; and *ita <ae>que* for *ita <quo>que* 6, 4. At 1, 51 in a discussion of Juppiter the tradition presents the text *dialem, quod eius est, flaminem isto iure donavit?* To read *qui d<omesticus> eius* seems a bit bold, to say the least. *Quod Iovis* seems not to have been previously suggested but is surely safer, if rhythmically inferior.

To discuss the merits of all these emendations would obviously be beyond the scope of a review, and even the mention of all of them would be idle if European publications were not still so inaccessible.

In general one may say that Axelson's criticisms show a balanced judgment, a keen interpreter's eye, and an unusual mastery of his authors. The whole work is certainly well above the average for such compilations.

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⁷ Axelson has recently published another study dealing with this author: "Das Prioritätsproblem Tertullian-Minucius Felix," *Publ. of the New Soc. of Letters at Lund*, XXVII (1941).

⁸ *Eranos*, XL (1940), pp. 182 f.

HOLGER STEN. *Les particularités de la langue portugaise.* Copenhagen, Einar Munksgaard, 1944. Pp. 77. (*Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague*, II.)

Holger Sten, the author of this monograph, belongs to a group of contemporary Danish linguists who have inaugurated *Acta Linguistica*, an international review devoted to structural linguistics and the *Bulletin du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague*, of which some six numbers have already appeared. It is inspiring to see that the notable work of such famous scholars as Jespersen and Nyrop is being continued by an able group of their compatriots. The quality and variety of these works should serve as an inspiration to linguistic scholars in other countries, where scholarly activities have declined during the last years. Among the best known of these younger Danish scholars are Louis Hjelmslev, author of *Principes de grammaire générale* and one of the editors of *Acta Linguistica*, Louis Hammerich, who published *Indledning til tysk Grammatik* in 1935, and P. J. Jensen, whose *Det latinske Perfectsystem* appeared in 1941.

The present volume by Sten has been published through the aid of a subvention furnished by the Department of Labor of the Danish government. The subject of this book is particularly timely, since the interest in the study of the Portuguese language has been growing rapidly during the last years. This is due in no small part to the desire of many Americans to know more about Brazil and to learn the language of that country with which they hope to establish closer contacts. In fact it is only recently that many Americans realized that the language of Brazil was Portuguese and not Spanish. The title chosen by Sten for his monograph clearly indicates the aims of his study, which he summarizes on page 21, where he states that he desires merely to present the characteristics of the Portuguese language and discuss them without any prejudice.

It seems to me an excellent idea to construct an outline of the striking traits of a language comparatively little known and then to compare the language with other related languages much better known, such as the French and the Spanish.

Before beginning to treat specifically the particular characteristics of the Portuguese language, which serve to distinguish it from all the other Romance languages, the author devotes seventeen pages to what he calls "Remarques Générales." This introduction which comprises about one fifth of the entire work deals with diachronic linguistics as contrasted with synchronic linguistics or the theories of the "matérialistes" and the "structuralistes." This part seems to be rather inappropriately prefixed to the body of the work, although the author refers to these opposing theories during the subsequent chapters. This introduction might well have been accorded less space and some of the later chapters could have then been developed, as I shall show later.

In his first chapter entitled "Phonétique (et Phonologie)" the author points out the richness and complexity of the Portuguese sounds and notes that they have until now received little study on the part of foreign scholars. It was the Portuguese savant Sá Nogueira who stated that the language has thirty-six vowels (not counting nasals and diphthongs), whereas Gonçalves Vianna in his

Essai has included only eleven vowels in his table. This shows that the Portuguese themselves are not always in agreement in such matters. Sten then proceeds to demonstrate that the contrasts between open *e* and close *e*, open *o* and close *o* are quite clear, as in *Sé* cathedral and *Sê* be, *avó* grandmother and *avô* grandfather. He finds more difficulty in distinguishing two types of *a* and notes that in Brazil no distinction is observed. He shows that the nasality of the vowels is less marked than in French and concludes that it is on this account that the nasal quality of *i* and *u* has been preserved. He devotes two pages to the treatment of the diphthongs, remarking that the nasal diphthongs are one of the notable characteristics of the language. Very little space has been given to the consonants, where he might well have pointed out the loss of intervocalic *l*, which is certainly a distinctive trait and is conspicuous in the definite article and the contracted forms, such as *dor* (*dolore*), *sair* (*salire*), etc.

Chapter II on Morphology and Syntax is probably the most interesting part of the book. Under nine different headings the author has treated some of the outstanding characteristics of the language. While indicating the different traits he has frequently cited the explanations proposed by various scholars and then modestly added his own preference or at times he has suggested a new original interpretation. It should be stated that he has quoted many examples from the works of numerous Portuguese writers, such as *Eça de Queiroz*, *Castello Branco*, *Julio Diniz*, and *Aquino Ribeiro*. These citations are well chosen and show wide reading and clear observation on the part of the author.

Under Metaphony he refers to the well known scholarly work of *Edwin B. Williams, From Latin to Portuguese*, in which the author states that "metaphony is not an independent phenomenon; it is indissolubly associated with inflection." He gives examples of this important trait of Portuguese inflection, where Latin *ō > o* in words ending in *-o*, whereas *ō > ɔ* when the termination is in *-a*. This is true of adjectives as well as substantives. He admits that there are exceptions like *espôso*, *espôsa*, and *tôdo*, *tôda*, *tôdos*, *tôdas*, for which he finds no adequate explanations. As for the plural of words in *-ão*, Sten merely indicates that the singular has been generalized, while the regularly developed plural forms have remained. This is the generally accepted idea.

In Section 3 *Falei de si, falo consigo*, the *si* after a preposition is used for the tonic pronoun of the second person, which has been frequently replaced by *o senhor*. This well-known trait has been studied by *Meyer-Lübke* and recently by *Spitzer*. Sten does not agree with the latter's explanation, but prefers to think that *si* need not refer to the subject of the sentence any more than *seu*, which can be used without a reflexive meaning.

Sections 5, 6, 7, and 8 deal with tenses of the verb. The author shows that the preterite is used both as a simple past tense and as a perfect and includes many examples to prove his point. To distinguish the latter use he states that the Portuguese employ such adverbs as *agora*, *já*, *ainda* *não*. He does not fail to notice that the language has also a compound past tense, which has a meaning very similar to the simple past, when used as a perfect. *Paiva Boléo* and *Vianna* have said that this compound tense is used to indicate re-

peated action, which continues up to the present. Sten notes that the simple pluperfect of the Latin is still retained in Portuguese which also uses the compound form in order to avoid repetition, but without any difference of meaning.

All students of Portuguese know that one of the outstanding peculiarities of the language is the insertion of the personal object pronoun between the root and the ending in both the future and conditional of the verb. This is one of the conservative traits which have survived from the earlier language, in fact it is found in several of the mediaeval Romance tongues, such as Old Spanish, Old Provençal, and Catalan. If the verb is preceded by another word, however, such as a negative or personal subject pronoun, or if it is used in a dependent clause the object pronoun is usually placed before the verb and is not inserted before the ending. This is particularly true in the spoken language and is characteristic of the Portuguese spoken and written in Brazil, where the subject pronoun is commonly used. Sten does not fail to cite the origin of these forms in the phrases *far-lo-hei* (*facere illud habeo*) and shows how they are survivals of an old construction, which has long since disappeared from most of the Romance languages.

The personal infinitive with inflectional endings is probably the most curious trait of the Portuguese. To explain this phenomenon the author gives three different theories as follows: A) it is derived from the future subjunctive with which it is identical except in the case of strong verbs. In both the first and third singular the forms are exactly the same as the infinitive. This is the theory of Diez and Meyer-Lübke, but was contested by Carolina Michaëlis de Vasconcellos. B) This infinitive is merely a continuation of the imperfect subjunctive of the Latin. C) It is a product of spontaneous evolution of the infinitive to which endings have come to be added to indicate the subject. This is the theory once defended by Mrs. Vasconcellos. More recently the second theory has gained favor and is accepted by Williams and Gamillscheg and was adopted by Mrs. Vasconcellos. Sten does well to call attention to the fact that there is no complete study of the use of the infinitive in Portuguese. Carolina Michaëlis and Zellmer collected much material in Old Portuguese and Franz Sester published in 1929 a study of the infinitive in the works of Eça de Queiroz, but the whole field should be thoroughly covered and investigated. Sten himself cites numerous examples.

In Section 9 (*le "langage-écho"*) the writer shows how the Portuguese prefer to use not a simple adverb, but the repetition of the finite verb in replies to questions. He admits that this is a Latin heritage and that it is common in other languages.

In the third chapter which deals with derivation, the author has seen fit to limit his remarks to the single suffix *-inho*. His remarks on the significance of this suffix are interesting, since he shows how it has lost at times all sense of the diminutive and in the case of *sózinho* has created a word which has replaced the original *só*. One cannot help regretting that the author has not devoted more space to word derivation in general and particularly to the use of other suffixes.

The bibliography which he has appended will be useful, although he might well have omitted such works as Meyer-Lübke and Bourciez. American scholarship should be pleased that he has cited and used the excellent works of Joseph Dunn and Edwin B. Williams on the Portuguese language. He has done well to mention recent studies by Danish linguists, who have contributed to this field of investigation, and the work of Paiva Boléo on the Perfect and Preterite in Portuguese with comparisons with the use in other Romance languages.

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KARL KERÉNYI. *Die Geburt der Helena. Samt humanistischen Schriften aus den Jahren 1943-45.* Zurich, Rhein-Verlag, 1945. Pp. 139. 8 fr. (*Albae Vigiliae, N. F., Heft III.*)

This volume is a collection of nine essays and articles which originally appeared in various periodicals. The subjects, ranging from strictly mythological problems to the question of the future of humanism, may appear somewhat diverse; but the author considers that their aspects are unified by a single basic aim, which is in the direction of a humanism at once wide and profound, the interpretation of the human spirit. Toward this end, classical philology is one means among many others (last essay, on the Concept and Future of Humanism), while mythology is one characteristic means of representing, through concrete images, the deep values of the spirit which cannot be described in explicit or analytical terms. Such a principle, which is most clearly stated in the essay on the spirit ("Geist," p. 36) is Professor Kerényi's main contribution to the study, and is the guiding thought through the essays entitled "Die Geburt der Helena," "Der Geist," "Mysterien der Kabiren," "Die Heiligkeit des Mahles im Altertum," and "Mnemosyne—Lesmosyne." In this light, for instance, the "mysteries" are interpreted as secret not so much because they were kept secure as because they were in their own nature secret, that is, inexpressible, and capable of communication only by being represented in cult (pp. 49-50). It may also be on this principle that Livy (*Praef. 10*), writing admittedly of the legendary and fabulous, is interpreted as one who addressed his work, parable-wise, to the generations of the future (pp. 109-110). Perhaps the same proposition is intended in the last essay, on the Future of Humanism (in terms of Existentialism?), but here the connection is not so evident.

Much that is said in this volume resembles or coincides with what has been said before by others (as, for example, that the nymphs and heroines beloved by gods are manifestations of a single form, the Maiden), but the general effect (aside from contributions in detail) is of originality because the author has evidently reached his conclusions by mulling over the material in his own mind, in his own way. He is not one to force his point by the impact of piled-up evidence, rather seizing and elaborating single clues. Because of this, we may sometimes feel that the argument is unnecessarily personal

and intuitive, and look in vain for expected corroborative passages. In connection with the woman-goddess, beloved of the god, who is represented as a water-fowl (pp. 1-3; 19), would it be superfluous to refer to the birth of Pan to Hermes and *Penelope* (Herodotus, II, 145, 4; cf. Pindar, frag. 90 Bowra)? If Pandora, like Eve, is the *καλὸν κακόν* who brings simultaneously beauty and suffering to mankind (p. 23), would not persuasion be increased through reference to the lovely Delusion formed by Zeus, herself *καλὸν πῆμα*, who bore the monstrous Centaurus to Ixion (Pindar, *Pyth.* II, 35-48)? Even if Pindar has merely transcribed for his temptress the attributes of Hesiod's Pandora, the myth is a variant and the moral is to the point. Perhaps it is now the fashion to cite too much, but more abundant evidence in these essays would take away the impression that we are being asked to consider, not the facts, but the personal beliefs of the author.

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ALFRED P. DORJAHN. Political Forgiveness in Old Athens. The Amnesty of 403 B. C. Evanston, Northwestern University, 1946. Pp. 56. (*Northwestern Univ. Studies in the Humanities*, XIII.)

The monograph under review is largely a refutation of Luebbert's dissertation published in 1881.¹ This refutation is successful but, since the evidence for it is taken for the most part from Aristotle's *Constitution of Athens* which was unknown to Luebbert, one cannot help feeling that Dorjahn has published his essay nearly sixty years too late.

The introduction contains an account of six known amnesties which took place in Athens. Dorjahn should have pointed out that five of these were based on the declaration *τοὺς ἀτίμους ἐπιτίμους εἶναι*, while the sixth (Dorjahn's no. 5), the "amnesty of 403 B. C.," is of an entirely different nature. For it simply forbade the victorious democrats to take undue vengeance on their opponents.

The first chapter deals with the date of this amnesty, which, as Dorjahn correctly stated, "is no longer a debatable question." Plato's passage of the *Menexenus* is mentioned but the equally significant testimony of the seventh letter is not taken into consideration.

The second chapter contains a discussion of the Institution and Ratification of the amnesty. Dorjahn makes here the surprising observations that the Latin equivalent of *ψήφισμα* was *plebiscitum*, that an oath would have been an unnecessary precaution "if the amnesty had been elevated to the status of a decree or a law," and that the amnesty "never became a psephism." Only the last of these statements requires some comment. Solon's amnesty was a *vómos* (the concept of *ψήφισμα* probably did not exist at that time), and four of

¹ The name is misspelled on pp. 41 and 42. The many printed errors in the Greek should be embarrassing to the author, to the publisher, and to the printer.

the remaining five amnesties discussed by Dorjahn were undoubtedly contained in *ψηφίσματα*. The amnesty of 403 B. C. is called by some authors a *ψήφισμα*, by others *ὅρκοι καὶ συνθήκαι* or simply *συνθήκαι*. Anyone familiar with Attic inscriptions would have deduced that the amnesty of 403 B. C. was embodied in a *ψήφισμα*, were it not for the fact that there is some doubt whether a proper *ψήφισμα* could have been passed at that time. I have tried to show that *I. G.*, II², 10 belongs to this very period, and that this decree contains Thrasylus' grant of citizenship to the loyal metics. It seems reasonable to assume that the so-called amnesty was also incorporated in a decree, for in no other way could later authors, among them Aristotle, know the precise provisions which it contained. Dorjahn's statement "oaths accompanied treaties or agreements, but not psephisms and laws" carries as little weight as his claim that the amnesty was "simply an agreement between political parties."

The third chapter is a discussion of the term *μὴ μητρικακεῖν τῶν γεγενημένων*; in this connection, the epigraphical evidence should not have been completely ignored. Dorjahn is able to show that specific provisions were made for the recovery of confiscated property, but it may be doubted whether they should properly be called part of the amnesty. This chapter and chapters IV and V contain a well written analysis of the literary evidence. Students of the Early Attic Orators will do well to consult this careful and for the most part sound monograph.

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